In Defense of Shaykhs Ibn Baz and Salih Al-Uthaymeen

Below is a translation of Ustadh Alaa’ Hasan’s article, Da‘áwá al-munāwi’īn li-fatáwá Ibn Bāz wa-Ibn ‘Uthaymīn.

Introduction:

Discussions periodically arise regarding the fatwas of contemporary scholars, among the most prominent of whom are Shaykhs ‘Abd al-‘Azīz ibn ‘Abd Allāh Ibn Bāz and Shaykh Muḥammad ibn Ṣāliḥ al-‘Uthaymīn. These discussions are often dominated by accusations by those who disagree with them that they are rigid, extreme, or even takfīrī, particularly concerning their positions on those who differ with them in creed and jurisprudence.

However, a study of their fatwas within their historical and scholarly contexts reveals a balanced approach grounded in Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamā‘ah’s principles. It also demonstrates a respect for scholarly disagreement and a spirit of tolerance toward those with differing views. Likely, the rigidity of some followers and the instrumentalization of the two scholars’ fatwas in service of extremist ideologies have inadvertently contributed to the perception that Salafī scholars’ fatwas incite extremism.

For this reason, at the Salaf Research and Studies Center, we have sought to address the most prominent issues raised concerning the fatwas of Shaykh Ibn Bāz and Shaykh al-‘Uthaymīn. We will examine how these fatwas have been misunderstood while also clarifying their similarities and differences in relation to other scholars’ positions throughout Islamic history.

First Section: The Position of Ibn Bāz and al-‘Uthaymīn Toward Opponents

To begin with, what many of their opponents do not realize is that Salafī scholars diverge from the Ḥanbalī school in matters of declaring an innovator who actively propagates his views to be a disbeliever, as well as in rejecting the testimony of an innovator who merely follows others in his views. They hold—following Ibn Taymiyyah—that a person who engages in interpretation (ta’wīl) and sincerely seeks the truth is neither declared a disbeliever nor deemed immoral, regardless of whether he is an active proponent of his views or merely an adherent. Ibn Taymiyyah’s position aligns with rational principles, for as long as an interpretation is established without the influence of personal desire, there remains no justification for invalidating one’s integrity (‘adālah).

The madhab on this issue is outlined as follows:

Al-Majd, may Allah have mercy on him, stated:

“The correct view is that in every innovation for which we declare its proponent to be a disbeliever, we deem the follower of that innovation immoral. This includes those who claim that the Qur’an is created, that Allah’s knowledge is created, that His names are created, that He will not be seen in the Hereafter, that the Companions should be reviled, or that Iman consists merely of belief and similar views. If a person is knowledgeable about one of these innovations, actively calls to it, and debates over it, then he is ruled to be a disbeliever. Imām Aḥmad explicitly affirmed this in multiple instances.”[1]

Ibn al-Najjār al-Futūḥī stated:

“The one who engages in ijtihād and actively calls to such beliefs is deemed a disbeliever. The Rāfiḍah are those who believe that the Companions were either disbelievers or immoral for granting leadership to someone other than ‘Alī. The Jahmiyyah are those who deny that Allah is established upon His Throne and who claim that the written Qur’an in the muṣḥaf is not the actual speech of Allah, but rather a mere representation of it.”[2]

Al-Mardāwī stated:

“His statement: (The testimony of an immoral person is not accepted, whether his immorality stems from actions or beliefs). This is the official madhab and the position of the Ḥanbalī scholars. In al-Furū‘, it is noted that this was the majority’s choice. It is mentioned in al-Wāḍiḥ that according to one report, such a person is ruled a disbeliever like a mujtahid, while another report states that he is not ruled as such. The author of al-Talkhīṣ adopted this latter view, as did Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn, may Allah have mercy on him, who held that no one should be deemed immoral on this basis.”[3]

Thus, it is evident that Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyyah was more lenient in granting excuses, whereas the Ḥanbalīs leaned toward both takfīr and tafsīq. In contrast, Ibn Taymiyyah refrained from labeling anyone as immoral at all out of consideration for ijtihād and ta’wīl. There is no doubt that most Salafīs—such as Ibn ‘Uthaymīn and Ibn Bāz—followed Ibn Taymiyyah in this regard. This means that the Salafī stance is more flexible and accommodating compared to the strictness of the traditional Ḥanbalī position. Therefore, it is fitting to clarify the position of Shaykh Ibn Bāz and Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn concerning the Ash‘arīs in the following section.

1) The Position of Ibn Bāz on the Ash‘arīs

Shaykh Ibn Bāz, may Allah have mercy on him, stated: “The Ash‘arīs are among Ahl al-Sunnah in most matters, but they are not from them in their interpretation of the divine attributes. They are not disbelievers; rather, among them are imams, scholars, and virtuous individuals. However, they erred in their interpretation of some of the attributes. They opposed Ahl al-Sunnah in certain issues, among them the interpretation of most of the divine attributes, and they were mistaken in their approach.”[4]

In response to Shaykh al-Ṣābūnī, he said:

“This statement requires clarification, as it contains both truth and falsehood. His claim—that interpreting some of the attributes does not remove a Muslim from the fold of Ahl al-Sunnah—is generally correct. Someone who interprets certain attributes, like the Ash‘arīs, does not thereby leave the Muslim community, nor does he cease to be part of Ahl al-Sunnah in matters other than the attributes. However, he is not included among Ahl al-Sunnah when discussing their affirmation of the divine attributes.”[5]

In general, Shaykh Ibn Bāz, may Allah have mercy on him, leaned toward a nuanced approach and refrained from issuing broad judgments of innovation. Instead, he would assess the specific doctrinal deviation itself.

2- The Position of Ibn ‘Uthaymīn on the Ash‘arīs

It is well known among researchers that the stance of Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn was more flexible than that of others and broader in granting excuses—something acknowledged by both his opponents and his supporters.

Ibn ‘Uthaymīn stated: “No one excludes the Ash‘arīs and Māturīdīs from the fold of Islam except someone ignorant of their reality or ignorant of the causes of kufr and expulsion from Islam. Those knowledgeable in these matters have not ruled them outside of Islam, nor have they excluded them from Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamā‘ah except in the areas where they differed from Ahl al-Sunnah. A person may possess an aspect of deviation from the truth while also having an aspect of adherence to it. This does not completely remove him from the people of truth. Rather, he is judged according to what he deserves and described with what befits him, so that justice is maintained.”[6]

The reader may even be surprised to learn that Ibn ‘Uthaymīn considered an Ash‘arī who arrived at his views through interpretation and ijtihād to be rewarded, falling within the principle of either receiving a single reward or a double reward. Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn, may Allah have mercy on him, stated:

“One of the principles of Ahl al-Sunnah wal-Jamā‘ah is that a person may combine both Sunnah and innovation in himself, as long as the innovation is not one of disbelief. It is well known that the Ash‘arī innovation does not expel one from Islam. There is also no harm in praising those among them who benefit the Muslim community, as they deserve such recognition. As for their innovations, if we know—or strongly assume—that they arrived at them through ijtihād, then they fall within the category of receiving either one or two rewards. Every mujtahid in this ummah, when dealing with issues where ijtihād is permissible, will not be deprived of either one or two rewards, as the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, said: ‘If a judge rules and strives to reach the correct decision and succeeds, he receives two rewards, and if he rules and strives but errs, he receives one reward.’”[7]

Reflect on the previous stance of Salafī scholars and compare it to the stance of many of their contemporary opponents—those who do not even permit praying behind Salafīs because they deem them anthropomorphists. Who, then, is truly engaging in takfīr?

