Gradualism in the Implementation of the Sharī‘a: Principles and Applications
Below is a translation of Ustadh Sharīf Ṭahā’s article, al-Tadarruj fī Taṭbīq al-Sharīʿa: Ḍawābiṭ wa-Taṭbīqāt.
Introduction:
Indeed, Allah, exalted is He, sent the messengers and revealed the scriptures so that people might uphold justice. Allah, exalted is He, said: “We certainly sent Our messengers with clear proofs and sent down with them the Scripture and the Balance so that people may uphold justice” [al-Ḥadīd: 25], meaning: “So that people may act justly among themselves.”[1]
The kitāb (Scripture) is the transmitted and affirmed revelation, and the mīzān (Balance) is: “justice—as stated by Mujāhid, Qatāda, and others,”[2] or “that by which justice is known.”[3] This accords with the view of those who said that the mīzān is that by which things are weighed in this world, as stated by Ibn Zayd and others.[4]
This is similar to Allah’s saying: “It is Allah who has sent down the Book in truth and the Balance” [al-Shūrā: 17]. This indicates that sound analogical reasoning (qiyās) is among that which Allah, exalted is He, has revealed and that which the messengers brought. Thus, in reality, analogy and Scripture do not conflict, for the evidences of truth do not contradict one another.
This sound analogical reasoning is among the greatest causes for the continued relevance of the Islamic Sharī‘a, its applicability to all times and places, and its capacity to address all newly arising events. For the Sharī‘a contains the standards and balances by which we can discern truth from falsehood, distinguish between benefits and harms, and weigh competing interests—foregoing the lesser to secure the greater—as well as weigh conflicting harms—enduring the lesser to ward off the greater.
It is upon these foundations, along with other principles, that the system of siyāsa shar‘iyya (legitimate governance) is built—a system grounded in the kitāb and the mīzān. The Sharī‘a is not to be opposed on the basis of interests,
فإن الشريعة مبناها وأساسها على الحكم ومصالح العباد في المعاش والمعاد، وهي عدل كلها، ورحمة كلها، ومصالح كلها، وحكمة كلها؛ فكل مسألة خرجت عن العدل إلى الجور، وعن الرحمة إلى ضدها، وعن المصلحة إلى المفسدة، وعن الحكمة إلى البعث؛ فليست من الشريعة وإن أدخلت فيها بالتأويل
“for the Sharī‘a is founded upon wisdom and the welfare of people in both this life and the next. It is entirely just, entirely merciful, entirely beneficial, and entirely wise; so any matter that departs from justice to injustice, from mercy to its opposite, from benefit to harm, or from wisdom to absurdity—is not part of the Sharī‘a, even if it is inserted into it by interpretation.”[5]
Ibn al-Qayyim, may Allah have mercy on him, said:
ومن له ذوق في الشريعة، واطلاع على كمالها، وتضمنها لغاية مصالح العباد في المعاش والمعاد، ومجيئها بغاية العدل الذي يسع الخلائق، وأنه لا عدل فوق عدلها، ولا مصلحة فوق ما تضمنته من المصالح؛ تبين له أن السياسة العادلة جزء من أجزائها، وفرع من فروعها، وأن مَن أحاط علمًا بمقاصدها ووضعها مواضعها وحَسُنَ فهمه فيها لم يحتج معها إلى سياسة غيرها البتة
“Whoever has a taste for the Sharī‘a and insight into its perfection, its encompassing of the ultimate interests of people in both this life and the next, and its bringing of the highest form of justice—a justice that accommodates all of creation, such that there is no justice beyond its justice, and no benefit surpassing the benefits it contains—it will become clear to him that just governance (siyāsa ‘ādila) is part of it and a branch of its branches. And whoever is fully aware of its objectives, places each matter in its proper context, and possesses a sound understanding of it, will find no need for any policy beyond it whatsoever.”[6]
This failure to comprehend the expansiveness of the Sharī‘a has been among the causes of the emergence of false political systems, which are put forward to fill the vacuum left by those affiliated with knowledge and jurisprudence—a vacuum resulting from the prevalence of rigidity and blind imitation among most of the later scholars. As a result, the Sharī‘a came to appear incapable of keeping pace with a reality that is rapidly and significantly changing.
This, in turn, became an avenue for altering the revealed laws and replacing the divine Islamic Sharī‘a with man-made legislations imported from Western countries in most parts of the Muslim world. This development has had the gravest consequences for the Muslims. For Allah, exalted is He, has made clear in His Book that ruling by other than what He has revealed is among the foundational forms of disbelief, injustice, iniquity, and hypocrisy—and the verses on this are well-known.
Thus, many Muslims—among scholars, students of knowledge, and reformers—rose up and called for the necessity of adhering to the law of Allah, exalted is He, and establishing His rule.
It is from this context that the importance of the issue of gradualism in the implementation of the Sharī‘a emerged. Neglecting and disregarding this principle has led to numerous harms, many of which have afflicted various Islamic movements. Among the most serious of these was the indiscriminate application of rulings of takfīr upon many governments in the Muslim world, without distinguishing between the general ruling and its application to specific individuals, without considering the fulfillment of conditions and the removal of impediments, and without regard for matters of ability and incapacity or the weighing of benefits and harms.
The absence of these foundational principles in da‘wa efforts, in the enjoining of right and forbidding of wrong, and in striving in the path of Allah has had profoundly negative consequences—not only for the members of these movements themselves but also for their societies and the wider Muslim umma.
Conversely, many of those who have cast off the Sharī‘a have used the claim of gradualism as a pretext to avoid implementing any part of the divine law. They make no effort to prepare an environment conducive to implementation—even when it is indeed unprepared—nor do they take the necessary steps to bring people closer to the Sharī‘a so that justice may be upheld and so that the kitāb and the mīzān may be acted upon.
Hence, this paper, issued by the Salaf Center for Research and Studies, aims to clarify the meaning of gradualism, its categories, and its conditions, along with the relevant evidences and practical applications of this important principle.
First: The Meaning of Gradualism—Linguistically and Technically
Linguistically, gradualism (tadarruj) is derived from daraj, which refers to levels or ranks, each one above the other. A daraja is an elevation in status, and it also refers to a step on a staircase.[7]
Technically, gradualism is the division of a material or non-material task into multiple stages, according to the distance between the starting point and the intended goal and in proportion to the capacity of the agent performing it—such that the completion of each stage serves as a foundation and preparation for the stage that follows until the final objective is reached.[8]
Thus, what is meant by gradualism is the movement from the lower to the higher—but step by step, not in a single leap. This is because many people cannot bear such leaps, and most of them require being elevated gradually, one step at a time.
Second: Types of Gradualism
The First Type: Gradualism in Legislation
What is meant by this is the gradual establishment of laws, the obligation of duties, and the prohibition of forbidden acts.
Indeed, Allah, exalted is He—the All-Wise, the All-Knowing—instituted His legislation for His servants gradually. He first commanded them with tawḥīd and the fundamentals of faith until the tree of Īmān became firmly rooted in their hearts. Only then did the observance of religious duties and laws become easier for them.
ʿĀ’isha, may Allah be pleased with her, said: “The first thing to be revealed was a sūra from Al-Mufaṣṣal in which there is mention of Paradise and the Fire. Then, when people turned to Islam, the lawful and unlawful were revealed. Had the first thing to be revealed been: ‘Do not drink wine,’ they would have said: ‘We will never give up wine.’ And had it said: ‘Do not commit fornication,’ they would have said: ‘We will never give up fornication.’ Indeed, a verse was revealed to Muḥammad in Mecca while I was a young girl playing: ‘Nay, the Hour is their appointed time, and the Hour is more grievous and more bitter’ [al-Qamar: 46]. The sūras of al-Baqara and al-Nisā’ were not revealed until I was with him.”[9]
Thus, the Makkan Qur’ān was mostly devoted to establishing the foundations of faith in Allah and the Last Day, whereas most legal rulings came in the Madinan sūras.
