Those who stay abreast of the ongoing discussions and conversations surrounding the attributes of Allah are well-acquainted with this topic. I even addressed it in a section of my article titled, The Hanbali School’s Aqeedah on Allah’s Attributes.
Below is a translation of Shaykh Faris al-‘Ajami’s telegram post on this topic.
What is the difference between the Ḥādith (temporal emergent event) and Makhlūq (created object)? Both have a beginning in time; thus, what distinguishes one from the other?
Response: The distinction between Ḥādith and Makhlūq, according to those who affirm such terms, has proven problematic for those who reject the distinction. They find differentiating between the two terms to be difficult. They apprehend the overlap and similarity between the two, and as a result, overlook the dissimilarity and consequently inquire: what is the difference between them?!
They are like those who say there is no difference between ‘Araḍ (accident) and Ṣifah (attribute) because both require a locus/essence to subsist in. This is despite the fact that most of the Ṣifātiyyah (theologians who affirm the reality of Divine attributes) differentiate between the two. The ‘Araḍ is spatial due to the very fact that its locus is spatial, for since the locus is spatial, then anything subsisting in it is spatial as well by default. However, the Ṣifah is not thus described. If we are to apply the same method the rejecters [between Ḥādith and Makhlūq] use, we should also make no distinction between the Araḍ and Ṣifah because both require a locus!
Several scholars affirm the distinction between Ḥādith and Makhlūq. However, at most times, the request for differentiation is usually directed to Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728AH/1328CE) and his followers. Ibn Taymiyyah has spoken about this distinction in several of his works. The gist of his stance is:
a. The Arabic language does not deem both terms equal. Linguistically, the Ḥādith is not the same as the Makhlūq. As far as Ibn Taymiyyah was concerned, creation (khalq) linguistically entails the manufacturing and designing of something. And temporality (Ḥudūth), linguistically, entails the existence of a thing after it had been nonexistent.
From a purely linguistic viewpoint, temporality in some contexts has a more specific meaning than mere existence after being nonexistent. It is deemed a relative issue, such as a relationship of something coming into being after another. For example, last year is new (Ḥāditha) relative to the year before it and deemed old (Qadīm) in relation to this year. Consequently, that which comes into being after nonexistence is called Qadīm linguistically.
As Allah says: As for the moon, We have ordained ˹precise˺ phases for it until it ends up ˹looking˺ like an old (Qadīm), curved palm stalk. [Surah 36:39]. Note how it is referred to as Qadīm even though it is new.
Additionally, in the language of the Shari‘ah, Ḥudūth (temporal emergence) is used without it having the meaning of creation (Khalq). We can see this in the statement of the Prophet (peace be upon him): ‘Allah introduces (Yuḥdithu) into His affairs (the Religion) whatsoever He wishes. Verily, Allah has now legislated (Aḥdatha) that you do not speak while in Ṣalah’. Undoubtedly, the introduction of not speaking cannot be linguistically equivalent to: creating not speaking in Salah!
Similarly, is Allah’s statement: And thus have we sent it down as an Arabic Qur’an and have diversified therein the warnings that perhaps they will avoid (sin) or it would cause (Yuḥdithu) them remembrance [Surah 20:113]
b. The Makhlūq is the Maf‘ūl (object of action). The Ḥādith is not the Maf‘ūl; rather, the Makhlūq that is Maf‘ūl arises from [an act that is] Ḥādith, which is the divine act of Allah. The act of creating is an act of Allah that is Ḥādith, while the Makhlūq is the effect of this temporal action. Where, then, is this supposed similarity between the action and its object? How does one claim that there is no difference between the Ḥādith and the Makhlūq when there exists the very difference between an action and its object? The following third response makes the matter clearer:
c. The Ḥādith subsists in the doer as its attribute, while the Makhlūq is separate and distinct from him. The Ḥādith that is not Makhlūq is simply an attribute of the doer. As for such Ḥādiths that are Makhlūq, they are either essences or attributes of an essence separate from the doer. This is why the Prophet referred to what human beings do of speech and actions as Muḥdathan (i.e., emergent actions). He did not call them Makhlūqan. For instance, he said: “beware of newly invented (Muḥdathat) matters.” If he had said: beware of created matters, it would have conveyed an inaccurate meaning. Had both words been synonymous, this would have been appropriate.
d. There is another issue that Ibn Taymiyyah did not explicitly mention, which is that the Ḥādith action of Allah has a perfect Divine reality. As for the Makhlūq, then it is clearly not like that. Of course, there is no doubt as to the difference between that which has a perfect Divine reality and that which has a dependent transient nature. This difference is the clearest one of all. And this is specifically for such a Ḥādith that is the action of Allah.
Much can be said, but these suffice.
Example of the difference between Divine hadith and makhluq:
And whoever abandons his religion from amongst you and dies whilst he is a disbeliever, then they are the ones whose actions are invalidated in this life and the next. (al-Baqarah 2:217)
"This is because they followed that which angered Allah, and they disliked His pleasure, so He invalidated their actions." (Quran 47:28)
And by necessity, every one with sound perception knows that it is not possible for an action to be invalidated except that it was not invalid (previously) and that it is not possible, ever, that an action is invalidated without it previously being counted (as acceptable).
And likewise, the saying of the Most High:
Allah blots out what He wills and confirms (what He wills), and with Him is the Mother of the Book (Ra'd 13:39)
So it is correct that He does not blot out except what He had already written, and it is impossible that He blot out what was not already written.
Let's say that before creating the Pen, we are able to say that Allah has the power and knowledge to create the Pen, that He is able to bring such a thing into existence from past eternity. Now when He actually created the Pen, that divine action of creating the pen itself is a hadith/occurrence.
السلام عليكم
Is it possible to email you a question?if so is it possible to get it since i have a question regarding the chapter's title of the famousاللالكائي book , it says " سياق روى عن النبي مما يدل على ان القران من صفات الله القديمة"