The Stances of the Two Shaykhs on Disagreements with Contemporary Scholars

1- The Position of Ibn Bāz on Some Contemporary Scholars

Shaykh Ibn Bāz maintained bonds of friendship with contemporary scholars of various backgrounds without scrutinizing their personal beliefs. He upheld respect for scholarly disagreement, particularly with those considered people of knowledge, even if they held different doctrinal positions.

1. He frequently critiqued many of his contemporaries who endorsed certain innovations or means leading to shirk. Nevertheless, he adhered to the etiquette of scholarly disagreement. One example is his correspondence with Shaykh al-Būṭī (may Allah have mercy on him) regarding the permissibility of seeking blessings (tabarruk) through saints and graves. The utmost respect and academic decorum marked his discussion. He began his letter with: “To the esteemed and honored brother, Dr. Muḥammad Sa‘īd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī, may Allah grant him success...”[8]

When responding to al-Būṭī’s second letter, he wrote: “I have reviewed the section you referred to in your letter and read it carefully. I found it to be a beneficial and valuable discussion—may Allah increase your reward and grant both me and you more knowledge and guidance. However, I have some observations in addition to what was mentioned.” He then proceeded to critique al-Būṭī’s position respectfully.[9]

Observe the profound etiquette and respect he maintained toward his interlocutor despite considering the issue a matter of impermissible innovation.

2. Ibn Bāz did not object to the printing of Al-Ḥalāl wal-Ḥarām by Shaykh al-Qaraḍāwī despite the fact that Al-Ḥalāl wal-Ḥarām contained rulings that Shaykh Ibn Bāz considered to be innovations or prohibitions, he nonetheless approved its printing. This was because he believed that scholarly disagreement should remain within the realm of academic discourse without restricting differing opinions.[10]

Shaykh al-Qaraḍāwī also spoke of Ibn Bāz, saying:

“I have not seen anyone like Shaykh Ibn Bāz in his warmth and graciousness toward his fellow scholars, nor in his kindness and generosity toward his students, nor his gentleness and compassion toward those in need—whether from his own country or the broader Muslim community. He was among the best in character, approachable, and beloved by all.

I saw him in the Islamic Fiqh Academy attentively listening to all opinions—whether in agreement with him or in opposition. He received them all with interest, responded with utmost courtesy, and disagreed with gentleness and tolerance, without arrogance or condescension toward anyone, whether they were seasoned scholars or budding students. He conducted himself with the manners of prophethood and embodied the ethics of the Qur’an.

I do not know of anyone among the followers of Islam who harbored a dislike for Shaykh Ibn Bāz—unless he was someone with a corrupt faith, a flawed creed, or a misguided understanding. He was truly among the sincere, those who learn and apply, who act with sincerity, and whose sincerity is reflected in their truthfulness. I believe him to be as such, and Allah is his judge.”[11]

3- Ibn Bāz’s Approach to Disagreement with Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī:

Shaykh al-Mūsā, may Allah have mercy on him—the director of Shaykh Ibn Bāz’s office—narrated:

“When Shaykh Muḥammad al-Ghazālī arrived in Riyadh to receive his award from the King Faisal International Prize committee, he visited Shaykh Ibn Bāz at his home. At that time, there was considerable controversy surrounding Shaykh al-Ghazālī’s book, Al-Sunnah al-Nabawiyyah bayna Ahl al-Fiqh wa-Ahl al-Ḥadīth. The book had been read to Shaykh Ibn Bāz, and yet, when al-Ghazālī visited him, he welcomed him with warmth, honored him, treated him kindly, and inquired about the state of da‘wah in Algeria and their needs. He assured him that he was fully prepared to support their efforts. At the time, Shaykh al-Ghazālī served as the president of a university in Algeria.

As usual, Shaykh Ibn Bāz’s gathering was filled with visitors, questioners, and those in need while the phone rang continuously. His scribes sat around him, reading aloud. Amid all this, whenever he found a moment, he would turn toward Shaykh al-Ghazālī, greet him, and engage him in friendly conversation. Al-Ghazālī was visibly impressed by what he observed.

During their discussion, Shaykh Ibn Bāz said to him, ‘I have read your aforementioned book. As you know, human beings are prone to error; we, like others, are not exempt from this. I have read parts of your book and have noted some observations.’

Shaykh al-Ghazālī responded, ‘I would be delighted if you could complete reading it and share your remarks with me. If there are errors, I will, Allah willing, correct them.’ He then said something to that effect.

Meanwhile, as Shaykh Ibn Bāz was responding to a phone call, a discussion arose between Shaykh al-Ghazālī and one of the attending scholars, Shaykh Khayr al-Dīn Wanlī from Syria. Shaykh Khayr al-Dīn said, ‘You stated such and such in your book,’ upon which al-Ghazālī reacted strongly, and the discussion became heated.

Hearing their exchange, Shaykh Ibn Bāz turned to them and asked, ‘What is the matter?’ Al-Ghazālī explained, ‘He said such and such.’

Shaykh Ibn Bāz then addressed them both, saying, ‘These matters should be placed within their proper academic context. We must strive earnestly to unify our ranks and avoid discord. We are facing significant issues that concern fundamental principles.’ He calmed their tempers, and the debate subsided.

Shaykh al-Ghazālī had been invited to lunch elsewhere but stayed at Shaykh Ibn Bāz’s gathering, where he dined with him instead. As he was about to leave, he looked at Shaykh Ibn Bāz and said, ‘We are in good hands as long as this man is among us.’”[12]

The Egyptian writer, Ustādh Walīd Kassāb, narrated:

“Dr. ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm ‘Uwais, may Allah have mercy on him, told me that Shaykh al-Ghazālī once visited Shaykh Ibn Bāz, may Allah have mercy on him. When Shaykh Ibn Bāz sensed his arrival, he stood up to receive him—something he was not accustomed to doing, as he would not stand for any visitor, not even for princes. Upon seeing this, Shaykh al-Ghazālī bowed down and kissed his head. Shaykh Ibn Bāz attempted to return the gesture, but Shaykh al-Ghazālī prevented him. Dr. ‘Abd al-Ḥalīm reported that as Shaykh al-Ghazālī left, tears welled in his eyes, and he said, ‘This is a man of Paradise.’”[13]

2- Ibn ‘Uthaymīn’s Stance Toward the Scholars of Al-Azhar

In Liqāʾ al-Bāb al-Maftūḥ, a gathering where he answered questions, the following exchange took place:

A questioner asked: “The adhān for Fajr was called, and five minutes later, the imām arrived, gave the iqāmah, and led the prayer. What is the ruling on this prayer?”

Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn responded by asking: “In which country did this occur?”

The questioner replied: “In Egypt.”

Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn then answered: “Ask Shaykh al-Azhar about it.”

When the questioner insisted on receiving a direct ruling from him, Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn cut him off and said: “Do you want me to give you a fatwa? My fatwa is that you refer the matter to Shaykh al-Azhar.”[14]

This response reflected his concern for maintaining unity and harmony among the scholars within a single country. Although the questioner sought Ibn ‘Uthaymīn’s opinion because of his trust in him, the Shaykh deliberately directed him to Al-Azhar, recognizing its authority and importance in Egypt.

Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn emphasized the importance of adhering to the scholarly authority within one’s own country to prevent societal fragmentation. He stated:

“As for the general public, they are bound to follow the scholars of their country so that they do not become unrestrained. If we were to tell a layperson that he could adopt any opinion that comes his way, the ummah would cease to be a unified community. For this reason, our Shaykh, ‘Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Sa‘dī, may Allah have mercy on him, used to say: ‘The common folk follow the madhhab of their scholars.’”[15]

- Similarly, when Ibn ‘Uthaymīn was asked about a man working in an interest-based bank based on a fatwa issued by Shaykh Sayyid Ṭanṭāwī, may Allah have mercy on him, who was then the Grand Mufti of Egypt, the questioner sought guidance on two issues:

1. Should he accept this man’s invitation?

2. Is his salary considered unlawful wealth?

Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn, may Allah have mercy on him, responded:

“If this man sincerely followed the fatwa of this scholar and was not merely seeking out concessions, then he bears no sin whatsoever. Allah says: ‘So ask the people of knowledge if you do not know’ [An-Naḥl: 43]. He has followed a scholar, and thus he is not at fault—just as if someone ate camel meat and then asked a scholar, who told him that eating camel meat does not nullify wudūʾ, and so he prayed without renewing his ablution. Would his prayer be invalid? No. Similarly, this individual who engaged in a transaction involving ribā based on the ruling of a scholar he follows, and without intending to follow his desires or seek concessions, is not blameworthy.”[16]

After this, Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn proceeded to explain why he considered the fatwa incorrect and clarified the sound ruling on the matter.

What may surprise the reader even more is that Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn held that a layperson should not be condemned for adhering to the scholars of his country, even in matters like smoking. He stated:

“As for matters that harm only the individual himself—such as a man who smokes and says, ‘I believe it is permissible, and I do not see it as forbidden, and my scholars say that it is permissible’—we leave him if he is a layperson because a layperson follows the rulings of his scholars. If he says, ‘I believe it is not prohibited,’ we do not object to him because this only harms him. However, if it is medically proven that it harms others by suffocating or disturbing them with its smell, then we may prohibit it on that basis.”[17]

Although some may view this ruling as excessively lenient, it exemplifies Ibn ‘Uthaymīn’s broad-mindedness and deep respect for scholarly differences.

Based on the preceding discussion, the claim made by some contemporary figures that Salafī scholars do not respect scholarly disagreement and hastily declare opponents as innovators (mubtadi‘ūn) is incorrect. This misconception has arisen primarily due to two reasons:

1. Failure to Distinguish Between Theoretical and Practical Contexts

Many critics fail to differentiate between academic discourse and practical application. Scholars may prefer a particular opinion and refute opposing views within a scholarly discussion. If someone then asks them about a controversial issue and they respond by stating that it is an innovation (bid‘ah) or impermissible (ḥarām), the listener may wrongly assume that the scholars are labeling the person who holds that opinion as an innovator or sinner, or even as misguided. However, this assumption is incorrect, as theoretical denunciation (inkār naẓarī) does not necessarily entail practical condemnation (inkār ‘amalī).

2. The Conduct of Extremist Followers or Some Students of Knowledge

Another reason for this misconception is the behavior of some overly zealous followers or students of knowledge who exhibit excessive harshness in their denunciation while citing the fatwas of Ibn Bāz and Ibn ‘Uthaymīn. While these fatwas may be valid within their scholarly framework, the rigid follower often fails to apply them correctly, does not adhere to the appropriate legal principles, and disregards the jurisprudence of disagreement (fiqh al-khilāf).

Consequently, when critics encounter extremists who justify their approach using the words of Ibn Bāz and Ibn ‘Uthaymīn, they assume that these followers accurately represent their scholars’ methodology. As a result, they generalize their judgment, failing to differentiate between the scholars themselves and their misinformed adherents.

Second Section: Is Criticism of the Ash‘arī School Evidence of Extremism?

Some opponents argue that Shaykh Ibn Bāz and Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn’s critiques of the Ash‘arī school in their explanations of theological texts are evidence of extremism. They point to statements in which the scholars describe the Ash‘arī school as part of the Mu‘aṭṭilah (those who deny all/some divine attributes) or their assertion that denying divine elevation (‘ulūw) aligns with the stance of the Jahmiyyah or that the Ash‘arīs concurred with the Mu‘tazilah regarding the Qur’an. These expressions, found in the commentaries of Salafī scholars such as Ibn Bāz and Ibn ‘Uthaymīn, are then interpreted as signs of extremism and poor etiquette, with some even comparing them to the Khawārij. The reasoning behind this claim is that the Ash‘arīs include some of the most prominent scholars of the ummah.

In response, we argue that what some perceive as extremism is, in reality, scholarly critique—something neither exclusive to Salafī scholars nor a new phenomenon. The Ḥanbalīs and Ash‘arīs have long engaged in academic criticism of each other’s theological positions, both in classical and modern works. This does not constitute extremism or excessive severity.

To demonstrate this, we will present examples of theological critiques from more recent scholars widely recognized by those who oppose the Salafī approach. We will deliberately avoid citing early scholars so that it is not claimed that this is merely an old dispute revived by the Wahhābīs. Instead, we will reference later scholars whom opponents themselves regard as authoritative.

A- Al-Saffārīnī’s Critique of Later Ash‘arīs

Many contemporary critics of Salafism only recognize Al-Saffārīnī for his statement that Ahl al-Sunnah consists of three groups. They often cite this phrase without carefully reading his works in full.

Al-Saffārīnī explicitly discusses the alignment of later Ash‘arīs with the doctrines of the Marīsiyyah Jahmiyyah:

“After the second century, this doctrine—referred to by the Salaf as the doctrine of the Jahmiyyah—spread due to Bishr ibn Ghiyāth al-Marīsī and his followers... The interpretations found in contemporary books, such as most of those mentioned by Abū Bakr ibn Fūrak in Al-Ta’wīlāt and Abū ‘Abdullāh Muḥammad ibn ‘Umar al-Rāzī in his book Ta’sīs al-Taqdīs, are the very same interpretations recorded by Bishr al-Marīsī in his book. This is evident from the refutation compiled by ‘Uthmān ibn Sa‘īd al-Dārimī, where he quoted these exact interpretations from Bishr al-Marīsī and refuted them with arguments so clear that any intelligent and perceptive person who reads them will undoubtedly recognize the truth of the doctrine of the Salaf. He will also realize the strength of their argument and the weakness of those who opposed them. The imams of guidance unanimously condemned the Marīsiyyah, with most of them declaring them to be disbelievers or severely misguided. By reading the work of Ibn Sa‘īd al-Dārimī, it becomes clear that this doctrine, which has spread among these later scholars who call themselves the Khalaf, is, in reality, the doctrine of the Marīsiyyah. There is no power nor strength except with Allah.”[18]

In this passage, Al-Saffārīnī equates the theological positions of Ibn Fūrak, Al-Rāzī, and later Ash‘arīs with the views of Bishr al-Marīsī and the Jahmiyyah, expressing regret over the state of later scholars.

To the fair-minded reader, what difference exists between the statements of contemporary Salafīs and the remarks of Al-Saffārīnī above? In fact, his words are even stronger, as neither Ibn Bāz nor Ibn ‘Uthaymīn classify the Ash‘arīs as pure Jahmiyyah.

