Were There No ‘Salafi’ Scholars Between Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Abdul Wahhab’s Time?

Ibn Taymiyyah died in 728 A.H., and Ibn Abdul Wahhab was born in 1115 A.H.

Following Ibn Taymiyyah’s death, we know his student, Ibn Abdul Hadi (d. 744 A.H.). There is no dispute that Ibn Abdul Hadi was fully aligned with Ibn Taymiyyah on the subject of sifat. He highly praised Imam Al-Darimi and Ibn Khuzaymah for their works on sifat,[1] which is enough to give away his theology.

He affirmed knowing the qadr al-mushtarak (common factor) in the divine attributes that would allow us to know their meanings, in addition to affirming the volitional attributes of Allah.[2]

Then we have Ibn Qadi Al-Jabal (d. 771 A.H.) who was a leading Hanbali jurist of his time. Ibn Qadi was an ardent supporter of Ibn Taymiyyah’s theology. His work, al-Radd ‘ala man Radd ‘ala Shaykh al-Islam fi Mas’alat al-Hawadith, clearly lays out his theology. In it, he challenges al-Qadi Abu Ya’la’s attempt to make ta’weel of Imam Ahmad’s statement that Allah speaks whenever He wills.[3]

We also have Abu Mudhfir Yusuf al-Sarmari (d. 776 A.H.), who authored a poem in defense of Ibn Taymiyyah against Imam al-Subki entitled, al-Himyah al-Islamiyyah fi al-Intisar li-Madhab Ibn Taymiyyah. In it, he explicitly defends that the divine attribute of speech is volitional.[4]

Ibn Rajab (d. 795 A.H.) was a student of Ibnul Qayyim, and in essence, he followed the same theology as Ibn Taymiyyah when it came to sifat. He was not a blind follower of Ibn Taymiyyah, as he did disagree with him on tertiary matters such as Ibn Taymiyyah’s position on divorce and whether to utilize ‘ilmul kalam itself to refute the Mutakallimeen.

Nevertheless, he affirmed both Allah’s volitional attributes[5] and the meanings of the divine attributes,[6] hence making it clear that he did not belong to the tafweedh camp.

Al-Jamal Al-Maqdisi (d. 798 A.H.) was the grandfather of Imam ibn al-Mibrad (d. 909 A.H.). Ibn al-Mibrad reports some of his grandfather Al-Jamal’s words from his missing book, al-Tuhfa wal-Fa’idah. In it, we can clearly see that he agreed with Ibn Taymiyyah’s stance on the affirmation of volitional attributes.[7]

Ibrahim Ibn Muflih (d. 884 A.H.)[8] categorized those who denied volitional attributes as Ibn Kullab, al-Muhasibi, al-Ashari, al-Qadi Abu Ya’la, Ibn Aqeel, Ibn al-Zaghouni, etc. As for those who affirmed them, he ascribes this stance to the majority of Ahlul Hadeeth, such as Ibn Al-Mubarak, Al-Bukhari, al-Darimi, Ibn Khuzaymah, Ibn Hamid, etc.[9]

‘Alaa’ al-Din al-Mardawi (d. 885 A.H.) affirms Allah’s volitional attributes. When speaking about the divine attribute of speech, he relays nine different opinions. The ninth opinion he relays is precisely Ibn Taymiyyah’s, namely that Allah speaks whenever He wills in a temporal sense. Al-Mardawi attributes this opinion to the Imams of hadeeth and Sunnah, including Imam Ahmad himself.[10]

Also, al-Mardawi does not differentiate between how he affirms any of Allah’s attributes, such as His speech, descent, coming, hearing, seeing, etc.[11] This is essential, as we all know that nobody made tafweedh of the meaning of Allah’s hearing and seeing, and thus this would entail that he did not do the same for the remaining.

And in case one retorts by saying that al-Mardawi considered the attributes to be mutashabih, the fact remains that for al-Mardawi, mustashabih did not entail not knowing their meanings at all. If we read al-Mardawi’s discussion on pages 1395-1399 in volume 3 of his al-Tahbeer, it becomes evident that mutashabih for him entails a lack of clarity on the details regarding a matter. For instance, he said that the cow in Surah 2:67 is mutashabih because details of the cow were not specified. But that does that mean that Al-Mardawi does not know the basic core meaning of cow in the ayah!