Likewise, the obligation of duties and the prohibition of forbidden acts were introduced gradually:
ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn ʿAbd al-Salām, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 669 AH), mentioned several examples of this, including:
أن الله أخر إيجاب الصلاة إلى ليلة الإسراء لأنه لو أوجبها في ابتداء الإسلام لنفروا من ثقلها عليهم
المثال الثاني: الصيام، لو وجب في ابتداء الإسلام لنفروا من الدخول في الإسلام
المثال الثالث: تأخير وجوب الزكاة إلى ما بعد الهجرة لأنها لو وجبت في الابتداء لكان إيجابها أشد تنفيرا لغلبة الضنة بالأموال
المثال الرابع: الجهاد، لو وجب في الابتداء لأباد الكفرة أهل الإسلام؛ لقلة المؤمنين وكثرة الكافرين
المثال الخامس: القتال في الشهر الحرام لو أجّل في ابتداء الإسلام لنفروا منه لشدة استعظامهم لذلك، وكذلك القتال في البلد الحرام
المثال السادس: القصر على أربع نسوة، لو ثبت في ابتداء الإسلام لنفرت الكفار من الدخول فيه، وكذلك القصر على ثلاث طلقات؛ فتأخرت هذه الواجبات تأليفا على الإسلام الذي هو أفضل من كل واجب، ومصلحته تربو على جميع المصالح
“That Allah delayed the obligation of prayer until the Night of the Ascension (al-Isrā’), for had it been made obligatory at the very beginning of Islam, people would have been repelled by its difficulty.
Second example: Fasting—had it been obligatory at the beginning of Islam, it would have deterred people from entering the religion.
Third example: Zakāt was only made obligatory after the Hijra because had it been required from the outset, it would have been even more off-putting, given people’s strong attachment to their wealth.
Fourth example: Jihad—had it been made obligatory at the start, the disbelievers would have annihilated the Muslims due to the latter’s small numbers and the former’s overwhelming strength.
Fifth example: Fighting in the sacred month—had it been delayed at the beginning of Islam, people would have been repelled by it due to their deep veneration of that month, and the same applies to fighting in the sacred precinct (ḥaram).
Sixth example: Limiting marriage to four wives—had this restriction been imposed at the beginning of Islam, the disbelievers would have been driven away from entering it. The same goes for limiting divorce to three pronouncements. Thus, these obligations were postponed out of consideration for winning people over to Islam—which is greater than all other obligations and whose benefit surpasses all other benefits.”[10]
Ibn al-Qayyim, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 751 AH), said:
ولما كان فطم النفوس عن مألوفاتها وشهواتها من أشق الأمور وأصعبها تأخر فرضه [أي: الصوم] إلى وسط الإسلام بعد الهجرة، لمَّا توطنت النفوسُ على التوحيد والصلاة، وألِفَتْ أوامرَ القرآن، فَنُقِلَتْ إليه بالتدريج… وفُرِضَ أولًا على وجه التخيير بينه وبين أن يُطْعِمَ عن كل يوم مسكينًا، ثم نُقِل من ذلك التخيير إلى تحتم الصوم
“Since weaning the soul from what it is accustomed to and from its desires is among the most difficult and demanding matters, the obligation of fasting was delayed until the middle period of Islam, after the Hijra, once the souls had become firmly grounded in tawḥīd and prayer, and had grown familiar with the commands of the Qur’ān. It was then introduced gradually. It was initially legislated as a choice between fasting or feeding a poor person for each day—then that choice was replaced with the definitive obligation to fast.”[11]
Among the examples of gradualism is also the gradual prohibition of wine:
Its prohibition was delayed until after the Hijra. Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 728 AH), said:
فإن الخمر حُرِّمت سنة ثلاث بعد أحُد باتفاق الناس
“Wine was prohibited in the third year after Uḥud, by agreement of the scholars.”[12]
Al-Qurṭubī, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 671 AH), said:
تحريم الخمر كان بتدريج ونوازل كثيرة، فإنهم كانوا مولعين بشربها، وأول ما نزل في شأنها: ﴿يَسۡـَٔلُونَكَ عَنِ ٱلۡخَمۡرِ وَٱلۡمَيۡسِرِۖ قُلۡ فِيهِمَآ إِثۡم كَبِير وَمَنَٰفِعُ لِلنَّاسِ﴾ [البقرة: 219] أي: في تجارتهم، فلما نزلت هذه الآية تركها بعضُ الناس وقالوا: لا حاجة لنا فيما فيه إثم كبير، ولم يتركها بعض الناس وقالوا: نأخذ منفعتها ونترك إثمها، فنزلت هذه الآية: ﴿لَا تَقۡرَبُواْ ٱلصَّلَوٰةَ وَأَنتُمۡ سُكَٰرَىٰ﴾ [النساء: 43] فتركها بعض الناس وقالوا: لا حاجة لنا فيما يشغلنا عن الصلاة، وشربها بعض الناس في غير أوقات الصلاة حتى نزلت: ﴿يَٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُوٓاْ إِنَّمَا ٱلۡخَمۡرُ وَٱلۡمَيۡسِرُ وَٱلۡأَنصَابُ وَٱلۡأَزۡلَٰمُ رِجۡس مِّنۡ عَمَلِ ٱلشَّيۡطَٰنِ فَٱجۡتَنِبُوهُ لَعَلَّكُمۡ تُفۡلِحُونَ﴾ [المائدة: 90] فصارت حرامًا عليهم
“The prohibition of wine occurred gradually, through numerous revelations, for they had been deeply attached to drinking it. The first verse revealed concerning it was: ‘They ask you about wine and gambling. Say: In them is great sin and [some] benefit for people’ [al-Baqara: 219]—that is, in terms of trade. When this verse was revealed, some people gave it up, saying: ‘We have no need for that which contains great sin.’ Others did not abandon it, saying: ‘We will take its benefit and avoid its sin.’ Then the verse was revealed: ‘Do not approach prayer while you are intoxicated’ [al-Nisā’: 43], so some people gave it up and said: ‘We have no need for that which distracts us from prayer.’ Others continued to drink it outside the times of prayer until the verse was revealed: ‘O you who believe, indeed wine, gambling, [sacrificing on] stone altars, and divining arrows are but defilement from the work of Satan, so avoid it that you may succeed’ [al-Mā’ida: 90]. It was then that wine became definitively prohibited for them.”[13]
The scholars had reached a consensus that wine was permissible before its prohibition and that the Companions used to drink it before the revelation forbidding it, as indicated by numerous ḥadīths. Among them is the authentic report from ʿAlī, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: “ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAwf prepared some food for us, invited us, and served us wine. The wine affected us, and when the time for prayer came, they put me forward to lead them. I recited: ‘Say: O disbelievers! I do not worship what you worship… and we worship what you worship’, so Allah revealed: ‘O you who believe, do not approach the prayer while you are intoxicated until you know what you are saying’ [al-Nisā’: 43].”[14]
And from Anas, may Allah be pleased with him, who said: “I was serving wine to the people on the day wine was prohibited, in the house of Abū Ṭalḥa, and their drink was nothing but faḍīkh—a mixture of unripe and ripe dates. Then a caller called out, and he [Abū Ṭalḥa] said: ‘Go out and see.’ I went out, and a caller announced: ‘Verily, wine has been prohibited.’ So it flowed through the streets of Madīna.”[15]
Al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Ḥajar, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 852 AH), said:
استُدِلَّ بهذا الحديث على أنّ شرب الخمر كان مباحًا لا إلى نهاية، ثم حرِّمت، وقيل: كان المباح الشربَ لا السكر المزيل للعقل، وحكاه أبو نصر بن القشيري في تفسيره عن القفال ونازعه فيه، وبالغ النووي في شرح مسلم فقال: ما يقوله بعض من لا تحصيل عنده أن السكر لم يزل محرمًا باطلٌ لا أصل له، وقد قال الله تعالى: {لَا تَقْرَبُوا الصَّلَاةَ وَأَنْتُمْ سُكَارَى حَتَّى تَعْلَمُوا مَا تَقُولُونَ} [النساء: 43] فإنّ مقتضاه وجود السكر حتى يصل إلى الحد المذكور، ونُهُوا عن الصلاة في تلك الحالة لا في غيرها، فدل على أنّ ذلك كان واقعًا… وعلى هذا فهل كانت مباحة بالأصل أو بالشرع ثم نسخت؟ فيه قولان للعلماء، والراجح الأول
“This ḥadīth is evidence that drinking wine was originally permitted without any time limit, and then it was prohibited. Some have said that what was permitted was drinking without intoxication, which impairs the mind. This view was reported by Abū Naṣr al-Qushayrī in his tafsīr from al-Qaffāl, who was disputed on this. Al-Nawawī strongly refuted this claim in his commentary on Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, saying: ‘What is claimed by some who lack sound knowledge—that intoxication was always prohibited—is false and has no basis. Allah said: “Do not approach the prayer while you are intoxicated until you know what you are saying” [al-Nisā’: 43], which indicates the actual occurrence of intoxication and that the prohibition was limited to praying in that state, not outside of it. This proves that it was indeed practiced…As for whether it was originally permitted by default or by divine sanction and then abrogated—the scholars have two views, and the stronger opinion is the former.”[16]
The eminent scholar al-Shanqīṭī preferred the view that the permissibility of wine was legal, and he cited as evidence the statement of Allah, exalted is He: “And from the fruits of the palm trees and grapevines you take intoxicants and good provision” [al-Naḥl: 67]. He said:
لأن إباحة الخمر قبل التحريم دلت عليها هذه الآية الكريمة، وما دلت على إباحته آية من كتاب الله لا يصح أن يقال: إن إباحته عقلية، بل هي إباحة شرعية منصوصة في كتاب الله، فرفعها نسخ
“Because this noble verse indicates the permissibility of wine prior to its prohibition. And whatever a verse from the Book of Allah indicates as permissible cannot be said to have been merely a rational allowance; rather, it is a legal permission explicitly stated in the Book of Allah, and its abrogation constitutes a case of naskh (legal repeal).”[17]
Regardless of which view one adopts, the prohibition of wine following its prior permissibility—whether rational or legal—falls under the principle of gradualism in presenting legal rulings. This was particularly the case with matters to which people had become accustomed and which were difficult for them to abandon all at once. Gradual prohibition was thus in harmony with divine wisdom.
