Ibn Taymiyyah and Sufism
From Hikmet Yaman’s article, “ḤANBALĪTE CRITICISM OF SUFISM: Ibn Taymiyya (d. 795/1328), a Ḥanbalīte Ascetic (Zāhid)”….
I agree with him when he argues that Ibn Taymiyya is not to be considered as a relentless opponent to Sufism. At the same time, however, it seems to me that Makdisi overstates the case when he tries to portray Ibn Taymiyya as an ordinary Sufi of the Qādiriyya order. Given Ibn Taymiyya‘s own writings on mystical1 issues, it appears that he does not uncritically celebrate Sufi doctrines and practices. He gives credit only to a particular type of taṣawwuf and he had other commitments besides Sufism as well. In this regard, I argue that without taking Ibn Taymiyya‘s own premises concerning Sufi practice and theory into consideration, Makdisi‘s argument seems to be a little forced.
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Since Makdisi most often overemphasizes Ibn Taymiyya‘s personal Sufi affiliation, he does not seem to pay enough attention to the essence of Ibn Taymiyya‘s understanding of Sufism. His argument thus overshadows Ibn Taymiyya‘s original intellectual position vis -à-vis Sufism. Although Ibn Taymiyya acknowledges the viability of Sufism as a practicing of Islam, his endorsement of Sufism is qualified. In this regard, Ibn Taymiyya promotes a particular type of Sufism, which seems more theologically and legally, rather than mystically, oriented.
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As far as the historical question of whether or not Ibn Taymiyya belonged to the Qādiri or so me other Sufi order is concerned, the Sharḥ leaves this question unanswered. Although he calls al-Jīlānī our master (shaykhunā) and praises the latter‘s statements (kalām sharīf) throughout the treatise, such statements in praise of preceding authorities are common ways of addressing and thus do not necessarily indicate Ibn Taymiyya‘s practical relationship to the Qādirī Sufi order. Throughout the Sharḥ, he speaks of Sufi terminology: ilhām, dhawq, wajd, maḥabba, kashf, ḥaqīqa, muḥaqqiq, kamāl al-nafs, bāṭin, ẓāhir, zuhd, wara‘, ḥāl, maqām, and the like. In Ibn Taymiyya‘s view, the sole touchstone in religious issues is the revealed law (sharī‘a). Any type of Sufism which is not based on this sharī‘a is heretical. In this regard, being their respective correspondings, a remarkable harmony exists between the terms sharī‘a and its authentic understanding truth (ḥaqīqa). At every spiritual station (maqām) and state (ḥāl), every single Sufi must observe thoroughly divine command (amr) and prohibition (nahy)
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One of the most striking remarks in the Sharḥ is Ibn Taymiyya‘s understanding of Sufi inspiration (ilhām). Makdisi considers Ibn Taymiyya‘s discussions on ilhām as a clear indication of the latter‘s practical Sufi affiliation. I agree with Makdisi‘s argument to the extent that Ibn Taymiyya does not deny the epistemological credibility of ilhām and other related Sufi concepts in religious matters. At the same time, however, it seems to me that Makdisi disregards the fact that, in the final analysis, Ibn Taymiyya reads these mystical concepts in light of exoteric legal and theological principles, rather than Sufi doctrines. For according to Ibn Taymiyya‘s explanations, ilhām is a type of independent judgment (ijtihād), and it has a validity in the legal and theological issues. When all other appropriate legal sources (al-adilla al-shar‘iyya) fail, ilhām must be put into practice on the level of legally valid evidence on which one bases a preference for one action as against another.
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Ibn Taymiyya does not give credit to extreme Sufi practices, especially in permissible (mubāḥ) matters. He asserts that every servant (‘abd) is responsible for his physical health; he, for example, is supposed to eat when he is hungry and he is supposed to take care of his body against possible dangers (Ibn Taymiyya, 1966a: 462 -463).
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Ibn Taymiyya further compares some extreme Sufi practices, such as their excessive practice of asceticism (zuhd) and celibacy, to the Christian monks (ruhbān). He argues that there must be a balance between the extent of spiritual exercises and of this-worldly responsibilities in such practices. In the case of celibacy, since marriage is recommended by the Prophet to every qualified believer, he is supposed to follow this recommendation (Ibn Taymiyya, 1966a: 510-511).
Ibn Taymiyya further criticizes some Sufis of their understanding of God‘s pre-destination (qadar). In his explanation, these Sufis diminish man ‘s role in his actions, whereas God‘s pre-destination never removes man‘s active participation in his actions. Otherwise, the idea of human responsibility in his actions would lose its very foundation. In this respect, Ibn Taymiyya even criticizes al-Anṣārī al-Ha rawī, whom the former‘s many Ḥanbalīte predecessors had treated very respectfully (Ibn Taymiyya, 1966a: 487-495).