Thus far, we have covered the 8th and 9th centuries. Moving on…

Ibn Al-Mibrad (d. 909 A.H.) affirms the volitional attributes of Allah and even contests al-Qadi Abu Ya’la’s attempt at making ta’weel of Imam Ahmad’s statement about Allah speaking whenever He wills.[12] He also cites Ibn Hamid’s opinion that descent implies movement and that this is the majority stance of the latter Hanbalis.[13]

Ibn al-Mibrad states that he is aware of more than one thousand scholars who opposed the Ashʿarīs.[14] This raises a question worthy of reflection: Did these scholars suddenly emerge in isolation without having learned from predecessors or inherited their theological positions from earlier generations? Is it reasonable to assume that the influence of such a large number of scholars vanished without a trace—that not even a single student preserved and transmitted their views, even for just one generation? Surely, such a notion defies reason and historical plausibility.

Thus far, we have covered the 8^th, 9^th, and 10^th centuries. Moving on…

During this period, there was a noticeable prioritization of attending to fiqh and standardization of some of the juristic school's formal opinions. Nevertheless, Ibn Taymiyyah’s influence remained.

Consider the following eye-opening and telling accounts by Abi Salim al-‘Ayyashi (d. 1090 A.H.). He states that on his trip to Madinah, he met the Shafi scholar Burhan al-Din al-Korani (d. 1101 A.H.), who authored a book on the differences between the Hanbalis and Asharis. He commended Burhan al-Din for his objectivity in his research. Al-‘Ayyashi states that Burhan al-Din told him that the Hanbalis only make tafweedh of those meanings that are problematic pertaining to the sifat, while generally speaking, they affirm the meanings as understood by the Arabs such as istiwa, elevation, descent, etc.[15]

This is very interesting, as the stance of the Hanbalis is being described as that of tafweedh of the meaning, although they still know the meanings according to the Arabic language! Clearly, the meaning whose knowledge is being negated is the denotative type, while the known one is connotative.[16]

He also says that his Hanbali companions in Cairo showed him one of Ibn Taymiyyah’s works and that it was standardized (mu’tamad) reading for the Hanbalis.[17] This is critical as we are speaking about mid-eleventh century Egypt, and Ibn Taymiyyah’s theological works[18] were still considered standard and official readings among the Hanbalis![19]

This, once again, raises a question worthy of reflection: did these scholars suddenly emerge in isolation, without having learned from predecessors or inherited their theological positions from earlier generations? And is it reasonable to assume that the influence of such a large number of scholars vanished without a trace—that not even a single student preserved and transmitted their views, even for just one generation? Surely, such a notion defies reason and historical plausibility.

Thus, we have covered the 8^th, 9^th, 10^th, and 11^th centuries. Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abdul Wahhab was born in the early 12^th century in 1115 A.H. And the rest is history.

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[1] He said in his Risala Lateefah fi Ahadeeth Mutafarriqah Da’ifah, pp. 75-76:

وصنف كتابا جليلا في الرد على بشر المريسي وأتباعه من الجهمية بعد المناظرة بينه وبين بعض الجهمية من أصحاب بشر والثلجي... وقد هتك رحمه الله في هذا الكتاب ستر الجهمية وبين فضائحهم، ولا أعلم للمتقدمين في هذا الشأن كتابا أجود منه ومن كتابه الآخر في الرد على عموم الجهمية، وكتاب التوحيد لإمام الأئمة محمد بن إسحاق ابن خزيمة، وإن كان جليلا في هذا الباب ومصنفه من أكابر أئمة المسلمين إلا أن كتاب الدارمي أنفع في بعض شبه الجهمية، والدارمي أحذق في معرفة كلام الجهمية والعلم بمرادهم والرد عليهم، وكلاهما إمام مبرّز في هذا الشأن وفي غيره، رحمهما الله ورضي عنهما وعن سائر أئمة الدين

“He (i.e., Ibn Taymiyyah) authored a monumental work refuting Bishr al-Marīsī and his followers among the Jahmiyya, following a debate between him and some Jahmī disciples of Bishr and al-Thaljī… In this book—may Allah have mercy on him—he tore away the veil of the Jahmiyya and exposed their scandals. I do not know of any earlier work on this subject that is more excellent than this book and his other treatise refuting the general doctrines of the Jahmiyya. While Kitāb al-Tawḥīd by the Imām of the Imāms, Muḥammad ibn Isḥāq ibn Khuzayma, is indeed a great work in this field—and its author is among the foremost scholars of the Muslims—al-Dārimī’s book is more beneficial in addressing certain doubts raised by the Jahmiyya. Al-Dārimī also demonstrates greater precision in understanding the language of the Jahmiyya, discerning their intent, and responding to them. Both are leading imams of distinction in this field and others—may Allah have mercy on them and be pleased with them and with all the imams of the religion.”