2- Al-Saffārīnī on the Ash‘arīs’ Agreement with the Mu‘tazilah

Al-Saffārīnī dedicated a section titled “The Ash‘arīs’ Agreement with the Mu‘tazilah,” in which he stated:

“In summary, the Mu‘tazilah agree with the Ash‘arīs, and the Ash‘arīs agree with the Mu‘tazilah in that the Qur’an, which is between the two covers of the muṣḥaf, is created and originated. The only difference between the two groups is that the Mu‘tazilah do not affirm any speech for Allah beyond this, whereas the Ash‘arīs affirm an eternal, intrinsic speech (kalām nafsī) subsisting within His essence.”[19]

He also stated:

“This also serves as evidence for the invalidity of the view that Allah did not reveal the Arabic Qur’an but is instead created—whether in Jibrīl, in Muḥammad, or in another entity such as the air. This is the view of the Kullābiyyah and the Ash‘arīs, who claim that the Arabic Qur’an is not the speech of Allah.”[20]

Al-Saffārīnī further remarked:

“This is one of the greatest issues in which the innovators among the mutakallimūn and the heretical philosophers have fallen into confusion. It has reached the point where a single individual authors multiple books, supporting one view in one book and a different view in another—this is evident in the writings of Al-Rāzī, Al-Āmidī, Abū Ḥāmid [Al-Ghazālī], and others.”[21]

The Key Takeaway:

Al-Saffārīnī explicitly stated that the Ash‘arīs agree with the Mu‘tazilah on the issue of the Qur’an being created. Yet, if Ibn ‘Uthaymīn had made the same statement, he would have been harshly condemned, accused of misunderstanding the Ash‘arī school, and subjected to the usual accusations. However, since these words come from Al-Saffārīnī—a figure not associated with contemporary Salafism—the same level of criticism is absent. This double standard reveals that the objection is often not to the critique’s content but to who is making it.

B- Ibn al-Najjār al-Futūḥī’s Position

Ibn al-Najjār al-Futūḥī stated:

“The mujtahid who actively calls to such beliefs is deemed a disbeliever. The Rāfiḍah are those who believe that the Companions were either disbelievers or immoral for granting leadership to someone other than ‘Alī. The Jahmiyyah are those who believe that Allah is not established upon His Throne and that the written Qur’an in the muṣḥaf is not the actual speech of Allah, but rather a mere representation of it.”[22]

This position represents the official stance of the Ḥanbalī school, as Ibn al-Najjār and Al-Mardāwī are among the primary authorities in the school’s later scholarship. However, scholars began avoiding such statements in their commentaries as the Ash‘arī school became dominant in later centuries. For instance, the renowned Ḥanbalī scholar Al-Buhūtī, in his commentary on Al-Muntahá, provided alternative examples that did not directly apply to the Ash‘arīs. On the other hand, Shaykh Al-Khalwatī, in his marginal notes on Al-Muntahá, openly criticized Ibn al-Najjār, citing Al-Sa‘d Al-Taftāzānī’s claim that the Qur’an consists of eternal intrinsic speech (kalām nafsī), whereas the written words and verses are created. Al-Khalwatī then remarked:

“From this, you can understand the issues in the commentator’s statement—meaning Ibn al-Najjār—so take heed lest your footing slip.”[23]

Regardless of whether Ibn al-Najjār or Al-Khalwatī was correct, the key point is that Ibn al-Najjār classified the Ash‘arī doctrine on the Qur’an and divine elevation (‘ulūw) as a position of kufr and ruled that a mujtahid who actively promoted it was guilty of kufr. His stance is, in fact, far more severe than that of contemporary Salafī scholars.

Nevertheless, it would be incorrect to claim that Ibn al-Najjār explicitly declared all Ash‘arīs to be disbelievers, as the necessary implications of a scholar’s position (lāzim al-madhhab) are not necessarily their actual belief (madhhab). The purpose of citing these historical positions is simply to demonstrate that contemporary Salafī critiques of Ash‘arism are not unprecedented. Consequently, labeling them as inherently extremist or takfīrī is unfounded.

وفي النقل السابق ينتقد النسفي الأشاعرة في نفي صفة الخلق (التكوين)؛ لأنهم يقولون: الخلق هو المخلوق، ولا يثبتون لله خلقًا، ثم يقول بأن هذا القول كفر. فهل الماتريدية متطرفون ويسيئون الأدب مع علماء الأمة الإسلامية؟!

C- The Māturīdīs Criticized the Ash‘arī School and Accused It of Kufr

Abū al-Mu‘īn al-Nasafī, one of the leading scholars of the Māturīdī school, stated:

“The claim made by most of the Mu‘tazilah, all of the Najjāriyyah, and the Ash‘arīs that ‘the act of creation (takwīn) and the created (mukawwan) are one and the same’ is an absurd statement. This is because saying that the act of creation is identical to the created is like saying that striking is the same as the object struck, that breaking is identical to the object broken, and that eating is identical to the food eaten. The invalidity of such a claim is self-evident. Thus, this assertion would result in removing Allah from being the Creator of the world and removing the world from being a creation of Allah. To say such a thing is kufr.”[24]

In this statement, Al-Nasafī strongly criticizes the Ash‘arīs for denying the attribute of takwīn (divine act of creation), as Ash‘arīs claim that creation is identical to the created object and do not affirm a distinct divine attribute of creation. He then explicitly states that this belief constitutes kufr. Yet, would anyone accuse the Māturīdīs of extremism or of disrespecting the scholars of the ummah?

Ibn al-Humām further stated:

“Rustughfanī said: Marriage is not permissible between Ahl al-Sunnah and the Mu‘tazilah. Al-Faḍl added: Nor with one who says, ‘I am a believer, if Allah wills,’ for such a person is a disbeliever. Based on this, marriage with the Shāfi‘īs would be invalid, and there was disagreement over this ruling. Some said it is permissible, while others said that a Māturīdī may marry their daughters, but they should not marry his.”[25]

Similarly, in Al-Fatāwā al-Hindiyyah, it is stated:

“Whoever doubts his faith and says, ‘I am a believer if Allah wills,’ is a disbeliever… Likewise, whoever claims that Iman is created is a disbeliever.”[26]

Taqī al-Dīn al-Subkī himself acknowledged this reality, stating:

“And now, you are aware—may Allah grant you success—of what you have mentioned, that a group of Ḥanafī scholars in this era have spoken on the issue of saying ‘I am a believer if Allah wills,’ and they declared that the Shāfi‘īs are disbelievers for holding this view.”[27]

The Key Takeaway:

Here we see Māturīdī scholars ruling some Ash‘arī beliefs to be kufr, yet this does not mean that they declared all Ash‘arīs to be disbelievers. Any student of knowledge who understands the difference between theoretical implication (ilzām naẓarī) and practical takfīr (ḥukm ‘amalī)—which takes into account valid interpretation (ta’wīl) and finding excuses (i‘tidhār) for opponents—would recognize this distinction.

From the above, it becomes clear that the past was not some idealized utopia where no theological debates occurred, only to be disrupted by Salafīs in modern times, as some critics like to portray. Scholarly critique has always existed and continues to exist. The key, however, is that such discourse should always be conducted with scholarly decorum and proper academic ethics.

Double Standards Among Opponents

If the critics were fair, they would not consider critiques of the Ash‘arī school as extremism. They are fully aware that the scholars of their own school have made far more severe accusations against the Salafīs than the critiques they object to from Salafī scholars.