Another example of this is the gradual prohibition of ribā (usury):
ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, may Allah be pleased with him, said: “The last verse to be revealed was the verse on ribā.”[18] And Ibn ʿAbbās, may Allah be pleased with him, said: “The last verse revealed to the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, was the verse on ribā.”[19] Both of them were referring to Allah’s statement: “O you who believe, fear Allah and give up what remains of ribā, if you are indeed believers” [al-Baqara: 278].
Al-Ḥāfiẓ Ibn Ḥajar, may Allah have mercy on him, said:
المراد بالآخرية في الربا تأخر نزول الآيات المتعلقة به من سورة البقرة، وأمّا حكم تحريم الربا فنزوله سابق لذلك بمدة طويلة، على ما يدل عليه قوله تعالى في آل عمران في أثناء قصة أحد: ﴿يَٰٓأَيُّهَا ٱلَّذِينَ ءَامَنُواْ لَا تَأۡكُلُواْ ٱلرِّبَوٰٓاْ أَضۡعَٰفا مُّضَٰعَفَة﴾ [آل عمران: 130]
“What is meant by ‘the last’ in the context of ribā is the delay in the revelation of the verses related to it in Sūrat al-Baqara. As for the ruling on the prohibition of ribā, it was revealed long before that, as indicated by Allah’s statement in Āl ʿImrān, in the midst of the story of Uḥud: ‘O you who believe, do not consume ribā, doubled and multiplied’ [Āl ʿImrān: 130].”[20]
Among the examples of gradualism is also the gradual obligation of jihad:
It is agreed upon that jihad—meaning armed struggle in the path of Allah, exalted is He—was not made obligatory all at once. Rather, its legislation passed through multiple stages. Many scholars have mentioned this or alluded to it in their works, and it has been the consistent practice of most Qur’ānic exegetes to mention it in their commentary on Allah’s statement: “Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress. Indeed, Allah does not love the transgressors” [al-Baqara: 190].[21] Imām al-Shāfiʿī also affirmed this, may Allah have mercy on him,[22] who outlined the beginning of the Prophet’s mission from the outset of his prophethood until the obligation of jihad. Ibn al-Qayyim, may Allah have mercy on him, followed the same framework with some variation and elaboration.[23]
From what they have stated, it may be concluded that the legislation of jihad passed through four stages:
The First Stage:
This was the stage of restraining the hand, showing pardon and forgiveness, and maintaining peaceful coexistence—commands that prohibited fighting against the polytheists during the Makkan period and required patience in the face of their harm. These include numerous verses, which Ibn Ḥazm, may Allah have mercy on him, counted as 114 in total.[24] However, there is scholarly disagreement concerning many of these verses as to whether they explicitly prohibit fighting or are simply silent on the matter without opposing it.
The Second Stage:
This was the stage of permission and allowance to fight after it had previously been prohibited. It is indicated by the verse: “Permission [to fight] has been granted to those who are being fought because they have been wronged—and indeed Allah is capable of granting them victory” [al-Ḥajj: 39]. This verse permitted fighting but did not make it obligatory.
The Third Stage:
This stage involved the command to fight those who fought them while refraining from fighting those who did not. It is indicated by the verse: “Fight in the way of Allah those who fight you, but do not transgress. Indeed, Allah does not love the transgressors” [al-Baqara: 190]. This is according to one interpretive view. According to the other view, the verse is not abrogated but remains binding, and the transgression being prohibited refers to excess in warfare—such as killing those whom it is not lawful to kill, like women, children, and the like.[25]
The Fourth Stage:
This stage was the initiation of combat against all polytheists. It began with Sūrat al-Tawba, in which Allah said: “And when the sacred months have passed, then kill the polytheists wherever you find them, capture them, besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every ambush” [al-Tawba: 5], along with other verses that scholars refer to as the verses of the sword and of fighting.
Ibn ʿAṭiyya, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 542 AH), said:
آية السيف نسخت جميع الموادعات
“The verse of the sword abrogated all agreements of truce.”[26]
It is well known that this gradual progression in legislation took into account the strength or weakness of the Muslim community. When they were in Mecca, without a state or power, they were commanded to forgive, pardon, and refrain from fighting. When they gained strength, they were permitted to fight. Then, once their power was complete, the verses of the sword and warfare were revealed.
Two Important Notes Regarding Gradualism in Legislation:
First Note:
Gradualism in legislation occurred during the time of prophethood and the continual descent of revelation. However, after the completion of the Sharī‘a, gradualism in legislation was abrogated, the door of legislation was closed, and it is impermissible for anyone to abandon definitive rulings (muḥkam) and act upon abrogated ones (mansūkh) under the pretext of gradualism.
Therefore, it is not permissible for anyone to permit the drinking of wine for new Muslims in the West or Europe under the claim of gradualism, as occurred in the early days of Islam.
Nor is it permissible for anyone to suspend the obligation of prayer, settling instead for praying at the beginning and end of the day under the pretext of gradualism, or to offer the choice between fasting and paying a fidya under the same justification.
All such rulings are abrogated and it is impermissible to act upon them by consensus of the scholars. Opening this door leads to a departure from the Sharī‘a and the legitimization of prohibited acts and immoralities
Second Note:
The naskh (abrogation) that occurred in the stages of jihad is not to be understood according to its technical definition—namely, the complete annulment of a ruling—but rather as restriction, specification, and clarification of what was general or ambiguous. This usage is valid, given that the original ruling no longer remained in its initial form of generality, absoluteness, or vagueness.
ʿIlm al-Dīn al-Sakhāwī, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 643 AH), said:
قولنا: تخصيص واستثناء اصطلاح وقع بعد ابن عباس، وكان ابن عباس يسمي ذلك نسخًا
“What we now call specification and exception was, in the time before Ibn ʿAbbās, referred to as naskh. Ibn ʿAbbās used to call that naskh.”[27]
Ibn al-Qayyim, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 751 AH), said:
مراد عامة السلف بالناسخ والمنسوخ رفع الحكم بجملته تارة وهو اصطلاح المتأخرين، ورفع دلالة العام والمطلق والظاهر وغيرها تارة، إما بتخصيص أو تقييد أو حمل مطلق على مقيد وتفسيره وتبيينه، حتى إنهم يسمون الاستثناء والشرط والصفة نسخًا؛ لتضمن ذلك رفع دلالة الظاهر وبيان المراد
“What the majority of the early scholars meant by nāsikh and mansūkh was sometimes the complete repeal of a ruling—which is the terminology of later scholars—and at other times it referred to the restriction of a general text, or the qualification of an absolute one, or the interpretation and clarification of an apparent meaning. They would even refer to exception, condition, and descriptive qualification as naskh because these entail the removal of the apparent indication and clarifying the intended meaning.”[28]
And al-Shāṭibī, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 790 AH), said:
الذي يظهر من كلام المتقدمين أن النسخ عندهم في الإطلاق أعم منه في كلام الأصوليين؛ فقد يطلقون على تقييد المطلق نسخًا، وعلى تخصيص العموم بدليل متصل أو منفصل نسخًا، وعلى بيان المجمل والمبهم نسخًا، كما يطلقون على رفع الحكم الشرعي بدليل شرعي متأخر نسخًا
“What becomes apparent from the words of the early scholars is that naskh in their usage is broader than how the later uṣūlīs define it. They would use naskh to refer to the restriction of an absolute ruling, the specification of a general one—whether by connected or separate evidence—and the clarification of what is ambiguous or vague, just as they used the term for the annulment of a legal ruling by a later divine text.”[29]
Thus, the abrogation of the verses concerning pardon and forgiveness falls into this category—namely, restriction based on the condition of weakness and the inability to engage in jihad against the disbelievers.
