Were Intra-Ashʿari Disagreements Only Minimal?
Below is a translation of a section of Ustadh Baraa’ Yaseen’s article, Khitab Al-Tafkir fi Al-Ikhtilaf Al-Ashʿari Al-Ashʿari.
The contemporary proponents of Ashʿari thought decisively deny this. They reject the notion that the disagreements among their imams constitute genuine divergence, let alone that such disputes could reach the level of takfīr.
One of them states:
الاختلاف أنواع، فمنه اختلاف في الأصول وفي الفروع، واختلاف حقيقي وآخر لفظي، أما الخلاف اللفظي فهو موجود بين الأشاعرة المتقدمين والمتأخرين وبين المتقدمين والمتأخرين من جهة، أما الاختلاف الحقيقي الأصلي فليس موجودًا لا من الأشاعرة المتقدمين ولا المتأخرين ولا المتقدمين والمتأخرين. وأما الاختلاف المعنوي الفرعي الذي لا يعودُ بالنقض على الأصول فهو موجود، ومسائِلُه محدودة، ولا يستلزمُ خروجًا على أصول المذهب
“Disagreement exists in various forms. There is disagreement over fundamentals and subsidiary matters, as well as true disagreement and merely semantical disagreement. Semantical disagreement exists among both the early and later Ashʿaris and between the early and later Ashʿaris on the one hand and between these groups and others on the other. However, true and fundamental disagreement does not exist among the early Ashʿaris, the later Ashʿaris, or between the early and later Ashʿaris. As for substantive subsidiary disagreements that do not undermine the fundamentals, they do exist, but their issues are limited in number and do not necessitate departure from the school’s core principles.”[1]
This statement is astonishing. Anyone who examines the internal disputes among Ashʿari scholars will find instances of denunciation, warnings, and excessive repudiation—matters not characteristic of mere subsidiary disagreements. For example:
1. Al-Qadi ʿIyad, in his commentary on the verse: {Do you feel secure about the One who is in the heaven?} [Al-Mulk: 16], stated:
ثم من صار من دهماء الفقهاء والمحدثين وبعض متكلمي الأشعرية وكافة الكرامية إلى الجهة أوّل (في) بـ(على)
“Then, those from the common ranks of jurists and hadith scholars, some of the Ashʿari Mutakallimun, and all of the Karramites, who adopted the idea of spatial direction, interpreted fi [‘in’] as ʿala [‘upon’].”[2]
This acknowledgment of the existence of groups of jurists, hadith scholars, and Mutakallimun who affirm elevation (ʿuluw) for Allah, the Exalted, was not accepted by many Ashʿaris. According to them, such a claim amounts to outright disbelief. They could not accept how al-Qadi ʿIyad presented this view, leading to strong criticism from al-Ubbī, who responded vehemently. Al-Ubbī also reported that Tunisian jurists such as Ibn ʿAbd al-Salam and Ibn Harun, and those from Fez such as al-Satī and Ibn al-Sabbagh, unanimously rejected this notion in the court of Prince Abu al-Hasan, the ruler of Morocco, to the extent that one of them remarked:
الله حسيبُه
“Allah will hold him to account.”[3]
Al-Sanusi, commenting on the statement of al-Qadi ʿIyad, said:
كلام شنيع، ليتَهُ لم يَقُلْه
“An appalling statement—if only he had not uttered it.”[4]
The objections raised by these critics against al-Qadi ʿIyad cannot be categorized as a mere subsidiary disagreement.