For instance, accusations of tashbīh (anthropomorphism) and tajsīm (corporalism) against the Ḥanbalīs are widespread. The matter reached such an extent that Shaykh Al-Kawtharī accused major imams of the Salaf—such as Al-Dārimī, Ibn Khuzaymah, ‘Abdullāh ibn Aḥmad, and others—of anthropomorphism. Many contemporary scholars have followed Al-Kawtharī’s claims without proper scrutiny.

Likewise, Dr. Sa‘īd Fūdah said about the imams of the Ḥanbalī school:

“Do not assume, dear reader, that all Ḥanbalīs are anthropomorphists. Rather, among them are anthropomorphists, such as Al-Qāḍī Abū Ya‘lá, Ibn al-Zāghūnī, and Ibn Qudāmah. However, their anthropomorphism is less extreme than that of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn al-Qayyim, and others.”[28]

The individuals Dr. Sa‘īd Fūdah mentions are among the most esteemed scholars of the Ḥanbalī school—figures relied upon in jurisprudence (fiqh) and principles of law (uṣūl). Yet, he labels them as anthropomorphists. He even includes Ibn Qudāmah, the author of Al-Mughnī, one of the most foundational works in Islamic jurisprudence and a highly revered figure in Islamic heritage.

A Clear Contrast

In comparison, neither Ibn ‘Uthaymīn nor Ibn Bāz ever singled out Ash‘arī scholars by name and accused them of being Mu‘aṭṭilah (those who negate Allah’s attributes). Rather, they consistently advised against specifying individuals, differentiating between a general theological classification and personal application (takfīr al-naw‘ wa-takfīr al-‘ayn). They emphasized that major scholars of Islam who erred were muta‘awwilūn (those who engaged in ta’wīl) and deserving of Allah’s mercy.

It is important to clarify that this discussion concerns the methodology of scholars like Ibn Bāz and Ibn ‘Uthaymīn—not the extremists or unknown figures falsely attributed to Salafism who have disrespected the scholars of the ummah. In fact, Salafī scholars themselves have refuted these extremists before anyone else.

Thus, we can confidently and with complete assurance state: The fairness and mercy in the discourse of Salafī scholars far exceed that of many of their critics. However, the fundamental problem with those who accuse Salafī scholars of extremism is that they do not read the works of both sides. Instead, they rely on widely circulated claims about Salafī scholars without engaging in a fair and balanced comparison of both perspectives.

Third Section: The Claim That the Public Is Overburdened, Making Everything Bid‘ah or Shirk

Some critics argue that Salafī scholars—such as Shaykh Ibn Bāz and Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn—have made religious matters overly difficult for the general public. They claim that these scholars frequently denounce common expressions used by ordinary people and classify some of their phrases as kufr or shirk. Examples they cite include the rejection of phrases like “Maddad yā Rasūl Allāh” (Grant us aid, O Messenger of Allah) and “Shayʾ li-llāh yā Badawī” (Something for the sake of Allah, O Badawī). Critics argue that this approach reflects an inclination toward takfīr and undue severity.

Response to This Claim:

This argument can be refuted from multiple angles:

1- The Rejection of Certain Phrases Is Not Exclusive to Salafīs

Denouncing problematic phrases used by the general public is not unique to Salafī scholars. Ash‘arī scholars have also criticized certain beliefs and expressions held by the masses and even ruled that some amount to kufr.

For instance, Al-Sanūsī, may Allah have mercy on him, stated:

“Most of the general public do not attend scholarly gatherings or associate with pious individuals. Many among them actually hold beliefs of anthropomorphism (tashbīh) and directionality (jiha), believe in the influence of nature, assume that Allah acts with a purpose, and hold that His speech consists of letters and sounds, that He speaks at times and falls silent at others—just like human beings. They adopt such doctrines from the people of falsehood. Some of these beliefs have been unanimously ruled as kufr by scholars, while others remain a matter of disagreement.”[29]

Here, Al-Sanūsī criticizes the general public for holding beliefs that he considers blameworthy, some of which he claims have been unanimously declared kufr. However, a closer look reveals that many of these views—such as the belief in Allah’s elevation (‘ulūw), the influence of causes and means, divine wisdom (ḥikmah), speech consisting of letters and sound, and the contingent nature of Allah’s speech—are actually positions upheld by the Salaf.

This demonstrates that condemning specific public expressions is not a phenomenon exclusive to Salafīs. If Ibn Bāz and Ibn ‘Uthaymīn are accused of undue severity for refuting certain common phrases, then the same critique must be applied to Ash‘arī scholars who engaged in similar denouncements. However, critics conveniently overlook this parallel, applying a double standard in their judgment.

2- Judging Excessiveness or Extremism Should Be Based on Objective Standards, Not Mere Sensationalism

The accusation of extremism or excessiveness (ghulūw) should not be based on exaggerated rhetoric or emotional reactions. Rather, statements must be analyzed according to established scholarly principles. The question should be: Do these rulings align with Islamic legal foundations? Do they have valid scholarly justifications?

It is well known that the Ḥanafī school has historically been expansive in its rulings on what constitutes disbelief (mukaffirāt), with some scholars listing up to 400 statements that qualify as kufr—many of them based on necessary implications (takfīr bil-lāzim). Yet, despite this extensive classification, no one accuses the Ḥanafīs of extremism in takfīr.

For instance, Ibn Nujaym states in Al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq:

“In Al-Khāniyyah and Al-Khulāṣah, it is mentioned that if a person contracts a marriage using the testimony of ‘Allah and His Messenger,’ the marriage does not take effect, and he is deemed a disbeliever because he has assumed that the Prophet knows the unseen.”[30]

However, saying ‘I bear witness by Allah and His Messenger’ could be open to interpretation and does not necessarily imply that the speaker believes the Prophet possesses knowledge of the unseen. Despite this, Ḥanafī scholars have classified this phrase as kufr and considered it impermissible.

Similarly, in Al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq, it is stated:

“He is considered a disbeliever for saying ‘Iman increases and decreases’ or for saying ‘I do not know whether a disbeliever is in Paradise or Hell.’”[31]

It also states:

“And for saying, ‘Christianity is better than Judaism,’ because he has affirmed virtue for something evil both in Shariah and reason.”[32]

In Majma‘ al-Anhur, it is mentioned:

“He is considered a disbeliever for honoring a non-Muslim. Even if he greets a dhimmī (a non-Muslim under Muslim protection) with respect or addresses a Zoroastrian with ‘O Master’ (yā ustādh) in a reverential manner, it constitutes disbelief.”[33]

Likewise, in Radd al-Muḥtār by Ibn ‘Ābidīn, it is stated:

“If one greets a disbeliever out of reverence, he is considered a disbeliever because honoring a disbeliever is itself disbelief. If he says to a Zoroastrian, ‘O Master,’ in a manner of reverence, it is disbelief.”[34]

A Clear Contrast

Many of these rulings involve takfīr bil-lāzim (declaring someone a disbeliever based on the necessary implications of their words), a method that most contemporary Salafī scholars do not apply. In fact, many of these rulings would not be classified as kufr at all by Salafī scholars.

This raises a question for the fair-minded observer: If Salafī scholars are accused of excessiveness for warning against certain problematic statements, why is the same accusation not directed at Ḥanafī scholars who have issued far stricter rulings? The answer is simple—critics selectively apply standards against Salafīs while ignoring similar or even stricter positions within other Islamic traditions.