Al-Zarkashī, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 794 AH), explicitly affirmed this, stating—in his discussion of the various types of naskh—the following:
الثالث: ما أُمِر به لسبب ثم يزول السبب؛ كالأمر حين الضعف والقلة بالصبر وبالمغفرة للذين لا يرجون لقاء الله، ونحوهما من عدم إيجاب الأمر بالمعروف والنهي عن المنكر والجهاد ونحوها، ثم نَسَخَه إيجابُ ذلك، وهذا ليس بنسخ في الحقيقة وإنما هو نسء، كما قال تعالى: {أَوْ نُنْسِئْهَا} فالمنْسَأ هو الأمر بالقتال إلى أن يقوى المسلمون، وفي حال الضعف يكون الحكم وجوب الصبر على الأذى، وبهذا التحقيق تبيَّن ضعف ما لهج به كثير من المفسرين في الآيات الآمرة بالتخفيف أنها منسوخة بآية السيف، وليست كذلك؛ بل هي من المنسأ بمعنى أن كل أمر ورد يجب امتثاله في وقتٍ ما لعلةٍ تُوجِب ذلك الحكم، ثم ينتقل بانتقال تلك العلة إلى حكم آخر
“The third type is what was commanded due to a specific cause, and then that cause ceased—such as the command, during times of weakness and few numbers, to be patient and to forgive those who do not hope to meet Allah. Similar to this is the non-obligation of enjoining right, forbidding wrong, jihad, and the like—which were later abrogated by their obligation. But this is not truly abrogation; rather, it is postponement (nasʾ), as in the verse: ‘or We postpone it’ [al-Baqara: 106]. The munsaʾ (postponed) is the command to fight, delayed until the Muslims became strong. In the state of weakness, the ruling was to endure harm patiently. Through this clarification, the weakness of what many exegetes have repeated becomes clear—namely, that the verse of the sword abrogated verses commanding leniency. This is not the case; rather, these verses are postponed, meaning that every command must be acted upon at a specific time for a reason that necessitates it, and then it transitions to another ruling when that reason changes.”[30]
Anyone who carefully follows the statements of the jurists in the chapters of treaties, truces, and similar matters will not doubt that they are, in reality, in agreement. The debate over whether naskh has occurred or not is merely a semantical dispute, not a substantive one. There is no actual contradiction between the verses that would require resorting to abrogation. Rather, the jurists apply all the relevant texts—provided their conditions and circumstances are properly fulfilled.
Ibn Qudāma, may Allah have mercy on him, said:
وأما إن صالحهم على مال نبذله لهم، فقد أطلق أحمد القول بالمنع منه، وهو مذهب الشافعي؛ لأن فيه صغارًا للمسلمين. وهذا محمول على غير حالة الضرورة، فأما إن دعت إليه ضرورة -وهو أن يخاف على المسلمين الهلاك أو الأسر- فيجوز؛ لأنه يجوز للأسير فداء نفسه بالمال، فكذا ها هنا، ولأن بذل المال إن كان فيه صغار فإنه يجوز تحمله لدفع صغار أعظم منه، وهو القتل والأسر وسبي الذرية الذين يفضي سبيهم إلى كفرهم
“As for making peace with them by offering wealth from our side, Aḥmad gave a general statement prohibiting it, and this is also the view of al-Shāfiʿī—because it entails humiliation for the Muslims. This, however, is to be understood as applying outside the context of necessity. As for when necessity demands it—such as fear for the Muslims of destruction or captivity—then it is permissible. This is because it is permissible for a captive to ransom himself with wealth, and the same applies here. Furthermore, although giving wealth may involve humiliation, it may be borne to avert a greater humiliation, namely killing, captivity, or the enslavement of women and children, which could lead to their apostasy.”[31]
Observe how the jurists conceived of giving wealth to disbelievers—not merely refraining from collecting jizya—and yet those who prohibited it did not argue their case by appealing to abrogation, nor did they claim that these rulings could no longer be acted upon. Rather, they agreed on its permissibility in cases of necessity.
Ibn Qudāma based the permissibility of such an action in cases of necessity on the Prophet’s offer (peace and blessings be upon him) to give Ghatafān one-third of the produce of Madīna to dissolve their alliance with the idolaters of Quraysh during the Battle of the Trench. Had such a concession not been legally conceivable, the Prophet ﷺ would not have made the offer.[32] According to al-Maghāzī by al-Wāqidī,[33] the Prophet ﷺ made peace with them by granting them the produce of Khaybar for a year.
The great imām Abū ʿUbayd al-Qāsim ibn Sallām said:
وإنما تكون الموادعة بين المسلمين وأهل الشرك إذا خاف الإمام غلبة منهم على المسلمين، ولم يأمن على هؤلاء أن يضعفوا، أو يكون يريد بذلك كيدًا، فإذا لم يخف ذلك فلا. وكذلك لو خاف من العدو استعلاءً على المسلمين فاحتاج أن يتقيهم بمال يردهم به عن المسلمين، فعل ذلك، كما صنع الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم يوم الأحزاب، وإنما الإمام ناظر للمسلمين
“Truces between the Muslims and the polytheists are only to be made when the imām fears that the disbelievers may overpower the Muslims, or he does not feel secure that the Muslims will not weaken, or when he intends some strategy thereby. If none of this is feared, then no [truce should be made]. Likewise, suppose the imām fears that the enemy may gain dominance over the Muslims, and he needs to protect the Muslims by paying them some wealth to repel them. He may do so in that case—just as the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, did on the Day of the Confederates. The imām is, after all, a steward over the affairs of the Muslims.”[34]
This text clarifies the state of necessity and affirms that it includes securing the legitimate interests of the Muslims and averting harm from them, according to the judgment of the imām and those with him.
This principle is stated even more explicitly by Imām Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan (d. 189 AH). In al-Siyar al-Ṣaghīr, he said:
قلت: أرأيتَ قومًا من أهل الحرب طلبوا إلى المسلمين الموادعة سنين معلومة بغير جزية، أينبغي للمسلمين أن يعطوهم ذلك؟ قال: نعم، ينبغي لإمام المسلمين أن ينظر في ذلك، فإن كانت لهم شوكة لا يستطيعهم وكانت موادعتهم خيرًا للمسلمين وادعهم
“I asked: What do you say about a group from the people of war who request a truce with the Muslims for a known number of years without paying jizya—is it proper for the Muslims to give them that? He said: Yes, it is proper for the Muslim imām to consider the matter. If they have strength and cannot be overcome, and a truce with them is better for the Muslims, then he may make peace with them.”[35]
Even clearer in its indication is what is found in Sharḥ al-Siyar al-Kabīr by al-Sarakhsī the Ḥanafī (d. 483 AH), in which he cites evidence for the permissibility of concluding truces with the polytheists if the interests of the Muslims require it, according to their strength or weakness. He said:
واستدل على جواز الموادعة بمباشرة رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم ذلك والمسلمين بعده إلى يومنا هذا. فقد قال محمد بن كعب القُرَظيُّ: “لما قدم رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم المدينة وادعته يهودها كلها، وكتب بينه وبينها كتابًا
“Evidence for the permissibility of truce-making is found in the fact that the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, practiced it—and the Muslims after him, up to our present time. Muḥammad ibn Kaʿb al-Quraẓī said: ‘When the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, arrived in Madīna, all of its Jewish tribes made a truce with him, and he wrote a document between him and them…’”[36]
Observe how he used the Prophet’s treaty with the Jews upon his arrival in Madīna as evidence for the permissibility of truces with the disbelievers—despite the fact that the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, lived among the Jews without engaging in battle or imposing jizya upon them. Rather, the treaty was based on a written agreement that did not specify a set duration, which is known as an open-ended treaty (ʿahd muṭlaq). Some may assume that this has been entirely abrogated and is no longer operative, but that is not the case; rather, it remains applicable if the interests of the Muslims warrant it.