Given these statements, it appears that Ibn Taymiyya embraces a quite moderate and sober type of Sufism. His explanations have very direct references to the formal theological and legal theories instead of nuanced Sufi conceptions. In this regard, even though in general I definitely agree with Makdisi that Ibn Taymiyya is not to be regarded as a sworn enemy of Sufism, I am not inclined to disregard the characteristics of Ibn Taymiyya‘s peculiar understanding of Sufis m either. Considering his strict application of theological and legal doctrines to the mystical matters, a simple designation of Ibn Taymiyya as being a practicing Sufi does not seem to be a complete description. Without dealing with such textual issues, therefore, Makdisi‘s arguments introduce incomplete conclusions concerning the essence of Ibn Taymiyya‘s discussions on Sufism.
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So far as the Iḥyā’ is concerned, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that al-Ghazālī borrowed from the al-Ri‘āya of al-Ḥā rith al-Muḥāsibī (d. 243/857), regarding his writings on Sufi terms—such as pride (kibr), conceitedness (‘ujb), hypocrisy (riyā’), and jealousy (ḥasad)—some of which are admissible, while some of which are not, and still the reliability of some of which are arguable. According to Ibn Taymiyya‘s discussion, there are many useful ideas in the Iḥyā’, while there are some objectionable materials in it as well. There are further misleading (fāsid) ideas originating from the arguments of philosophers pertaining to the unity of God (tawḥīd), prophecy (nubuwwa), and hereafter (ma ‘ād) in the Iḥyā’. In the cases when al-Ghazālī uses such philosophical arguments to articulate Sufi concepts, most of his efforts result in failure. On account of such speculative thoughts, Ibn Taymiyya asserts, some authorities disapproved al-Ghazālī‘s writings saying that he was incurably influenced by the Shifā’ of Ibn Sīnā. Still, Ibn Taymiyya states, there are many useful arguments compatible with the Qur‘an and Sunna in al-Ghazālī‘s work (Ibn Taymiyya, 1966c : 552).
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There is, however, a third group who experience mystical truths as the intoxicated pious people do, but still retain their consciousness. According to Ibn Taymiyya, these last people attain a more excellent spiritual state than afflicted Sufis. That is the perfect state which the Companions and the Prophet Muhammad enjoy in their devotional lives.
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Instead, Ibn Taymiyya appreciates Sufi practices and theories leading to a moderate asceticism, world-renouncing piety, attaining moral self -perfect ion, and purifying soul from blameworthy characteristics. Despite his approval of Sufism in such a moral and ethical framework, however, he does not agree with Sufis who consider asceticism as an essential basis, but not an ultimate goal in the course of spiritual journey. In their argument, Sufism is the way through which a Sufi seeks to understand metaphysical questions including Divine mysteries. In Ibn Taymiyya‘s view, however, a Sufi is not supposed to comprehend God‘s unknowable essence, but he should simply follow His command explicated in His Book. Metaphysically-oriented speculative Sufi ideas are not compatible with the fundamental doctrines of the sharī‘a, nor with the practice of the salaf al-ṣāliḥūn.20
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Ibn Taymiyya‘s position vis -à-vis Muslim religious groups and their theories is based solely on his own understanding of the sharī‘a. Any given idea is admissible or reprehensible in accordance with its compatibility with the heavenly regulations realized by the early Muslim generations in their practical lives. On this basis, Ibn Taymiyya does not differentiate Sufi beliefs and practices from the ideas of any other Muslim theological or legal group. He certainly appreciates spiritual significance of Sufism to the religious life of every believer. In this regard, within the framework of Ibn Taymiyya‘s own ideas and beliefs, Sufis m performs an indispensable role in the Muslim community. Since he does not appreciate a pious life based simply on external rituals, he welcomes Sufi practices insofar as they internalize religious beliefs. In order to overcome some negative characteristics, such as egoism, hypocrisy, and pride embedded in human personality, Ibn Taymiyya promotes moderate Sufi methods to discipline the human self. Whenever, however, he comes to the intellectual and speculative Sufi teachings and personalities, considering them not genuine Sufi ideas and individuals he severely criticizes them. He repeatedly emphasizes that the literal understanding of the Qur‘an and Sunna represents the only criterion for testing every religious belief and practice.
Related Reading:
Ibnul Qayyim and Sufism