[2] He states in his al-Sarim al-Munki, pp. 233-234:

لكن إثبات القدر المشترك لا بد منه كما في الوجود، وباقي الصفات، وإلا لزم التعطيل المحض، فنحن نثبت النزول على وجه يليق بجلال الله وعظمته، من غير تحريف ولا تعطيل ولا تكييف ولا تمثيل

…

وقد دل العقل والنقل على قيام الأفعال الاختيارية به فهو الفاعل المختار بفعل ما يشاء ويختار، ذو القدرة التامة والحكمة البالغة والكمال المطلق، وقد ثبت في الصحيح أنه يتحول من صورة إلى صورة وثبت أنه يتبدى لهم في صورة غير الصورة التي رأوه فيها أول مرة ثم يعود في الصورة التي رأوه فيها أول مرة
وهذا كله حق لأن الصادق المصدوق المعصوم الذي لا ينطق عن الهوى قد أخبر به،وليس في العقل ما ينفيه، بل جميع ما أمر به صاحب الشرع يوافقه العقل الصحيح ويؤيده وينصره ولا يخالفه أصلًا
وإذا عرف هذا فقد يقال ما ورد من الأدلة الدالة على العظمة وكبر الذات، ليس بينها وبين ما قيل إنه يعارضها منافاة ولا معارضة، بل جميع ذلك حق والجمع بين ذلك كله سهل يسير بعد العلم بإثبات الأفعال الاختيارية

“However, affirming the shared or common meaning (in divine attributes) (al-qadr al-mushtarak) is necessary—just as it is in the case of existence and other attributes—otherwise, pure negation would necessarily follow. Thus, we affirm the Divine descent in a manner befitting the majesty and greatness of Allah, without distortion, denial, modality, or likening (to creation).

Both reason and revelation attest to the reality of voluntary actions being attributable to Him: He is the willful agent who acts as He wills and chooses, possessing complete power, perfect wisdom, and absolute perfection. It is authentically established in the Ṣaḥīḥ that He transforms from one form to another, and that He manifests Himself to them in a form different from the one in which they first saw Him, and then returns to the form they initially saw.

All of this is true, for it has been reported by the truthful, trustworthy, and infallible Messenger—he who does not speak from whim. There is nothing in sound reason that negates it. Rather, everything the Lawgiver has commanded aligns with sound reason, supports it, affirms it, and in no way contradicts it.

Given this, it may be said that the evidences indicating divine grandeur and the greatness of His essence do not conflict with what has been reported and alleged to contradict them. Rather, all of it is true, and reconciling all of it is easy and straightforward once one affirms the reality of voluntary actions being attributable to Him.”

[3] In the manuscript form of the book at Dar al-Kutub wal-Makhtutat al-Masriyyah, it states on page 14:

وتأول القاضي أبو يعلى المشيئة في قوله إذا شاء، على مشيئة الإسماع بناء على أن الكلام صفة نفسية لا يتعلق بالمشيئة بل هو نعت ذاتي كالحياة والعلم، فقيل عليه هذا باطل لثلاثة أوجه أحدهما أن رد المشيئة إلى مشيئة الإسماع تأويل الكلام وخروج عن ظاهره بغير دليل، الثاني أنه يلزم منه قِدم السامع لأن قوله لم يزل عبارة مستغرقة، الثالث أن الإمام أحمد قال فيما رده على الجهمية في قوله تعالى "إنا جعلنا قرآنا عربيا" أي صيرناه على فعل من أفعالنا، وهذا يخالف تأويل من تأول الجعل بمعنى التسمية

“Al-Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā interpreted the Divine will (mashīʾa) in the verse “if He wills” (idhā shāʾa) as referring to the will to make it heard, based on his view that speech is an inherent attribute of the Divine essence (ṣifah nafsiyyah) that is not contingent upon will, but rather is an essential attribute like life and knowledge. It was said in response to him that this interpretation is invalid for three reasons:

First, interpreting will as the will to make heard constitutes a distortion of the text and a departure from its apparent meaning without any supporting evidence.
Second, it entails the pre-eternality of the hearer, since the phrase “His speech has always been” (lam yazal) encompasses all of time, thereby implying that the one hearing the speech must also have always existed.