Among the supporting evidence for this is also what al-Bukhārī, may Allah have mercy on him, included in his Ṣaḥīḥ under the chapter heading: “Truces and Reconciliation with the Polytheists through Wealth and Other Means.” Al-Ḥāfiẓ, in his commentary, expressed a view similar to what has already been mentioned, articulating it as a general principle summarizing the intended meaning. He said, may Allah have mercy on him:
الأمر بالصلح مقيد بما إذا كان الأحظُّ للإسلام المصالحة، أما إذا كان الإسلام ظاهرًا على الكفر ولم تظهر المصلحة في المصالحة فلا
“The command to engage in reconciliation is conditional upon such reconciliation being more beneficial for Islam; but if Islam is dominant over disbelief and no benefit is apparent in reconciliation, then it is not [to be pursued].”[37]
Al-Qurṭubī, may Allah have mercy on him, transmitted from Mālik the permissibility of an open-ended truce without a specified duration. In his commentary on Allah’s statement: “And if they incline toward peace, then incline to it as well and rely upon Allah; indeed, He is the Hearing, the Knowing” [al-Anfāl: 61], he said:
وقيل: ليست بمنسوخة، بل أراد قبول الجزية من أهل الجزية، وقد صالح أصحاب رسول الله صلى الله عليه وسلم في زمن عمر بن الخطاب رضي الله عنه ومن بعده من الأئمة كثيرًا من بلاد العجم على ما أخذوه منهم، وتركوهم على ما هم فيه، وهم قادرون على استئصالهم
“It was said: this verse is not abrogated. Rather, it refers to accepting jizya from the People of the Book. The Companions of the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, during the time of ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, may Allah be pleased with him, and those imāms who came after him, made peace with many of the lands of the non-Arabs based on what they took from them, leaving them in their condition—despite having the capability to eliminate them.”[38]
He also transmitted from Ibn Ḥabīb, from Mālik, the statement:
تجوز مهادنة المشركين السنة والسنتين والثلاث، وإلى غير مدة
“It is permissible to conclude a truce with the polytheists for one year, two years, three—or without any fixed term.”[39]
The intended purpose of all this is to clarify that these stages have not been entirely abrogated in the sense that they are no longer to be acted upon. Rather, they remain operative when their cause exists—namely, weakness—and the verses on fighting are to be acted upon by those who are capable and have the means.
Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 728 AH), said:
فمن كان من المؤمنين بأرض هو فيها مستضعَف، أو في وقت هو فيه مستضعف، فليعمل بآية الصبر والصفح عمّن يؤذي الله ورسوله من الذين أوتوا الكتاب والمشركين، وأما أهل القوة فإنما يعملون بآية قتال أئمة الكفر الذين يطعنون في الدين، وبآية قتال الذين أوتوا الكتاب حتى يعطوا الجزية عن يد وهم صاغرون
“Whoever among the believers is in a land where he is weak, or in a time when he is weak, then let him act according to the verse commanding patience and pardon toward those who harm Allah and His Messenger—whether from the People of the Book or the polytheists. As for those who possess strength, they are to act in accordance with the verse commanding the fighting of the leaders of disbelief who attack the religion and the verse commanding the fighting of the People of the Book until they pay the jizya by hand, in humility.”[40]
The Second Type: Gradualism in Conveying and Teaching
What is meant by this is taking into account the condition of the one being addressed, teaching him what will benefit him, and beginning with what is most important, then moving to what is of lesser importance.
There is ample evidence for this, among which is the statement of Allah, exalted is He:
“But be you rabbānīyīn because of what you have taught of the Book and because of what you have studied” [Āl ʿImrān: 79].
Imām al-Bukhārī, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 256 AH), said: “Ibn ʿAbbās said regarding ‘Be you rabbānīyīn’ [Āl ʿImrān: 79]: wise and learned. And it is said: the rabbānī is the one who nurtures people with the lesser matters of knowledge before the greater ones.”[41]
In the well-known ḥadīth of Muʿādh, the Prophet ﷺ said: “No one bears witness that there is no deity but Allah and that Muḥammad is the Messenger of Allah—sincerely from his heart—except that Allah makes the Fire forbidden for him.” Muʿādh then said: “Shall I not inform the people so that they may rejoice?” He said: “Then they would rely on it [and stop striving].”[42]
ʿAlī, may Allah be pleased with him, said: “Speak to people in accordance with what they know. Would you love for Allah and His Messenger to be belied?”[43]
And Ibn Masʿūd, may Allah be pleased with him, said: “You will not speak to a people with something their minds cannot grasp except that it will become a trial for some of them.”[44]
Among the evidences for gradualism in conveyance is the ḥadīth of Muʿādh when the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, sent him to Yemen. It is reported from Ibn ʿAbbās, may Allah be pleased with them both, that the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, when he dispatched Muʿādh, may Allah be pleased with him, to Yemen, said:
"You are going to a people from the People of the Book, so let the first thing you call them to be the worship of Allah. If they come to know Allah, then inform them that Allah has obligated upon them five prayers in their day and night. If they do so, then inform them that Allah has obligated upon them zakāh, to be taken from their wealth and distributed among their poor. If they comply with that, then take it from them, but avoid the best of people’s wealth.”[45]
Even though the dispatching of Muʿādh occurred in the tenth year [after the Hijra], before the Farewell Pilgrimage[46]—that is, after the legislation of the religious obligations, including ḥajj and other duties of Islam—the Prophet nonetheless commanded him to begin with tawḥīd, then prayer, then zakāh, and to proceed with them gradually in teaching and conveyance.
Another example of this is the Prophet’s, peace and blessings be upon him, instruction to the man who performed his prayer incorrectly. He taught him only what is necessary for the validity of prayer without mentioning the recommended or supererogatory elements. It is narrated from Abū Hurayra, may Allah be pleased with him, that the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, entered the mosque, and a man entered and prayed, then greeted the Prophet. The Prophet returned the greeting and said: "Go back and pray, for you have not prayed." The man returned and prayed as he had before, then greeted the Prophet again. The Prophet said: "Go back and pray, for you have not prayed."— this happened three times. The man then said: "By the One who sent you with the truth, I do not know any better than this, so teach me." The Prophet said: "When you stand for prayer, say the takbīr, then recite what is easy for you from the Qur’ān, then bow until you are at ease in your bowing, then rise until you are standing straight, then prostrate until you are at ease in your prostration, then sit until you are at ease in your sitting. Do this in all of your prayer."[47]
Imām al-Nawawī, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 676 AH), said:
هذا الحديث مشتمل على فوائد كثيرة، وليعلم أولا أنه محمول على بيان الواجبات دون السنن
“This ḥadīth contains many benefits. It should first be understood that it is to be interpreted as a clarification of the obligatory acts, not of the sunnah practices.”[48]
He also said:
وفيه الرفق بالمتعلم والجاهل وملاطفته وإيضاح المسألة وتلخيص المقاصد والاقتصار في حقه على المهمّ دون المكمّلات التي لا يحتمل حاله حفظها والقيام بها
“It demonstrates gentleness with the learner and the ignorant, kindness toward them, clarity in explanation, conciseness in presenting objectives, and limiting instruction in their case to what is essential—without including supplementary matters that their circumstances would not allow them to retain or carry out.”[49]
Also included under this category is the permissibility of refraining from condemning wrongdoing when doing so at that moment would lead to greater harm.
Among the evidences for this is the authentic report from Anas ibn Mālik, may Allah be pleased with him, that a Bedouin man urinated in the mosque. The people rose up against him, but the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, said: “Do not interrupt him.” Then, he called for a bucket of water and poured it over the area.[50]
The Prophet ﷺ refrained from rebuking the man while he was urinating due to the greater harm that would have resulted—namely, causing the man to flee in panic and further soil the mosque, as well as alienating him from the faith had the Companions forcefully stopped him.
Clarifications Related to Gradualism in Conveyance
First Note:
Gradualism in conveyance is firmly established and remains applicable; it has not been abrogated like the earlier form [related to legislation]. What is prescribed in teaching is to begin with what is most important, then proceed to what is of lesser importance while considering the condition of the one being addressed.
Second Note:
Gradualism in conveyance does not constitute delaying clarification beyond the time of need. Rather, it is the postponement of clarification until the time of need—the former is impermissible, while the latter is legislated.
Third Note:
Gradualism in conveyance does not mean lying about Allah, exalted is He, or declaring the unlawful to be lawful and vice versa under the pretense of accommodating the audience. Its objective is merely to withhold mention of some issues until the appropriate time to explain them—not to distort the Sharīʿa or alter its rulings.
Fourth Note:
Designating certain individuals for specific knowledge does not mean that there exists some form of esoteric knowledge exclusive to an elite class, unknown to the general public—as claimed by the Bāṭinīs and extremist Ṣūfīs who conceal their religion from the masses, alleging that the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, entrusted this knowledge secretly to ʿAlī, who then passed it on to his sons, and so on, until it is passed down among followers from their shaykhs under sworn allegiance.