Shaykh Al-Dumyāṭī, a Shāfi‘ī scholar, stated:

“Know that many kinds of disbelief frequently occur on the tongues of the common people without them realizing it. It is therefore obligatory upon scholars to clarify these matters for them so that they may avoid them upon learning of their gravity—lest their deeds be nullified and they be condemned to the greatest punishment and most severe torment.”[35]

Similarly, Al-Qarāfī, a Mālikī scholar, commented on certain supplications uttered by the public that contain statements of disbelief:

“The questioner must be extremely cautious of these supplications and anything similar to them, as they lead to the wrath of the Almighty, eternal damnation in the Hellfire, the nullification of good deeds, the annulment of marriages, and the forfeiture of lives and wealth. All of this corruption results from a single invocation of such supplications, after which one does not return to Islam.”[36]

The Key Takeaway:

This demonstrates that warning against problematic phrases commonly used by the public is not exclusive to Salafī scholars. Some contemporary critics assume otherwise because modern Ash‘arīs have become more lenient and open to various influences, leading them to neglect the duty of forbidding wrong. However, this laxity does not reflect the actual stance of classical Ash‘arī scholars.

Indeed, Salafīs—drawing upon the views of Ibn Taymiyyah—are more meticulous in highlighting phrases associated with shirk, such as “Shayʾ li-llāh” or “Maddad yā Badawī.” Meanwhile, Ash‘arī scholars may focus on different statements they consider kufr. Scholars may disagree on individual cases, but they all acknowledge the existence of harmful expressions that should be corrected. If critics accuse Salafīs of burdening the public, they must also direct the same criticism toward Ash‘arī scholars.

Moreover, the issue of shirk is not exclusive to Salafīs—many other scholars across different traditions have also addressed these concerns. This further reinforces the point that warning against theological errors among the general public is a shared responsibility among scholars, not a unique feature of Salafism.

Here are some examples from non-Salafi schools that reject the practice of calling upon the saints:[37]

Shaykh Al-Tahāwunī, a Ḥanafī Māturīdī scholar—known among the Ḥanafīs as Ḥakīm al-Ummah—was asked about the invocation “Yā Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qādir, shayʾ li-llāh” and similar phrases used in supplication. He responded:

“The impermissibility of this and the absence of any precedent for it among the imams is evident, as is the clarity of the proof against it. Among the evidences is the statement of Allah: ‘And who is more astray than the one who invokes besides Allah those who will not respond to him until the Day of Judgment, and they are unaware of their supplication?’ [Al-Aḥqāf: 5].”[38]

Likewise, Shaykh Al-Tahānawī was asked about invoking the Prophet ﷺ after his passing using direct address or ascribing to anyone other than Allah titles such as “The Remover of Drought and Plague,” “The Reliever of Distress,” or “The Fulfiller of Needs.” What was his ruling on this matter?

Shaykh Al-Tahānawī, may Allah have mercy on him, responded:

“Allah says: ‘Do not say Rā‘inā’ [Al-Baqarah: 104], and the Messenger of Allah ﷺ said: ‘None of you should say: my slave (ʿabdī) or my slave-girl (amatī),’ and he also said: ‘Do not say: What Allah wills and what so-and-so wills.’ In another narration: ‘Do not say: What Allah wills and what Muḥammad wills.’

The phrases mentioned in the question exceed those prohibited expressions by several degrees in their ability to imply shirk with certainty. Regardless of the degree of prohibition, they remain undesirable and disapproved in every case. Since the lighter forms of such expressions were explicitly forbidden by the Prophet ﷺ, then by qiyās al-awlá (a fortiori reasoning), the more severe forms are even more impermissible.”[39]

Qāḍī Thanā’ullāh al-Miẓharī, the Ṣūfī Naqshbandī—renowned among the Ḥanafīs as Bayhaqī al-Waqt—stated:

"Some ignorant people, when facing distress, say: ‘Yā Shaykh ‘Abd al-Qādir al-Jīlānī, shayʾ li-llāh,’ while others say: ‘Yā Khwāja Shams al-Dīn, shayʾ li-llāh.’ This is impermissible; rather, it is shirk and kufr, for Allah Most High says:

‘Indeed, those you invoke besides Allah are servants like you. So call upon them, and let them respond to you if you are truthful’ [Al-A‘rāf: 194].

Those whom the grave worshippers call upon are servants like them, possessing no power to benefit, harm, or fulfill needs.

If one of them argues: ‘This verse was revealed concerning disbelievers who used to invoke idols, whereas we do not call upon idols but rather the awliyā’ (saints) of Allah,’ then the response is that the phrase ‘besides Allah’ (min dūn Allāh) in the verse is general, meaning ‘other than Allah.’ The rule is that the application of a verse is based on the generality of its wording, not the specificity of its revelation. Therefore, the ruling includes prophets, saints, and everything besides Allah. Thus, invoking anything other than Allah during times of distress—whether idols, living beings, or the dead—is impermissible.”[40]

Shaykh Imām ‘Abd al-Ḥayy al-Laknawī, the Ḥanafī Māturīdī, was asked about a man who calls upon and addresses the awliyā’. He responded:

“This is a man of corrupt belief, and he is even at risk of disbelief. The idea that saints can hear calls from afar is not established, and absolute knowledge of all particulars at all times is exclusive to Allah, the Exalted. It is stated in Al-Fatāwā al-Bazzāziyyah: ‘Whoever claims that the souls of the shaykhs are present and possess knowledge has committed kufr.’ End quote. It is also mentioned therein that whoever contracts a marriage with the testimony of ‘Allah and His Messenger’ commits kufr because he assumes that the Messenger knows the unseen. End quote. And Allah knows best.”[41]

Although Al-Laknawī was not a Salafī and even authored refutations of Ibn Taymiyyah regarding the divine attributes and traveling for visitation, this ruling demonstrates that the objections raised against Salafī scholars on these issues are not exclusive to them. Many scholars from various madhāhib have also denounced these practices.

Fourth Section: The Exploitation of Ibn Bāz and Ibn ‘Uthaymīn’s Statements by Extremist Groups

Some critics argue that extremist groups use certain statements from Ibn Bāz and Ibn ‘Uthaymīn to justify their views. From this, they conclude that these fatwas contributed to takfīr and violence or that Ibn Bāz and Ibn ‘Uthaymīn shared the same ideology.

This reasoning is unjust and unfair to the scholars. The refutation of this argument can be outlined as follows:

First Point: The Mere Use of a Scholar’s Words Does Not Mean the Citer Understands Them

The fact that extremist groups cite a scholar’s words does not mean they correctly understand his statements. These groups also quote the works of Ibn Taymiyyah—so what then? Should Ibn Taymiyyah also be accused of extremism or takfīr? No fair-minded critic would make such a claim.

Moreover, these extremist groups have also cited classical jurists such as Al-Nawawī and Zakariyyā al-Anṣārī regarding rulings on killing non-Muslims, tatarus (the use of human shields), and targeting civilians. However, they fail to contextualize these rulings or understand their conditions and limitations properly. Yet, no one accuses these jurists of extremism based on such misinterpretations.

Second Point: Established Legal Principles Dictate That General Statements Must Be Interpreted in Light of Specific Explanations

A fundamental scholarly principle is that ambiguous or general statements (mujmal) should be clarified by detailed explanations (mufassal). The one who made a statement is the most qualified to explain its intended meaning, rather than allowing others to impose their own misinterpretations.