Third, Imām Aḥmad, in his refutation of the Jahmiyya, said regarding the verse “Indeed, We have made it an Arabic Qur’an” (Q 43:3) that this means: “We have fashioned it as one of Our acts.” This directly contradicts the interpretation of those who take “We have made” (jaʿalnā) to mean mere designation or naming, rather than actual origination or action.”

[4] He states:

أو قلت فعل اختيار منه ممتنع ضاهيت قول امرئ مغو بأنصبه

ولم يزل بصفات الفعل متصفا وبالكلام بعيدا في تقربه

سبحانه لم يزل ما شاء يفعله في كل ما زمن ما من معقبه

نوع الكلام كذا نوع الفعال قديم لا المعين منه في ترتبه

“Or if you say His voluntary action is impossible,
You mirror the claim of one misled by his idols.

He has ever been described by attributes of action,
And by speech—sublime beyond one's drawing near.

Exalted is He—He has ever done whatever He wills,
At every moment in time—none can overrule Him.

The genus of speech, as the genus of action, is pre-eternal—
Not so the specific instance, in its ordered occurrence.”

[5] In his Fathul Bari, vol. 7, p. 236, Ibn Rajab affirms Allah’s coming as a volitional attribute connected to Allah’s will and even states that this is the position of Imam Ahmad:

ومن جملة صفات الله التي نؤمن بها، وتمر كما جاءت عندهم: قوله تعالى
﴿وجاءَ رَبُّكَ؟والمَلَكُ صَفاًّ صَفاًّ﴾ [الفجر:٢٢] ونحو ذلك مما دل على إتيانه ومجيئه يوم القيامة
وقد نص على ذلك أحمد وإسحاق وغيرهما
وعندهما: أن ذلك من أفعال الله الاختيارية التي يفعلها بمشيئته واختياره

“Among the attributes of Allah in which we believe—and which, according to them, are to be accepted as they have come without reinterpretation—are His words, Exalted is He:

“And your Lord shall come, and the angels, rank upon rank” [al-Fajr: 22], and similar verses that indicate His coming and arrival on the Day of Judgment.

Both Aḥmad and Isḥāq, among others, explicitly affirmed this. According to them, such passages refer to Allah’s voluntary actions, which He performs by His will and choice.”

He does the same with Allah’s speech in vol. 9, p. 259 of the same work:

وقوله: «هل تدرون ماذا قال ربكم؟» - وفي بعض الروايات
«الليلة»، وهي تدل على
أن الله تعالى يتكلم بمشيئته واختياره
كما قال الإمام أحمد: لم يزل الله متكلما إذا شاء

And his statement: “Do you know what your Lord said?”—in some narrations, it appears as “tonight”—indicates that Allah, Exalted is He, speaks by His will and choice.

As Imām Aḥmad said: “Allah has always been speaking whenever He wills.”

[6] In his Dhayl Tabaqat al-Hanabila, vol. 1, pp. 385-386, Ibn Rajab talks about how the attributes are taken on their reality and that we know their meanings:

اللفظ إنْ دل بنفسه فهو حقيقة لذلك المعنى، وإن دل بقرينة فدلالته بالقرينة حقيقة للمعنى الآخر، فهو حقيقة في الحالين. وإن كان المعنى المدلول عليه مختلفا فحينئذ يقالُ: لفظ اليمين في قوله سبحانه وتعالى: «والسّماواتُ مَطْوِيّاتٌ بِيَمينهِ» ٣٩: ٦٧، حقيقة. وهو دالٌ على الصفة الذاتية. ولفظ اليمين في الحديث المعروف: «الحَجَرُ الأسوَدُ يَمِينُ اللهِ في الأرْضِ. فَمَن صافَحَهُ فَكَأنما صافَح اللهَ

وقيل: يمينه يُرادُ به - مع هذه القرائن المحتفة به - محل الاستلام والتقبيل. وهو حقيقة في هذا المعنى في هذه الصورة، وليس فيه ما يوهم الصفة الذاتية أصلا، بل دلالته على معناه الخاص قطعية لا تحتمل النقيض بوجهٍ، ولا تحتاج إلى تأويل ولا غيره