ʿAlī, may Allah be pleased with him, refuted this claim. Abū Juḥayfa reported: “I said to ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib: Do you have a book? He said: No, except the Book of Allah, or an understanding granted to a Muslim man, or what is in this scroll. I said: And what is in this scroll? He said: Al-ʿaql (compensation for injury), the freeing of captives, and that no Muslim is to be killed in retaliation for a disbeliever.”[51]
Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya, may Allah have mercy on him, said:
وبهذا الحديث ونحوه من الأحاديث الصحيحة استدل العلماء على أنّ كل ما يذكر عن علي وأهل البيت من أنهم اختصوا بعلم خصهم به النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم دون غيرهم كذبٌ عليهم، مثل ما يذكر منه الجفر والبطاقة والجدول وغير ذلك، وما يأثره القرامطة الباطنية عنهم، فإنه قد كُذِب على جعفر الصادق رضي الله عنه ما لم يُكْذَبْ على غيره… ومما يبين هذا: أن في السنن: أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم كان عام الفتح قد أهدر دم جماعة منهم عبد الله بن أبي سرح، فجاء به عثمان إلى النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم ليبايعه، فتوقف عنه النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم ساعة ثم بايعه وقال: «أما كان فيكم رجل رشيد ينظر إلي وقد أمسكت عن هذا فيضرب عنقه؟!» فقال رجل من الأنصار: يا رسول الله، هلا أومأت إلي؟ فقال: «ما ينبغي لنبي أن تكون له خائنة الأعين
“Based on this ḥadīth and others like it from the sound narrations, the scholars deduced that everything claimed about ʿAlī and Ahl al-Bayt—that the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, imparted to them exclusive knowledge which he did not share with others—is false. This includes what is said about al-jafr, al-biṭāqa, al-jadwal, and other such things, as well as what the Qarmaṭians and Bāṭinis transmit from them. Indeed, lies have been fabricated against Jaʿfar al-Ṣādiq, may Allah be pleased with him, more than against anyone else…
Among the proofs for this is what is narrated in the Sunan: that the Prophet ﷺ, in the year of the Conquest [of Mecca], had declared the blood of certain individuals permissible to shed—among them ʿAbd Allāh ibn Abī Sarḥ. ʿUthmān then brought him to the Prophet ﷺ to pledge allegiance. The Prophet paused for a moment before accepting it and then said: ‘Was there not among you a rational man who, upon seeing me withhold from this one, would rise and strike his neck?’ A man from the Anṣār said: ‘O Messenger of Allah, why did you not signal to me?’ He said: ‘It is not befitting for a prophet to have treacherous eyes.’”[52]
فهذا ونحوه مما يبين أن النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم يستوي ظاهره وباطنه، لا يظهر للناس خلاف ما يبطنه كما تدعيه الزنادقة من المتفلسفة والقرامطة وضلال المتنسكة ونحوهم
“This and similar examples demonstrate that the Prophet ﷺ did not conceal anything from the people, nor did he show them something contrary to what he kept inward—as is claimed by the heretical sects among the philosophers, the Qarmaṭians, and the misguided ascetics, and those like them.”[53]
The Third Type: Gradualism in Implementation
Allah, exalted is He, has made it obligatory to judge by the Sharīʿa. He said: “And judge between them by what Allah has revealed, and do not follow their desires, and beware of them lest they tempt you away from some of what Allah has revealed to you. But if they turn away, then know that Allah intends to afflict them for some of their sins. Indeed, many among the people are defiantly disobedient. Do they seek the judgment of jāhiliyya? But who is better in judgment than Allah for a people who are certain?” [al-Māʾida: 49–50].
However, the obligation to carry out duties is conditional upon capacity and ability. Allah, exalted is He, said:“So fear Allah as much as you are able” [al-Taghābun: 16], and He also said: “Allah does not burden a soul beyond its capacity” [al-Baqara: 286].
And the Prophet ﷺ said: “When I command you with something, do of it what you are able; and when I forbid you from something, then avoid it.”[54]
Al-Nawawī, may Allah have mercy on him, said:
هذا من قواعد الإسلام المهمة ومن جوامع الكلم التي أعطيها صلى الله عليه وسلم، ويدخل فيها ما لا يحصى من الأحكام، كالصلاة بأنواعها، فإذا عجز عن بعض أركانها أو بعض شروطها أتى بالباقي، وإذا عجز عن بعض أعضاء الوضوء أو الغسل غسل الممكن، وإذا وجد بعض ما يكفيه من الماء لطهارته أو لغسل النجاسة فعل الممكن، وإذا وجبت إزالة منكرات أو فطرةُ جماعةٍ مَنْ تلزمه نفقتهم أو نحو ذلك وأمكنه البعضَ فَعَلَ الممكنَ، وإذا وجد ما يستر بعض عورته أو حفظ بعض الفاتحة أتى بالممكن، وأشباه هذا غير منحصرة
“This is among the foundational principles of Islam and from the comprehensive statements with which the Prophet ﷺ was endowed. It encompasses countless rulings—such as the various forms of prayer: if one cannot perform some of its pillars or conditions, he performs what remains. If he cannot wash some limbs in wuḍūʾ or ghusl, he washes what he can. If he possesses only part of the water needed for purification or washing away impurities, he does what is possible. If the removal of evils is obligatory, or providing for a group of dependents becomes incumbent upon someone, or similar responsibilities arise, and he can fulfill some of them, then he does what he can. If he can cover only part of his ʿawra, or recite only part of al-Fātiḥa, he does what is possible. And such examples are innumerable.”[55]
And ability (istiṭāʿa) is not limited to physical capacity—that is, the soundness of faculties and the capacity to carry out an action—but also includes non-physical capacity, namely: safety from the consequences and outcomes of the action. This refers to situations where carrying out an act would result in greater harm than the benefit attained by performing it.
If an action leads to greater corruption than what would result from omitting it, then one must not repel one harm by bringing about a greater one nor forsake a greater benefit in pursuit of a lesser one. For Allah, exalted is He, does not love corruption, and He has commanded reform. Thus, any matter that leads from righteousness to corruption is not part of the Sharīʿa, even if it is attributed to it through interpretation or ignorance.
Among the evidences for this is the statement of the Prophet ﷺ: “Hands are not to be cut off during battle.”[56]
Al-Tirmidhī, may Allah have mercy on him, said: “This is the practice according to some of the people of knowledge, among them al-Awzāʿī. They held that the ḥadd punishment should not be carried out during battle in the presence of the enemy out of fear that the one upon whom the ḥadd is carried out may defect to the enemy. But once the imām leaves the land of war and returns to the land of Islam, he should carry out the ḥadd on the one subject to it.”[57]
Thus, when implementing the ḥadd would result in a greater harm, its postponement was permitted until the return from battle and the removal of that harm.
Ibn al-Qayyim, may Allah have mercy on him, said:
فهذا حَدٌّ من حدود اللَّه تعالى، وقد نهى عن إقامته في الغزو خشية أن يترتب عليه ما هو أبغض إلى اللَّه من تعطيله أو تأخيره من لحوق صاحبه بالمشركين حمية وغضبًا
“This is a ḥadd from the limits set by Allah, yet the Prophet forbade carrying it out during battle out of fear that it might lead to something more hateful to Allah than delaying or suspending the punishment—namely, that the individual might join the polytheists out of tribal pride or anger.”[58]
He also said:
وأكثر ما فيه تأخير الحد لمصلحة راجحة، إما من حاجة المسلمين إليه، أو من خوف ارتداده ولحوقه بالكفار، وتأخيرُ الحدِّ لعارضٍ أمرٌ وردت به الشريعة، كما يؤخَّر عن الحامل والمرضع وعن وقت الحَرّ والبرد والمرض؛ فهذا تأخير لمصلحة المحدود؛ فتأخيره لمصلحة الإِسلام أولى
“In most cases, the ḥadd is only postponed due to an overriding benefit—either because the Muslims need the individual or out of fear that he might apostatize and join the disbelievers. The postponement of the ḥadd due to a temporary condition is something established in the Sharīʿa, just as it is postponed for a pregnant or nursing woman or due to extreme heat, cold, or illness. That is a postponement for the benefit of the person being punished—so postponing it for the benefit of Islam is even more appropriate.”[59]
Among the evidences for this is the Prophet’s ﷺ decision not to demolish the Kaʿba and rebuild it upon the foundations of Ibrāhīm due to his knowledge that Quraysh would not be able to bear such an action.
The Prophet ﷺ said: “O ʿĀʾisha, were it not that your people have only recently left shirk, I would have demolished the Kaʿba and brought it down to the ground, and I would have given it two doors—an eastern door and a western door—and I would have added six cubits from the Ḥijr to it, for Quraysh left that part out when they built the Kaʿba.”[60]
Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 544 AH), said:
أراد استئلافهم وتسكين الأمور وتركها، حتى يتمكنَ الإيمانُ في قلوبهم
“He intended to win their hearts, calm the situation, and leave the matter as it was until īmān became firmly established in their hearts.”[61]
Here is the Messenger of Allah ﷺ—despite Allah having granted him victory over Mecca and the Arabs having submitted to him—still taking into consideration the harm that might result from rebuilding the Kaʿba upon the foundations of Ibrāhīm. The Prophet ﷺ bore this lesser harm to prevent a greater one, foregoing a lesser benefit—correcting the structure of the Kaʿba—in pursuit of a greater benefit: the firm establishment of faith in their hearts and avoiding a trial in their religion, especially given that they were still recent converts from shirk.