In his commentary on Kitāb al-Tawḥīd—the very same book that extremists cite—Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn states:

“As for those who establish legislative laws while knowing Allah’s ruling and that these laws contradict His ruling, then such a person has replaced the Shariah with these laws, and he is a disbeliever. This is because he would not have preferred this law over Allah’s Shariah unless he believed it to be better for the people and the land than Allah’s law.

However, when we say that he is a disbeliever, we mean that this action leads to kufr. Yet, the one who enacts such laws may still have an excuse. For example, he may have been deceived, such as being told that this does not contradict Islam or that it falls under al-maṣāliḥ al-mursalah (unrestricted public interest). Some scholars—even though they are mistaken—say that transactional matters have no connection to the Shariah but rather depend on what is beneficial for the economy at a given time. They argue that if the circumstances necessitate the establishment of interest-based banks or the imposition of taxes on people, then there is no harm in it. This is undoubtedly an error, but if they engage in ijtihād, Allah may forgive them.”[42]

Reflect on this brilliant legal reasoning by Ibn ‘Uthaymīn, which embodies both knowledge and mercy. While he did state that the essence of the issue constitutes kufr, he also sought excuses for the rulers who implement such laws and the scholars who issued fatwas permitting them. He viewed them as mistaken but engaging in ta’wīl (interpretation).

So, what did the extremist groups do? They took the first part of Ibn ‘Uthaymīn’s statement and ignored the rest. They disregarded his conditions, clarifications, and restrictions. Is this the fault of the Shaykh or the fault of selective and manipulative reading?

In a clear example of this, Ibn ‘Uthaymīn was directly asked about extremist groups in Algeria, who were using his words to argue that general legislation contrary to Shariah is kufr, then concluding from this that the government is composed of disbelievers and that Algeria is a land of disbelief (dār kufr).

Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn, may Allah have mercy on him, responded:

“Their approach is incorrect. May Allah bless you—issuing a ruling on a matter in itself is different from passing judgment on a specific individual. Students of knowledge must understand the distinction between ruling on an issue as a general concept and ruling on the one who enacts it. A specific ruler may have corrupt scholars misleading him, and most Muslim rulers today do not possess knowledge of Islamic law. So when someone comes to them and deceives them, they may be misled.

Have you not seen that some Muslim scholars have even said that Islamic law has no role in any aspect of daily life? They were confused by the Prophet’s ﷺ statement: ‘You are more knowledgeable about your worldly affairs.’ Therefore, we do not declare rulers disbelievers simply because they enact something that constitutes kufr—not until the evidence has been established against them.”[43]

He further stated:

“As for declaring the ruler a disbeliever because of this—consider how long Algeria remained under French colonial rule. 130 years? Now, can such laws, codified by the French, be changed overnight? No, it is not possible.”[44]

It is worth noting that Dr. Sa‘īd Fūdah—one of the well-known contemporary Ash‘arī scholars—also holds the view that ruling by other than Shariah is kufr, yet no one has accused him of takfīr.

Dr. Sa‘īd Fūdah stated:

“There is no doubt whatsoever that contemporary states and governments do not rule by what Allah has revealed. This means that they have not committed themselves to ruling by Islamic law, even if they have adopted some rulings from it in various areas, such as personal laws, commercial transactions, and others. However, they have also mixed these with laws that were not derived from it but rather came from Western legal systems or were invented by themselves.

The previous scholarly disagreement—regarding whether to revolt against a ruler who commits injustice—was about those who ruled by Islam and adhered to it but were oppressive. As for those who have changed and replaced the laws of the religion, their case is clear. They are unquestionably included under the Prophet’s ﷺ statement: ‘Unless you see clear and manifest disbelief.’”[45]

We say to the critics: If we were to apply the same reasoning that opponents use against Salafī scholars, then Dr. Sa‘īd Fūdah’s statement would also serve as an entry point for extremists and takfīrī groups. However—as we have stated—the problem with many lay critics is that they do not read the works of their own scholars. They assume that these kinds of controversial statements are unique to Salafīs, while in reality, similar views exist among non-Salafī scholars as well.

Third Point: Applying the Same Logic Would Require Condemning Many Revered Scholars

If critics were consistent in their reasoning, they would have to condemn many past and present scholars whom they hold in high regard. Many of these scholars have issued fatwas that could be misinterpreted in an extreme way or exploited by deviant groups. Below is an example:

Example 1: Shaykh of Al-Azhar, Muḥammad al-Damanhūrī

Shaykh Muḥammad al-Damanhūrī, the Shaykh al-Azhar and the commentator on Al-Sullam al-Munawraq, authored a treatise titled Al-Ḥujjah al-Bāhirah fī Hadm Kanā’is Miṣr wal-Qāhirah (“The Clear Proof in the Demolition of Churches in Egypt and Cairo”).

In this treatise, he discusses the ruling on prohibiting the construction of new churches in lands conquered by force (‘anwatan) while allowing the continued existence of pre-existing churches. He argues that Egypt was a land conquered by force and adopts the view that churches built after the Islamic conquest should be demolished.

Regardless of whether Shaykh al-Damanhūrī’s legal reasoning was correct or not—since that is a separate issue—there is no doubt that such a treatise could be misused by extremist groups that target churches. However, we are certain that this was not the Shaykh’s intent. Rather, the issue has legal conditions and restrictions that he did not mention explicitly in the treatise, assuming that his readers were students of knowledge who understood that such rulings fall under the jurisdiction of the ruler or qualified judicial authorities, not individuals.

Furthermore, there are considerations of maṣlaḥah (public interest) and mafsadah (harm), along with other nuances that a scholar understands but an ignorant person may overlook.

If extremist groups in our time were to act upon the conclusions of this treatise and proceed to bomb churches, the blame would not fall on Shaykh al-Damanhūrī; may Allah have mercy on him. Rather, it would fall on the ignorant individuals who took his words without acquiring proper knowledge and understanding.

As the saying goes:

“It is upon me to craft verses from their sources,
But it is not upon me if the cattle fail to understand.”

The same applies to certain statements from Ibn Taymiyyah, Shaykh Ibn Bāz, Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn, and others, which some deviant groups have misapplied. These rulings have their own legal context, principles, and conditions, as understood by these scholars, but the misguided have taken them out of context and misused them.

Example 2: Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Ulaysh – The Grand Mālikī Scholar of Al-Azhar

Shaykh Muḥammad ‘Ulaysh, one of the foremost Mālikī scholars of Al-Azhar and a teacher of Muḥammad ‘Abduh, issued rulings prohibiting travel to Europe for education. He also declared that wearing the European hat (burnīṭah) was an act of kufr and even called for the execution of those who wore it, considering it an act of imitation of the disbelievers (tashabbuh bil-kuffār).

He wrote in response to a contemporary:

“It has been established in Islamic law that traveling to the land of the enemy for trade wounds one’s testimony and compromises one’s integrity (‘adālah), let alone settling there and residing for an extended period. This man was previously unknown and considered upright, but he has now exposed himself as one of the so-called scholars of Islam who has abandoned the limits of the Shariah, engaged in immoral behavior, disregarded the defect in his testimony, and neglected the flaw in his integrity. He has chosen to live among the disbelievers in their lands, turning away from residing among Muslims and the vast lands available to them. What a disgrace! What a shameful scandal!