وإذا قيل: فابن الفاعوس لم يكن من أهل هذا الشأن - أعني: البحث عن مدلولات الألفاظ؟ قيل: ولا ابن الخاضبة كان من أهله، وإن كان محدثا. وإنما سمع من ابن الفاعوس، أو بلغه عنه إنكار أن يكون هذا مجازا، لما سمعه من إنكار لفظ المجاز فحمله السامع لقصوره أو لهواه على أنه إذا كان حقيقة لزم أن يكون هو يد الرب عزَّ جل، التي هي صفته. وهذا باطل. والله أعلم

If a word indicates a meaning by itself, then it is a literal expression (ḥaqīqah) for that meaning. If it indicates a meaning by contextual clues (qarīnah), then its indication through those clues is a literal expression for that other meaning. Thus, it is literal (ḥaqīqah) in both cases. If the meaning it conveys differs in each context, then we may say: the word “right hand” (yamīn) in the verse “and the heavens will be rolled up in His right hand” [al-Zumar 39:67] is literal, and it indicates an essential attribute (of Allah).

As for the word yamīn in the well-known ḥadīth: “The Black Stone is the right hand of Allah on earth. Whoever touches it, it is as if he has shaken hands with Allah,”—some have said that “His right hand” here, given the surrounding contextual clues, refers to the place of touching and kissing. In this instance, it is literal with respect to that specific meaning and context, and it carries no connotation of a divine attribute whatsoever. Rather, its indication of its intended meaning is definitive and not subject to contradiction in any way; it requires no interpretation or rephrasing.

And if it is said: “But wasn’t Ibn al-Fāʿūs not among the scholars of this field—i.e., the study of linguistic meanings and implications?” It may be responded: “Nor was Ibn al-Khāḍibah among its experts either, though he was a ḥadīth transmitter.” He merely heard from Ibn al-Fāʿūs—or it reached him—that he denied the statement being metaphorical (majāz), because of what he had heard about the rejection of the term majāz itself. So the listener—whether due to his own inadequacy or personal bias—assumed that if the wording were literal (ḥaqīqah), then it must necessarily mean that the Black Stone is the actual hand of the Lord, Mighty and Majestic, which is one of His attributes. And that is false. Allah knows best.

[7] See Ibn al-Mibrad’s Sayr al-Haath ila ‘Ilm al-Talaq al-Thalaath, ed. al-‘Ajmi, p. 59.

[8] He is not to be confused with the more prominent Hanbali jurist, Shams ud-Deen ibn Muflih, who died in 763 A.H.

[9] Still in its manuscript form, he states in al-Isti’adha min al-Shaytan wa-Ahkamihi, folio 16:

فإن قيل: كان الله ولا عرش، فإن كان على العرش للزم التحول، قلنا: هذا سؤال مشهور للنفاة، وعنه جوابان مشهوران، أحدهما: قول من لا يجيز أن يقوم بالله أفعال تتعلق بقدرته ومشيئته، كما هو قول ابن كلاب والحارث المحاسبي والأشعري والقاضي أبي يعلى وابن عقيل وابن الزاغوني وغيرهم، أن العرش حوله من حال إلى حال، فكان التعبير والتحويل في العرش

…

والجواب الثاني: جواب أكثر أهل الحديث كابن المبارك وأمثاله والبخاري وعثمان الدارمي وابن خزيمة وابن حامد وابن منده وإسماعيل الأنصاري وابن عبد البر وغيرهم – رضي الله عنهم – ممن يقول: إنه تقوم به الأفعال الاختيارية المتعلقة بمشيئته وقدرته

“If it is said: “Allah was, and there was no Throne—so if He is now upon the Throne, that would entail change or transition,” we reply: this is a well-known objection raised by the deniers (of divine actions), and it has two well-known responses.

The first is the position of those who do not allow that actions may subsist in Allah and be related to His will and power. This is the view of Ibn Kullāb, al-Ḥārith al-Muḥāsibī, al-Ashʿarī, Al-Qāḍī Abū Yaʿlā, Ibn ʿAqīl, Ibn al-Zāghūnī, and others. According to them, it was the Throne that underwent change—being altered from one state to another—so the movement and transformation occurred in the Throne itself, not in Allah.

