Dr. Cole M. Bunzel on Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab Being Antagonized First
Dr. Cole M. Bunzel is the author of the dissertation entitled, “Manifest Enmity: The Origins, Development, and Persistence of Classical Wahhābism (1153-1351/1741-1932).” This dissertation clearly has no interest in painting a rosy picture of Shaykh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab and the “Wahhabis.” In fact, several critics of the “Wahhabi” movement promote this particular work of his.
Nevertheless, the author does make some interesting remarks demonstrating that hostilities were not necessarily initiated by the “Wahahbis.” I have pasted some excerpts below. Bold emphasis is mine.
As for what should be done about the Najdī, Ibn al-Ṭayyib, like the two scholars who endorsed al-Ṭandatāwī’s refutation, does not mince words: “Jihād against this sinner, and taking action to kill him and relieve all people of his error, are a duty incumbent on all who are able, not to be delayed.”113 Here, then, was another early opponent of Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s who wanted him dead, this once again being before the Wahhābīs had perpetrated violence against other Muslims. (page 58)
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Dr. Cole M. Bunzel spoke about how Shaykh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab was preaching peacefully and successfully in al-Uyayna and neighboring towns in al-Aridh. Then…
Wahhābism’s success at this time was not limited to al-ʿUyayna. According to Ibn Ghannām, the movement had begun to catch on in all the major towns of al-ʿĀriḍ (fa[1]fashā ʾl-dīn fī buldān al-ʿĀriḍ al-maʿrūfa).66 This is likely what made it difficult for Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb to stay where he was. Ibn Ghannām relates that his local enemies wrote to the powerful leader of the Banū Khālid tribe in al-Aḥsāʾ, Sulaymān Āl Muḥammad, warning him that Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb intended to remove him from power and change the way he conducted his affairs, including preventing him from levying of non-canonical taxes (mukūs).67 Whatever the real content of the warning conveyed to Sulaymān, the tribal chief was evidently concerned by the movement that Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb was forming under the protection of Ibn Muʿammar. He ordered Ibn Muʿammar either to kill or expel the troublesome preacher, and Ibn Muʿammar chose the second of these options.68 (page 242)
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During the next two years, he seems to have proceeded in the same non-violent manner as before. This changed around (fī ḥudūd) 1159/1746f, when war broke out between al-Dirʿiyya and Riyadh.71 The ruler of the latter town, Dahhām ibn Dawwās (fl. 1187/1773), had rejected Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s preaching. The war began, Ibn Ghannām tells us, when Dahhām attacked the nearby town of Manfūḥa, whose people had converted to Wahhābism (qad dakhalū fī hādhā ʾl-dīn) and acknowledged Muḥammad ibn Suʿūd as their overlord (wa-lil amīr Muḥammad ibn Suʿūd min al-muttabiʿīn).72 It would appear that as Wahhābism spread among the people of Najd, the various rulers of its towns tendered their allegiance to Ibn Suʿūd. Pledging support to the center of a religious movement growing in popularity would have made sense for these leaders. Their allegiance may have involved little at first, but an attack on one town could be portrayed as an attack on all. In addition to Manfūḥa, al-ʿUyayna appears to have given over to al-Dirʿiyya as well, since it is seen taking part in the early military response to Riyadh.73 The war with Riyadh was to last, with some interruptions, nearly thirty years, coming to an end only in 1187/1773 with the town’s final submission.
Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb maintained that the military operations of al-Dirʿiyya were strictly defensive—that they were, in other words, defensive jihād. In an undated letter to an Iraqi scholar, he writes, in response to a question about why the Wahhābīs are fighting, “To this day we have not fought anybody but to defend ourselves and [our] women. They are the ones who entered our lands and left [us] no choice.”74 Ibn Ghannām similarly states that Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb did not order the use of violence until his enemies excommunicated him and deemed his blood licit: “He gave no order to spill blood or to fight against the majority of the heretics and the misguided until they started ruling that he and his followers were to be killed and excommunicated.”75 True or not, it was the standard Wahhābī claim that the enemies of the movement were the ones who began both the fighting and the takfīr. As Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb says, “they are the ones who started declaring us to be unbelievers and fighting us” (hum alladhīna badaʾūnā biʾltakfīr waʾl-qitāl).76 The takfīr claim is dubious, unless what is meant is that Ibn ʿAbd alWahhāb made only vague accusations of takfīr at the beginning of his mission, while his enemies made specific ones. This is how Ibn Ghannām seems to justify the claim. 77 But the charge that the enemies of Wahhābism, and more specifically Dahhām ibn Dawwās, were the first to engage in warfare is possibly true. The memory of Riyadh’s striking first against al-Dirʿiyya was engrained in Wahhābī tradition. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Ḥasan Āl al-Shaykh describes Dahhām as the first person who launched a military attack on the Wahhābīs (awwal man shanna ghāra ʿalayhim), an unprovoked attack by the strongest town in the region.78 This period of defensive jihād in al-Dirʿiyya can thus be compared to the third stage of the Prophet’s career—open preaching with defensive jihād. (pages 243-245)
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In al-Aḥsāʾ, the Wahhābīs were frequently violent and aggressive, while in the Ḥijāz they tended to show restraint and were even conciliatory at times. The difference seems to owe to the heavy concentration in al-Aḥsāʾ of imāmī Shīʿa, whom the Wahhābīs gave every indication of wishing to annihilate. Such anti-Shīʿī hostility is unsurprising given Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s views on the Shīʿa, namely, that they were the first to bring shirk into the umma (awwal man adkhala ʾl-shirk fī hādhihi ʾl-umma al-rāfiḍa al-malʿūna) 134 and had left the faith (fahāʾulāʾi ʾl-imāmiyya khārijūn ʿan al-sunna bal ʿan al-milla). 135 But in addition to odium theologicum, mundane power politics also played a role. It was the rulers of al-Aḥsāʾ who had pushed Ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb out of al-ʿUyayna and who ordered the invasion of Najd in 1178/1764. They also launched a campaign against al-Dirʿiyya in 1172/1758f. 136 Al-Aḥsāʾ was thus a threat on more than one level; it was also a potential source of revenue as a trading hub and rich date-palm oasis. (page 256)
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By the time of this third mission, the Wahhābīs and the sharīf were engaged militarily. The two sides’ forces first come to blows in 1205/1790f, when Ghālib launched a months-long offensive against Najd.161 According to Daḥlān, this was a preemptive attack aimed at preventing the Wahhābīs from gaining control of the Ḥijāz.162 It was not successful, however, as every year the Wahhābīs seemed to be gaining more followers among the sharīf’s erstwhile tribal allies. In 1210/1795f, Ghālib’s forces were defeated in the desert by the Wahhābīs and several of these tribes.163 (page 263)
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