Moreover, al-Kawthari attempted to distort the intended meaning of al-Qadi ʿIyad’s statement by downplaying the significance of those who were reported to affirm Allah’s elevation (ʿuluw). However, his effort was unconvincing, as the interpretation of ʿala [‘upon’] as meaning fi [‘in’] mentioned by al-Qadi ʿIyad was also affirmed by al-Hafiz al-Bayhaqi.[5] Al-Kawthari could not diminish the credibility of this stance.[6]
2. Al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar, in his biography of al-Qutb al-Tahtani, states:
رأيت له سؤالًا سأل فيه تقي الدين السبكي عن قوله صلى الله عليه وسلم: «كل مولود يولد على الفطرة»، وجواب السبكي له عما استشكله، فنقض هو ذلك الجواب وبالغ في التحقيق والتدقيق، فأجابه السبكي وأطلق لسانه فيه، ونسبه إلى عدم فهم مقاصد الشرع والوقوف مع ظواهر قواعد المنطق، وبالغ في ذمه
“I came across a question he posed to Taqi al-Din al-Subki regarding the statement of the Prophet ﷺ: ‘Every newborn is born upon the fitra.’ Al-Subki responded to his query regarding what he found problematic, but al-Qutb rebutted that response and delved deeply into verification and precision. Al-Subki replied again, unleashing his tongue against him, accusing him of failing to understand the objectives of the Shariʿa and being fixated on the superficialities of logical principles, and harshly criticizing him.”[7]
Setting aside the specifics of this debate, one might question: If the disagreements among Ashʿari scholars are merely subsidiary and do not undermine fundamental principles, why did al-Subki unleash such severe criticism against al-Qutb al-Tahtani? And why did he exaggerate in his denunciation of him?
Either al-Subki did not understand the distinction between fundamental and subsidiary matters, or the one who claims that all disagreements among Ashʿari scholars fall into the category of subsidiary differences is unaware of the true positions of the imams to whom he claims affiliation.
3. Abu ʿAbd Allah Muhammad b. Yusuf al-Sanusi—whose works became a cornerstone for later Ashʿaris—criticized Fakhr al-Din Muhammad b. ʿUmar al-Razi in ways that cannot be considered subsidiary disagreement. He remarked:
له زَلَّات معروفة في العقائد، نبّه عليها ابن التلمساني وغيره
“He has well-known lapses in matters of creed, which Ibn al-Tilimsani and others have pointed out.”[8]
Commenting on the reason for al-Razi’s prayer to die upon the faith of the elderly women, he stated:
وقد يحتمل أن يكون سبب دعائه بهذا ما علم من حالِهِ من الوُلُوع بحفظ آراء الفلاسفة وأصحاب الأهواء، وتكثير الشُّبَه لهم، وتقوية إيرادها، ومع ضعفه عن تحقيق الجواب عن كثير منها على ما يظهر من تواليفه، ولقد استرقوه في بعض العقائد، فخرج إلى قريب من شنيع أهوائهم، ولهذا يحذر الشيوخ من النظر في كثير من تواليفه. قال الشيخ أبو عبد الله محمد بن محمد بن أحمد المقري التلمساني رحمه الله تعالى ورضي عنه: من تحقق كلام ابن الخطيب وجده في تقرير الشبه أشد منه في الانفصال عنها، وفي هذا ما لا يخفى.
وأنشدني شيخي أبو عبد الله الآبلي قال: أنشدني عبد الله بن إبراهيم الزموري قال: أنشدني تقي الدين ابن تيمية لنفسه:
محصل في أصول الدين حاصله .. من بعد تحصيله علم بلا دين
أصل الضلالة في الإفك المبين فما .. فيه فأكثره وحي الشياطين
قال: وكان بيده قضيب فقال: لو أدركت فخر الدين لضربته بقضيبي هذا على رأسه. انتهى
“It is possible that the reason for his supplication was his own state, characterized by an obsession with preserving the opinions of philosophers and people of desires, multiplying their doubts, and strengthening their arguments while showing weakness in effectively refuting many of them, as is evident from his works. Indeed, they managed to influence him in some points of creed, leading him to something close to the reprehensible errors of their beliefs. For this reason, the Shaykhs caution against examining many of his writings. Shaykh Abu ʿAbd Allah Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Maqri al-Tilimsani, may Allah have mercy on him and be pleased with him, said: ‘Whoever closely studies Ibn al-Khatib’s (i.e., al-Razi) words will find that his articulation of doubts is more rigorous than his refutations of them, and this is not hidden from anyone.’
My teacher, Abu ʿAbd Allah al-Abli, recited to me, saying: ʿAbd Allah b. Ibrahim al-Zamuri recited to me, who said: Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah recited to me a poem he composed himself:
The essence of “The Collector” (Al-Muḥaṣṣil) in the principles of religion, its outcome …
After its attainment is knowledge without religion.
It is the root of misguidance in manifest falsehood, for what it contains …
Most of it is the revelation of devils.