The second response is that of the majority of the ḥadīth scholars—such as Ibn al-Mubārak and his peers, al-Bukhārī, ʿUthmān al-Dārimī, Ibn Khuzayma, Ibn Ḥāmid, Ibn Mandah, Ismāʿīl al-Anṣārī, Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr, and others (may Allah be pleased with them)—who hold that voluntary actions (afʿāl ikhtiyāriyya) may be ascribed to Allah and are connected to His will and power.”

[10] He states in his al-Tahbeer Sharh al-Tahreer, vol. 3, p. 1312:

التّاسِع: [أن يُقال]: لم يزل الله متكلما إذا شاءَ، ومَتى شاءَ، وكَيف شاءَ، بِكَلام يقوم بِهِ، وهُوَ يتَكَلَّم بِهِ بِصَوْت يسمع، وأن نوع الكَلام قديم، وإن لم يكن الصَّوْت المعِين قَدِيما، وهَذا القَوْل هُوَ المَأْثُور عَن أئِمَّة الحَدِيث والسّنة)

ومن أعظم [القائِلين] بِهَذا القَوْل الأخير الإمام أحْمد، فَإنَّهُ قالَ: (لم يزل الله تَعالى متكلما كَيفَ شاءَ بِلا تكييف)، وفِي لفظ: (إذا شاءَ)

“Ninth: It is to be said: Allah has always been speaking whenever He wills, whenever He wishes, and however He wishes, with speech that subsists in Him. He speaks with it using a voice that is heard. The genus of speech is eternal, even if the specific uttered voice is not pre-eternal. This is the position transmitted from the Imāms of ḥadīth and the Sunnah.

Among the greatest proponents of this view is Imām Aḥmad, for he said: “Allah, Exalted be He, has always been speaking however He wills, without asking how,” and in another narration: “whenever He wills.””

He also reaffirms in vol. 3, p. 1352 that Imam Ahmad’s stance is that Allah speaks according to His will:

فَهَذا الإمام أحْمد - ﵀ ورَضي عَنهُ - قد صرح فِي غير رِوايَة بِأن الله يتَكَلَّم بِصَوْت بقدرته ومشيئته إذا شاءَ وكَيف شاءَ، وهجر من قالَ: إنَّه لا يتَكَلَّم بِصَوْت وبدعه

“Thus, Imām Aḥmad—may Allah have mercy on him and be pleased with him—explicitly stated in multiple reports that Allah speaks with a voice, by His power and will, whenever He wills and however He wills. He openly repudiated those who claimed that He does not speak with a voice, declaring them to be innovators.”

[11] He states in, vol. 3, p. 1345:

ولا خيال - نفي التَّشْبِيه والتمثيل والتكييف، وأنَّهُمْ قائِلُونَ فِي صفة الكَلام، كَما يَقُولُونَ فِي جَمِيع صِفات الله تَعالى، من النُّزُول، والمجيء، والاستواء، والسمع، والبَصَر، واليَد، وغَيرها، كَما قالَه سلف هَذِه الأمة الصّالح مَعَ إثباتهم لَها

“And they do not engage in imaginative projection (khayāl); rather, they negate tashbīh (likening), tamthīl (comparison), and takyīf (asking how), and they speak regarding the attribute of speech just as they do concerning all the other attributes of Allah—such as descent, coming, rising over the Throne (istiwā’), hearing, sight, hand, and others—just as the righteous predecessors (salaf) of this Ummah did: affirming them without likening, comparing, or inquiring into their modality.”

[12] He states in his book Tuhfat al-Wusul ‘ila ‘Ilm al-Usul ‘ala Madhab Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, pp. 106-107:

وعندي أن الأمر على غير ما ذكره القاضي، وأن الأمر في ذلك على شيئين: الأول: القرآن كلام الله قديم، وهذا ليس له مدخل في كلام أحمد...الثاني: أن كلام الله عز وجل بالقرآن وتعبير القرأن قديم، وأن الله عز وجل لم يزل متكلما، ولا نقول: الكلام صفة حدثت له = فهو لم يزل متكلما من حيث الجملة من غير نظر إلى شيء

