Things Are Not Good Simply Because You Desire Them

“The central problem with these positions, in our judgment, is that each of them puts the cart before the horse: an object is not judged to be good because it is desired; rather, it is desired because it is judged – rightly or wrongly – to be good. And an object is not actually good simply because it would cause enjoyment; rather, an object (a condition or activity) is reasonably enjoyed only if that object is truly good. A person might find himself or herself with a desire for an object he or she knows is not worthwhile. For example, the person may find himself or herself desiring to eat dirt (a medical condition called pica or geophagia) or even, through a neural quirk, plagued by a bizarre desire – for example, an overwhelming desire to count the number of the blades of grass on courthouse lawns. These desires are obviously for conditions or activities that are not genuinely worthwhile. Desires are not self-validating. Objects of desires require some feature that makes them worthwhile and the desire for them reasonable. A similar point applies to pleasures: whether a pleasure is a genuine good depends on what one is taking pleasure in – the pleasure of a Nazi in murdering people whom he dislikes or the pleasure of a sadist, for example, is not a good. But if hedonism were true, one would have to say that the pleasures experienced by the Nazi or the sadist were in themselves goods, though outweighed by the pain or harm he causes. This is incorrect – such pleasures are not goods to begin with. Thus, whether a pleasure is a good, or a disorder, depends on what one takes pleasure in – whether the object of the pleasure is a genuine good.”

- P. Lee & R. George, Conjugal Union: What Marriage Is and Why It Matters, p. 25