Among the evidences for this is what occurred when ʿAbd Allāh ibn Ubayy ibn Salūl said: “By Allah, if we return to Madīna, the more honored will surely expel from it the more humiliated.” ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb, may Allah be pleased with him, said: “O Messenger of Allah, let me strike the neck of this hypocrite.” But the Prophet ﷺ said: “Leave him, lest the people say that Muḥammad kills his companions.”[62]
Al-Khaṭṭābī, may Allah have mercy on him (d. 388 AH), said:
في هذا الكلام باب عظيم من سياسة أمر الدّين والنظر في عواقب أموره، وذلك أن الناس إنما يدخلون في الدين ظاهرًا، ولا سبيل إلى معرفة ما في نفوسهم، فلو عُوقب المنافق على باطن كفره، وظاهرُ حالِهِ الإسلامُ؛ لَوَجَدَ أعداءُ الدين سبيلًا إلى تنفير الناس عن الدخول فيه والقبول له، بأن يقولوا لإخوانهم وذويهم: ما يؤمنكم إذا دخلتم في دين هذا النبي وحُصِّلتم في كفِّه وأنتم مؤمنون به ومخلصون له، أن يدَّعي عليكم كفر الباطن وجحد السريرة وأن يقول لكم: قد أوحي إليَّ في أمركم وجاءني الخبر عن سرِّكم أنكم منافقون، فيستبيح بذلك دماءكم وأموالكم، فلا تُغرِّروا بأنفسكم ولا تُسلّموها للهلاك، فيكون ذلك سببًا لنفور الناس عن الدين وزهادتهم فيه
“This statement contains a significant principle concerning the governance of religious affairs and considering their outcomes. People enter the religion outwardly, and there is no means of knowing what lies within their hearts. So, if a hypocrite were to be punished for the inward disbelief he conceals while outwardly displaying Islam, the enemies of the religion would find in that a path to drive people away from entering it and accepting it. They would say to their brothers and relatives: ‘What assurance do you have that, after entering the religion of this Prophet and placing yourselves under his authority—while being sincere and faithful to him—he will not claim that you harbor inward disbelief and hidden denial, and say: “Revelation has come to me concerning your affair, and I have received news of your secret, that you are hypocrites,” and thereby make your blood and wealth lawful?’ Thus, they would say: ‘Do not endanger yourselves or hand yourselves over to destruction.’ This would become a cause for people turning away from the religion and losing interest in it.”[63]
This type of harm—namely, driving people away from Islam and distorting its image—may not be recognized by some ignorant individuals as a valid or considerable harm. As a result, they may commit actions in the name of jihād or the Sharīʿa that ultimately lead to even greater obstruction from the path of Allah, exalted is He. Yet jihād was only legislated so that the word of Allah might be supreme—so how can one, in its name, commit that which leads to the very opposite: distorting the word of Allah in the minds of people and turning them away from His path?
Some may assume that a ruler has reached the height of empowerment and thus cannot justify abstaining from any part of what he can enforce—failing to understand the expansive meaning of capacity (wusʿ and qudra), which includes not only physical or material ability but also moral and strategic capacity, which pertains to the outcomes of one’s actions, not merely the availability of tools to execute them.
Indeed, a ruler may be unable to combat certain corrupt individuals who spread disorder in the land—or even factions of heretics and apostates—and may choose to leave them or make a truce with them. This is because ability is the condition upon which responsibility is based. If fighting is not truly feasible, it becomes a fight of fitna (discord and tribulation)—even if the group in question should, in principle, be fought according to the Sharīʿa. Attending to these circumstances is an obligation; failure to do so leads to great corruption.
Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya, may Allah have mercy on him, said:
الأمر بقتال الطائفة الباغية مشروط بالقدرة والإمكان؛ إذ ليس قتالهم بأولى من قتال المشركين والكفار، ومعلوم أنّ ذلك مشروط بالقدرة والإمكان، فقد تكون المصلحة المشروعة أحيانًا هي التألف بالمال والمسالمة والمعاهدة كما فعله النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم غير مرة… ويشهد لذلك أن الرسول أخبر بظلم الأمراء بعده وبغيهم ونهى عن قتالهم لأن ذلك غير مقدور؛ إذ مفسدته أعظم من مصلحته؛ كما نُهي المسلمون في أول الإسلام عن القتال كما ذكره بقوله: ﴿أَلَمۡ تَرَ إِلَى ٱلَّذِينَ قِيلَ لَهُمۡ كُفُّوٓاْ أَيۡدِيَكُمۡ﴾ [النساء: 77] وكما كان النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم وأصحابه مأمورين بالصبر على أذى المشركين والمنافقين والعفو والصفح عنهم حتى يأتي الله بأمره
“The command to fight the rebellious faction (ṭāʾifa bāghiya) is conditional upon ability and feasibility, for fighting them is not more obligatory than fighting the polytheists and disbelievers—and it is well known that such fighting is conditioned by capacity and feasibility. At times, the legislated benefit may be found in offering wealth, peaceful relations, and truce agreements, as the Prophet ﷺ did on multiple occasions…
This is supported by the fact that the Messenger ﷺ informed us of the oppression and injustice of rulers after him. Yet, he forbade fighting them—because doing so was not within one’s ability, and its harm would outweigh its benefit. Likewise, the Muslims were forbidden from fighting in the early period of Islam, as Allah said: ‘Have you not seen those who were told: Restrain your hands…’ [al-Nisāʾ: 77]. And just as the Prophet ﷺ and his Companions were commanded to remain patient in the face of harm from the polytheists and hypocrites, and to pardon and forgive them—until Allah brought forth His command.”[64]
Ibn al-Qayyim, may Allah have mercy on him, said:
فإنكار المنكر أربع درجات:
الأولى: أن يزول ويخلفه ضده
الثانية: أن يقل وإن لم يُزل بجملته
الثالثة: أن يخلفه ما هو مثله
الرابعة: أن يخلفه ما هو شر منه
فالدرجتان الأُولَيانِ مشروعتان، والثالثة موضع اجتهاد، والرابعة محرمة
فإذا رأيت أهل الفجور والفسوق يلعبون بالشِّطْرنج كان إنكارك عليهم من عدم الفقه والبصيرة إلا إذا نقلتهم منه إلى ما هو أحبّ إلى اللَّه ورسوله كَرَمي النشَّاب وسباق الخيل ونحو ذلك، وإذا رأيت الفسّاق قد اجتمعوا على لهو ولعب أو سماع مُكَاء وتَصْدِية فإن نقلتهم عنه إلى طاعة اللَّه فهو المراد، وإلا كان تركهم على ذلك خيرًا من أن تفرغهم لما هو أعظم من ذلك فكان ما هم فيه شاغلًا لهم عن ذلك، وكما إذا كان الرجل مشتغلًا بكُتُب المجنون ونحوها وخِفْتَ من نقله عنها انتقاله إلى كتب البدع والضلال والسّحر فَدَعْهُ وكتبه الأولى، وهذا باب واسع؛ وسمعت شيخ الإِسلام ابن تيمية قدّس اللَّه روحه ونوّر ضريحه يقول: مررت أنا وبعضُ أصحابي في زمن التَّتَار بقوم منهم يشربون الخمر، فأنكر عليهم مَنْ كان معي، فأنكرتُ عليه، وقلت له: إنما حرم اللَّه الخمر لأنها تصدُّ عن ذكر اللَّه وعن الصلاة، وهؤلاء يصدهم الخمر عن قتل النفوس وسَبي الذرية وأخذ الأموال فَدَعْهم
“Condemning wrong (inkār al-munkar) has four levels:
First: That the evil is removed and replaced with its opposite.
Second: That it is lessened, even if not entirely eliminated.
Third: That it is replaced with something of equal harm.
Fourth: That it is replaced with something worse.
The first two are legislated, the third is a matter of ijtihād, and the fourth is prohibited.
So if you see people of immorality and disobedience playing chess, your condemnation of them would be due to a lack of understanding and insight—unless you transfer them to something more beloved to Allah and His Messenger, such as archery or horseback riding. If you see sinners gathered in vain entertainment or clapping and whistling (mukāʾ wa-taṣdiya), and you can redirect them to obedience to Allah, then that is the objective. Otherwise, leaving them in that state is better than freeing them up for something worse. What they are currently doing may be preoccupying them from something more severe.