وقول أحمد: ((متى شاء)) يعني: متى شاء أن يتكلم بشيء تكلم به، مع أن كلامه الذي هو ضد ما لم يتكلم قديم، وأنه إذا شاء تكلم، وإذا شاء لم يتكلم، وأن كلامه ليس بمتصل منه في سائر الأوقات، بل إذا شاء الكلام تكلم، مع أن وصفه بأنه متكلم قديم، وأنه إذا شاء تكلم بشيء، وإذا شاء تكلم بغيره، وأما ما قالوه؛ يلزم منه أنه متكلم في كل وقت من الأوقات، وأن كلامه متصل مستمر على سائر الأوقات، وهذا يرده النقل والعقل

وأيضًا فإن قول النبي صلى الله عليه وسلم: (إذا تكلم الله بالوحي؛ سمع أهل السماء للسماء صلصلة كجر السلسلة على الصفوان)، هذا يدل على أن له أوقاتًا لا يتكلم فيها، وأنه لا يتكلم إلا إذا شاء، مع أن وصفه بأنه متكلم قديم، وقولهم يلزم منه إذا تكلم بكلمة لا يزال يقولها، وليس الأمر كذلك، بل يتكلم بشيء ينتهي ويأتي غيره

“In my view, the matter is not as Al-Qāḍī [Abū Yaʿlā] described it. Rather, the issue rests on two points:

First: The Qur’an is the speech of Allah and is pre-eternal (qadīm). This point, however, is not what Aḥmad was addressing.

Second: The speech of Allah, Exalted is He, as manifested in the Qur’an and its expression, is pre-eternal. Allah, Exalted is He, has always been speaking. We do not say that speech is an attribute that arose for Him at a certain point—rather, He has always been speaking in a general sense, without reference to any specific utterance.

Aḥmad’s statement, “whenever He wills,” means that whenever Allah wills to speak about something, He speaks about it. At the same time, His speech—as opposed to silence—is pre-eternal. He speaks when He wills and refrains from speech when He wills. His speech is not continuous or uninterrupted at all times; rather, when He wills to speak, He speaks. And yet, the description of Him as one who speaks (mutakallim) is pre-eternal. He may will to speak about one matter at one time and something else at another.

As for the view of those who say otherwise, it would necessitate that He is constantly speaking at every moment, with an unbroken stream of speech throughout all times—and this is refuted both by revelation and by reason.

Furthermore, the statement of the Prophet ﷺ: “When Allah speaks with revelation, the inhabitants of the heavens hear a sound like the clanging of a chain being dragged across a smooth stone,” indicates that there are times when He does not speak, and that He only speaks when He wills. At the same time, He is eternally described as One who speaks.

Their view, however, would imply that if He speaks a word, He continues to utter it perpetually—and that is not the case. Rather, He speaks a particular utterance, it ends, and then another follows.”

[13] See: Tuhfat al-Wusul ‘ila ‘Ilm al-Usul ‘ala Madhab Ahlus Sunnah wal-Jama’ah, p. 73

[14] He said in his Jamʿ al-Juyūsh wa’l-Dasākir:

وَقَدْ رَأَيْنَا فِي أَصْحَابِنَا وَرُفَقَائِنَا وَمَنِ اشْتَغَلَ مَعَنَا أَكْثَرَ مِنْ أَلْفِ وَاحِدٍ عَلَى مُجَانَبَتِهِمْ وَمُفَارَقَتِهِمْ، وَالْوُقُوعُ فِيهِمْ، وَمَا تَرَكْنَا مِمَّنْ تَقَدَّمَ أَكْثَرَ مِمَّنْ ذَكَرْنَا

“We have witnessed among our companions, peers, and those who studied alongside us—more than a thousand individuals—firmly distancing themselves from [the Ashʿarīs], parting ways with them, and speaking critically of them. And among those who preceded us, we did not omit mention of any—yet those we did not name were even more numerous than those we did.”