He (al-Abli) said: “He (Ibn Taymiyyah) was holding a rod in his hand and remarked: ‘Had I encountered Fakhr al-Din, I would have struck him on the head with this rod of mine.’” And that was the end of his statement.”[9]
The book's editor [10] attacked Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah for his remarks regarding the work Al-Muḥaṣṣil fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, citing some commentators who described the two couplets as an act of disrespect and dismissed them as unworthy of attention. However, the essence of this objection is directed at al-Sanusi rather than Ibn Taymiyyah, as it was al-Sanusi who transmitted and publicized the two lines.
Al-Sanusi emphasized this point elsewhere, stating:
وليحذرِ المبتدي جهده أن يأخذ أصول دينه من الكتب التي حُشِيَت بكلام الفلاسفة، وأُولِع مُؤلِّفُوها بنقل هَوَسِهم وما هو كفرٌ صراح من عقائدهم، التي ستروا نجاستها بما ينبَهِمُ على كثير، من اصطلاحاتهم وعباراتهم التي أكثرها أسماء بلا مسميات، وذلك ككتب الإمام الفخر في علم الكلام، وطوالع البيضاوي ومن حذا حذوهما في ذلك
“Let the beginner be as diligent as possible in avoiding taking the principles of his religion from books filled with the words of philosophers, whose authors were obsessed with transmitting their delusions and their outright kufri beliefs. These were cloaked in terms that confuse many with their jargon and expressions, most of which are names without realities. Examples include the books of Imam Fakhr [al-Razi] in theology, the Tawāliʿ of al-Baydawi, and others who followed their path.”[11]
Al-Dusuqi, in his commentary, added:
أي: ومن سلك مسلكهما كالأرموي والعلامة السعد والعضد وابن عرفة
“That is, those who followed their methodology, such as al-Armawi, al-ʿAllama al-Saʿd, al-ʿAḍud, and Ibn ʿArafa.”[12]
He then cited Burhan al-Laqqani in defense of al-Razi and his school, particularly their inclusion of the philosophers’ doubts in their works. This defense was preceded by Taj al-Subki, who had also defended Fakhr al-Razi.[13]
Whoever examines the works of the Asharis will find instances where their disagreements reach the level of mutual takfir, not merely excessive criticism. For example:
1. Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, while criticizing Qadi Abu Bakr Ibn al-Tayyib’s definition of disbelief as denial of Allah Almighty, which is interpreted as ignorance, states:
فقد تقرر شدة وقوع الاختلاف في صفات الله تعالى بين الأصحاب، ولا يجوز الالتفات إلى ما يتكلف في إزالة هذه الاختلافات، فإن أمثال تلك التكلُّفَات مما لا يعجز عنها أحدٌ من أرباب المذاهب. فثبتَ أنَّا لو حكمنا بأن الجهل بشيء من صفات الله تعالى يكون كفرًا يلزمنا تكفيرُ أئمتنا ومشايخنا، وإنه غير جائز
“It has been established that severe disagreement exists among the [Ash’ari] companions concerning the attributes of Allah Almighty, and it is impermissible to pay heed to forced attempts to reconcile these differences. Such contrived reconciliations are within the capacity of anyone belonging to any sect. Thus, it follows that if we were to rule that ignorance of any of Allah’s attributes constitutes disbelief, we would be compelled to declare our own imams and elders disbelievers, and this is unacceptable.”[14]
The point of significance in al-Razi’s statement is that Qadi Abu Bakr Ibn al-Tayyib’s choice of defining disbelief implies the takfir of certain imams and elders of the Asharis, given that some among them negate attributes that he considers necessary to affirm. This critique was also directed at the Mutazilites, as they similarly defined disbelief as ignorance.[15]
This is sufficient for the intended point, and it does not matter that al-Razi himself disagreed with this view in his own position; the relevant evidence lies in the opinion of Qadi Abu Bakr, not in al-Razi’s perspective.