It is like someone who is absorbed in foolish books—if you fear that moving him away from them will lead him to books of innovation, misguidance, or sorcery, then leave him with his earlier books. This is a vast matter.
I heard Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya—may Allah sanctify his soul and illuminate his grave—say: ‘I once passed by a group of the Tatars along with some companions, and they were drinking wine. One of those with me condemned them, but I rebuked him and said: Allah only forbade wine because it diverts from Allah's remembrance and prayer. Yet this wine is diverting them from killing souls, enslaving women and children, and plundering wealth—so leave them.’”[65]
This is a vast field indeed, and the applications set forth by the scholars in the areas of siyāsa sharʿiyya—in matters of jihād, the enforcement of ḥudūd, enjoining good and forbidding evil, and implementing the Sharīʿa—are extremely numerous.[66]
Important Clarifications Regarding Gradualism in the Implementation of the Sharīʿa:
First Note:
The acceptable form of gradualism is based on actual capacity and incapacity and on legally recognized benefits and harms—not on whim or desire, nor on imagined or invalidated interests.
The distinction between legitimate and illegitimate interests is known to those firmly grounded in knowledge, so it is essential to refer to the well-rooted scholars in these matters.
Second Note:
The legal maxim states: “What is possible is not nullified by what is impossible.” Thus, being unable to implement part of the Sharīʿa does not exempt one from acting upon what is within one's capacity.
Third Note:
The sign of sincere gradualism is taking the means that enable the completion of the matter at hand and preparing the people to accept what may be difficult for them from the rulings of Allah, exalted is He. When the circumstances change, and the obstacle is lifted, we must hasten to implement what we were previously unable to.
It has been authentically reported that ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Zubayr, may Allah be pleased with them both, rebuilt the Kaʿba in accordance with what the Prophet ﷺ had wished to do—using as his evidence the change in circumstances and the disappearance of the harms which the Prophet ﷺ had once feared. He said: “I heard ʿĀʾisha say that the Prophet ﷺ said: ‘Were it not that the people have only recently left disbelief, and were it not that I do not have the funds to support its reconstruction, I would have included within it five cubits from the Ḥijr, and I would have given it two doors—one through which the people enter, and another through which they exit.’”
He [Ibn al-Zubayr] then said: “Today, I possess the means to fund it, and I no longer fear the people.”[67]
Thus, gradualism does not imply laziness or negligence in implementing the Sharīʿa.
Conclusion:
Gradualism is one of the distinctive features of Islamic legislation.
Gradualism in legislation was abrogated with the completion of the Sharīʿa. It is thus impermissible for anyone to claim, for instance, that a woman should be given a share equal to that of a man in inheritance on the pretext that granting her half was merely a stage in gradual legislation—since, in pre-Islamic times, she was denied inheritance altogether. Such a claim is, in reality, a form of absurdity—indeed, disbelief and heresy—for it constitutes a rejection of the Sharīʿa and denial of what is necessarily known of the religion.
That which was legislated due to a specific cause and whose ruling changed once that cause ceased remains applicable when the cause returns—such as the stage of withholding the hand, showing pardon, and forgiveness for those who are weak and vulnerable.
Gradualism in conveyance is firmly established and a confirmed Sunnah: teaching people what benefits them and what they need, beginning with what is most important and then what is less so, while considering the addressee's state.
Gradualism in conveyance does not imply that there are secret teachings in the religion known only to an elite, as claimed by the heretics.
Gradualism in implementation, when based on capacity, incapacity, benefit, and harm, is a legitimate form of gradualism and in accordance with the principles of the Sharīʿa.
Capacity is of two kinds: physical and non-physical, and incapacity is likewise of two kinds. If an action leads to greater harm in the end, it is deemed beyond one’s capacity.
Gradualism must not be used as a pretext to suspend the Sharīʿa.
True gradualism entails taking the necessary means to implement the law of Allah, removing obstacles, and acting upon what is within one’s ability—for what is possible is not nullified by what is impossible.
And Allah is Most High and All-Knowing. May peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muḥammad and his family and Companions.
Recommended Reading:
Brief Answers to Frequently Asked Questions About the Implementation of the Shariah
The Significance of Segmented Revelation
[1] Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī (22/425)
[2] Tafsīr Ibn Kathīr (8/59)
[3] Majmūʿ al-Fatāwá (28/37)
[4] See: Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī (22/424)
[5] Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn, by Ibn al-Qayyim (3/11)
[6] al-Ṭuruq al-Ḥukmiyyá (p. 7)
[7] Lisān al-ʿArab (2/266), and al-Qāmūs al-Muḥīṭ (p. 1289)
[8] See: al-Tadarruj, ʿAbd al-Raḥmān Ḥasan Ḥabannaká (p. 11)
[9] Reported by al-Bukhārī (4993)
[10] Qawāʿid al-Aḥkām fī Maṣāliḥ al-Anām (1/63)
[11] Zād al-Maʿād (2/29)
[12] Majmūʿ al-Fatāwá (14/117)
[13] Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī (6/286)
[14] Reported by Abū Dāwūd (3671), al-Tirmidhī (3026), authenticated by al-Albānī
[15] Reported by al-Bukhārī (2464), and Muslim (1980)
[16] Fatḥ al-Bārī (10/40)
[17] Aḍwāʾ al-Bayān (2/406)
[18] Reported by Ibn Mājah (1860), authenticated by al-Albānī
[19] Reported by al-Bukhārī (4544)
[20] Fatḥ al-Bārī (8/205)
[21] See for example: Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī (3/561), Aḥkām al-Qurʾān by al-Jaṣṣāṣ (1/319)
[22] al-Umm (4/169)
[23] Zād al-Maʿād (3/143)
[24] al-Nāsikh wa-l-Mansūkh (p. 12)
[25] See: Tafsīr al-Ṭabarī (3/561)
[26] al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz (5/182)
[27] Jamāl al-Qurrāʾ wa-Kamāl al-Iqrāʾ (p. 337)
[28] Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn (1/29)
[29] al-Muwāfaqāt (3/344)
[30] al-Burhān (2/42)
[31] al-Mughnī (9/298)
[32] See: Sīrat Ibn Hishām (2/223)
[33] Maghāzī al-Wāqidī (2/443)
[34] al-Amwāl by Ibn Zanjawayh (p. 399)
[35] al-Siyar al-Ṣaghīr (p. 165)
[36] Sharḥ al-Siyar al-Kabīr (1/1690)
[37] Fatḥ al-Bārī (6/276)
[38] Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī (8/41)
[39] Tafsīr al-Qurṭubī (8/41)
[40] al-Ṣārim al-Maslūl (p. 221)
[41] Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (1/24)
[42] Reported by al-Bukhārī (128)
[43] Reported by al-Bukhārī (127)
[44] Reported by Muslim in the introduction to his Ṣaḥīḥ (1/11)
[45] Reported by al-Bukhārī (1458), and Muslim (19)
[46] Al-Bukhārī said: “Bāb Baʿth Abī Mūsá wa-Muʿādh ilā al-Yaman Qabla Ḥijjat al-Wadāʿ.” Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (5/161)
[47] Reported by al-Bukhārī (757) and Muslim (397); this is the wording of al-Bukhārī
[48] Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (4/107)
[49] Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (4/108)
[50] Reported by al-Bukhārī (6025) and Muslim (284)
[51] Reported by al-Bukhārī (111)
[52] Reported by Abū Dāwūd (4359)
[53] Majmūʿ al-Fatāwá (2/218–219)
[54] Reported by al-Bukhārī (7288), and Muslim (1377)
[55] Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (9/102)
[56] Reported by Abū Dāwūd (4408), al-Tirmidhī (1450)—this is his wording—and al-Nasāʾī (4979); authenticated by al-Albānī
[57] Sunan al-Tirmidhī (4/53)
[58] Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn (4/340)
[59] Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn (4/345)
[60] Reported by al-Bukhārī (1586) and Muslim (1333)
[61] Ikmāl al-Muʿallim bi-Fawāʾid Muslim (4/431)
[62] Reported by al-Bukhārī (4907) and Muslim (2584)
[63] Aʿlām al-Ḥadīth (3/1586)
[64] Majmūʿ al-Fatāwá (4/442–443)
[65] Iʿlām al-Muwaqqiʿīn (4/339–340)
[66] For further examples and applications, see: al-Ghiyāthī by al-Juwaynī and Qawāʿid al-Aḥkām by al-ʿIzz ibn ʿAbd al-Salām
[67] Reported by al-Bukhārī (126) in abridged form, and Muslim (1333)—this is his wording