As for his claim that ‘they came from their lands for the purpose of learning,’ this only proves his ignorance of what knowledge is sought and what is not. It is established in Islamic law that the knowledge to be pursued consists of religious sciences and their tools, such as Arabic sciences. Beyond that, additional knowledge is not to be sought but rather avoided. It is well known that Christians do not possess any knowledge of Islamic sciences or their tools at all. Most of their sciences pertain to storytelling,[46] entertainment, and barbering, which are among the lowest professions among Muslims. It has been established in their own religion that these professions compromise one’s integrity…

It is established in Islamic law that those who engage in such practices are to be commanded to repent, return to their religion, and adopt the appearance of Muslims. They are to be given three days to do so. If they repent within this period, their repentance is accepted, and they are freed. However, if the three days pass without their repentance, their heads are to be struck off with the sword, they are not to be washed, they are not to be prayed over, for they have died upon disbelief.

Peace be upon those who follow the guidance. Praise be to the One who has illuminated the hearts of the believers with faith.”[47]

Shaykh ‘Ulaysh’s position, may Allah have mercy on him, reflects a strict stance that does not consider the objectives of the Shariah (maqāṣid al-sharī‘ah). In contrast, Ibn Taymiyyah offers a more flexible and balanced perspective. He states:

“If a Muslim resides in a land of war or a non-hostile land of disbelief, he is not required to outwardly differ from them in appearance if doing so would cause him harm. In fact, at times, it may even be recommended or obligatory for him to adopt their external customs if there is a religious benefit in doing so—such as inviting them to Islam, gaining insight into their inner affairs to inform Muslims, or preventing harm from reaching Muslims. These and similar beneficial purposes may necessitate such actions.”[48]

Consider this maqāṣid-oriented reasoning from Ibn Taymiyyah and compare it to Shaykh ‘Ulaysh’s fatwa, which includes takfīr and the call for execution. Additionally, Shaykh ‘Ulaysh’s prohibition of learning in non-Muslim lands, his restriction of knowledge to religious sciences alone, and his opposition to the study of industrial and technical sciences reflect an imprudent position.

In contrast, Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn permits studying in Western countries under specific conditions.[49]

The Key Takeaway:

If extremists were to exploit Shaykh ‘Ulaysh’s ruling to declare wearers of the burnīṭah (European hat) as disbelievers and to justify shedding their blood, the fault would not lie with the Shaykh himself. His fatwa was issued in a specific historical context and had its own conditions. Moreover, matters of ta‘zīr (discretionary punishment) are not for individuals to enforce but rather fall under the jurisdiction of Islamic courts and legitimate rulers.

Conclusion

It has become clear that the fatwas of Shaykh Ibn Bāz and Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn, may Allah have mercy on them, were grounded in established scholarly principles while taking into account ijtihād, granting excuses, and considering valid interpretations for opponents. Despite attempts by some to exploit their opinions—whether to discredit them or to promote extremist ideologies—it is evident that their positions were never aimed at declaring Muslims as disbelievers or sinners. Rather, their rulings were academic warnings intended to safeguard correct ‘aqīdah.

A balanced and comparative analysis of the views of scholars from various schools demonstrates that scholarly discourse is not the exclusive domain of any one group. Rather, it remains a field open to critique and disagreement, provided that it remains within the bounds of respect and ijtihād.

May Allah send blessings and peace upon our Prophet Muḥammad, his family, and his companions.

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[1] Al-Inṣáf, Al-Mardáwī (12/48).

[2] Ma‘ūnat Ūlī al-Nuhá (11/436).

[3] Al-Inṣáf (12/36).

[4] Majmū‘ Fatáwá wa-Maqálát al-Shaykh Ibn Báz (28/257).

[5] Majmū‘ Fatáwá wa-Rasá’il Ibn Báz (3/74).

[6] Majmū‘ Fatáwá wa-Rasá’il Ibn ‘Uthaymín (1/235).

[7] Majmū‘ Fatáwá Ibn ‘Uthaymín (1/438).

[8] Majmū‘ Fatáwá wa-Maqálát al-Shaykh Ibn Báz (4/353).

[9] Ibid.

[10] An article on Dr. Yūsuf al-Qaraḍáwī’s website titled: Ibn Báz wal-Qaraḍáwī: Ikhtiláf Ḥáṣil wa-Adab Jamm.

[11] See: Imám al-‘Aṣr, Náṣir al-Zahrání (p. 138).

[12] Jawánib min Sīrat al-Imám Ibn Báz, Muḥammad ibn Ibráhím al-Ḥamd (p. 280).

[13] The article Fī Dhikrá al-Ghazálī by Walíd Kassáb, published by the International Union of Muslim Scholars.

[14] Liqā’ al-Bāb al-Maftūḥ No. (232).

[15] Liqā’ al-Bāb al-Maftūḥ (49/192-193).

[16] Silsilat Liqā’ al-Bāb al-Maftūḥ -126b.

[17] Liqā’ al-Bāb al-Maftūḥ (34/11).

[18] Lawāmi‘ al-Anwār (1/299).

[19] Lawāmi‘ al-Anwār (1/165).

[20] Ibid. (1/163).

[21] Ibid. (1/299).

[22] Ma‘ūnat Ūlī al-Nuhá (11/436).

[23] Ḥáshiyat al-Khalwatī ‘alá al-Muntahá (pp. 249-251).

[24] Al-Tamhíd (p. 29). See also: Tabṣirat al-Adillah (p. 428).

[25] Fatḥ al-Qadīr (3/230).

[26] Al-Fatāwá al-Hindíyyah (2/257).

[27] Fatāwá al-Imām al-Subkí (1/53).

[28] Tahdhíb Sharḥ al-Sanūsíyyah (p. 12).

[29] Sharḥ Umm al-Baráhīn (p. 86).

[30] Al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq (3/155).

[31] Al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq (5/131).

[32] Al-Baḥr al-Rā’iq (3/366).

[33] Majma‘ al-Anhur (2/705).

[34] Radd al-Muḥtár (9/592).

[35] I‘ánat al-Ṭálibín (4/149).

[36] Al-Furūq (4/265).

[37] Translator’s note: See: Non-“Wahhabi” Quotes on Venerating the Dead

[38] Imdād al-Fatāwá (4/352).

[39] Imdád al-Fatáwá (4/352).

[40] Irshād al-Ṭālibín (p. 21).

[41] Majmū‘at al-Fatāwá li al-Luknawí (pp. 387-389).

[42] Al-Qawl al-Mufíd ‘alá Kitāb al-Tawḥíd (2/326).

[43] See: Fatāwá al-‘Ulamā’ al-Akābir fīmā Uhdira min Dimā’ al-Jazā’ir (p. 145), and Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymín signed this fatwa in the book.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Al-Sharḥ al-Kabír ‘alá al-‘Aqídah al-Ṭaḥāwíyyah (pp. 1050-1051).

[46] Most likely a typographical error; the correct term should be al-ḥayākah (weaving).

[47] Shaykh ‘Ulaysh’s treatise was cited in Majallat al-Risālah, issue 467, under the title: Ra’y al-Azharíyyīn fī Lubs al-Burníṭah. The original manuscript is preserved in the Makhṭūṭāt al-Azhar al-Sharíf, manuscript number 305297 (Fiqh ‘Āmm).

[48] Iqtiḍā’ al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqím (pp. 176-177).

[49] Majmū‘ Fatāwá al-Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymīn (6/131-132).