2. Ibn ‘Atiyyah, in his commentary on the verse {Muhammad is not the father of any of your men, but he is the Messenger of Allah and the Seal of the Prophets} [Al-Ahzab: 40], states:
وما ذكره الغزالي في هذه الآية وهذا المعنى في كتابه الذي سماه بـ(الاقتصاد) إلحادٌ عندي، وتطرُّقٌ خبيث إلى تشويش عقيدة المسلمين في ختم محمد صلى الله عليه وسلم النبوءة، فالحذرَ الحذرَ منه، والله الهادي برحمته
“What al-Ghazali mentioned concerning this verse and its meaning in his book titled Al-Iqtisad is, in my view, heretical and a malicious attempt to confuse the Muslim belief in Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him, being the Seal of Prophethood. Beware, beware of it, and Allah is the guide by His mercy.”[16]
Al-Burhan al-Biqa‘i, centuries later, discussed Ibn ‘Atiyyah’s statement and warned against paying attention to it.[17] However, he maintained good assumptions about Ibn ‘Atiyyah and treated him respectfully, refraining from mentioning his name explicitly to avoid disparaging him.[18]
3. Al-Qadi ‘Iyad, after recounting al-Jahiz’s position on excusing imitators among the Jews and Christians, remarks:
وقد نحا الغزالي قريبًا من هذا المنحى في كتاب (التفرقة)، وقائل هذا كله كافر بالإجماع على كفر من لم يكفر أحدًا من النصارى واليهود، وكل من فارق دين المسلمين، أو وقف في تكفيرهم، أو شك
“Al-Ghazali leaned toward a similar approach in his book Al-Tafriqah. Whoever holds any of these views is a disbeliever by consensus, as it is unanimously agreed that anyone who does not declare the Jews and Christians, or anyone who deviates from the religion of the Muslims, to be disbelievers, or who hesitates or doubts in declaring them so, is himself a disbeliever.”[19]
Ibn Hajar al-Haytami, centuries later, responded to Al-Qadi ‘Iyad and cited in his reply the statement of Ibn al-Subki:
لا يبغض الغزالي إلا منافق أو زنديق
“None dislikes al-Ghazali except a hypocrite or a heretic.”[20]
These three examples suffice for the intended purpose, with Allah’s permission. They clearly demonstrate the falsehood of the claim that all disagreements among the Ash‘ari scholars are merely subsidiary. They also refute the allegation that Ahl al-Sunnah are the ones who broke the veil of reverence in accusing opponents of disbelief. Such a claim, in light of these texts and others, is pure fabrication, reminiscent of the saying: She accused me of her own ailment and slipped away.
[1] The statement is by Sa‘īd Fūda. See al-Nashāṭ al-Ash‘arī al-Mu‘āṣir (pp. 103–106).
[2] See: Ikmāl Ikmāl al-Mu‘allim by al-Ubbī (2/241). There is a difference with what appears in the printed edition of Ikmāl al-Mu‘allim bi-Fawā’id Muslim (2/465).
[3] Ikmāl Ikmāl al-Mu‘allim (2/241).
[4] Mukammil Ikmāl al-Ikmāl, in the marginal notes of Ikmāl Ikmāl al-Mu‘allim (2/241).
[5] al-I‘tiqād wal-Hidāyah ilá Sabīl al-Rashād (p. 116).
[6] al-Sayf al-Ṣaqīl fī al-Radd ‘alá Ibn Zafīl (p. 113).
[7] al-Durar al-Kāminah (6/99).
[8] ‘Umdat Ahl al-Tawfīq wal-Tasdīd (p. 168).
[9] Ibid. (pp. 159–160).
[10] Verified by the editor of the Dār al-Taqwā edition, Damascus, published in 2019. See also al-Kawtharī’s opposition to Ibn Taymiyyah in Ṣaf‘āt al-Burhān ‘alá Ṣafḥāt al-‘Udwān (pp. 47–48).
[11] Sharḥ Umm al-Barāhīn (p. 137).
[12] Ḥāshiyat al-Dusūqī ‘alá Sharḥ Umm al-Barāhīn (p. 71).
[13] Mu‘īd al-Ni‘am wa-Mubīd al-Niqam (p. 65).
[14] Nihāyat al-‘Uqūl (4/274).
[15] See al-Baḥth ‘an Adillat al-Takfīr wal-Tafsīq by Abū al-Qāsim al-Bustī (p. 8).
[16] al-Muḥarrar al-Wajīz (4/388).
[17] Naẓm al-Durar fī Tanāsub al-Āyāt wal-Suwar (15/366–367).
[18] Tahdīm al-Arkān min Laysa fī al-Imkān Abda‘ mimmā Kāna (pp. 188–189).
[19] al-Shifā’ (2/602–603).
[20] al-I‘lām bi-Qawāṭi‘ al-Islām (pp. 242–243).