[15] We read in al-Rihla al-‘Ayyashiyyah, pp. 570-580:

وقد أجاد شيخنا رضي الله عنه – يعني الكوراني رحمه الله بالفحص عن كلِّ ما نُسِبَ إلى الحنابلة، ولم يقلِّد في ذلك أهل مذهبه من الشافعية، لعلمه بما يقع بين المتناظرين وعدم تحقيق محل النزاع، ونسبة كل واحد منهما صاحبه إلى لازم قوله وتعلقه بظواهر أقواله، وإن كان في صريح كلامه ما يدفع تلك اللوازم ويحيل تلك الظواهر، ولذلك كتب شيخنا عند عزمه على البحث في هذه المسائل بإشارة شيخه الصفي إلى الشيخ عبد الباقي الحنبلي البعلي الدمشقي (أبي المواهب)، وهو إذ ذاك كبير الحنابلة وإمامهم علما وعملا وصلاحا بدمشق، ، ليكتب له بمعتقد الحنابلة محرَّرًا مبيِّنًا بأدلته حتى لا ينسب إليهم شيئا مما لم يقولوه، وأخذ هو في الفحص عن رسائل الشيخ ابن تيمية وأصحابه فيما يتعلّق بذلك حتى ظفر من ذلك بما تحرّر له به معتقد الحنابلة ومبنى طريقتهم.

قال لي: لما أمعنت النظر في رسائل القوم ومصنفاتهم وجدتهم برآء من كثير مما رموهم به أصحابنا الشافعية من التجسيم والتشبيه، وإنما القوم متمسكون بمذهب كبراء المحدثين كما هو المعروف من حال إمامهم رضي الله تعالى عنه، من إبقاء الآيات والأحاديث على ظواهرها والإيمان بها كذلك، مفوضون فيما أشكل معناه...

فيقولون: الله ورسوله أدرى بمعاني الآيات والأحاديث من هؤلاء المؤولين، وما ورد عنهم أنهم أولوا شيئًا من ذلك…فمراد الله بهذه الألفاظ هي المعاني التي تريدها منها العرب في لغتهم، وتطلق على كل واحد بحسب ما يليق به، فالمراد بالاستواء والفوق والنزول هي معانيها المعهودة في كلام العرب، فإذا قلت: زيد فوق السرير" فمعناه مستقر عليه متمكن منه مستعل، ولما علمنا أن زيدًا جرم من الأجرام والسرير كذلك تحقق لنا أن الفوقية في حقه واستقراره فوق السرير يوجب مماسته له، وتحيزه في جهة من جهاته، وأما المولى ﷻ فماهية ذاته غير مدركة لأحد من الخلق، فكيف نقول بأن استقراره فوق العرش يوجب مماسته له وتحيزه في جهة، لأن ذلك استقرار الجسم، وأما استقرار من ليس بجسم فلا نحكم بأنه يوجب كذا وكذا حتى نعلم ماهيته والماهية غير معلومة، فنثبت له استقرارًا حقيقيًا فوق العرش، لأنه أثبته لنفسه في كتابه وعلى لسان رسوله…

“Our teacher—may Allah be pleased with him—referring to al-Kūrānī (may Allah have mercy on him), excelled in his careful investigation of everything attributed to the Ḥanbalīs. He did not merely imitate his own Shāfiʿī school in this matter, knowing well the contentious nature of debates between disputants, the frequent failure to pinpoint the actual point of contention, and the tendency of each side to attribute to the other the necessary implications of their statements or to latch onto the outward sense of their words—even if the clear context of those words refutes such implications and renders such surface readings invalid.

For this reason, our teacher, upon setting out to research these issues—under the guidance of his own shaykh, al-Ṣafī—wrote to Shaykh ʿAbd al-Bāqī al-Ḥanbalī al-Baʿlī al-Dimashqī (Abū al-Mawāhib), who at that time was the leading Ḥanbalī scholar in Damascus in knowledge, practice, and piety. He requested from him a clearly articulated and well-substantiated account of the Ḥanbalī creed so that nothing might be falsely attributed to them. At the same time, he personally undertook a careful examination of the treatises of Shaykh Ibn Taymiyya and his followers on these matters until he was able to clarify the Ḥanbalī doctrine and the foundational principles of their approach.

He said to me: “When I examined the writings and treatises of these scholars in detail, I found them innocent of many of the accusations leveled against them by some of our Shāfiʿī companions—such as anthropomorphism (tajsīm) and likening Allah to creation (tashbīh). In reality, they adhere to the doctrine of the leading hadith scholars, as is well known from the state of their imām (may Allah be pleased with him): namely, affirming the verses and hadiths as they are, with faith in them according to their apparent meanings, while consigning the understanding (mufawwiḍūn) of that which is unclear to Allah.”

They say: “Allah and His Messenger know best the meanings of these verses and hadiths, more so than the people of figurative interpretation (taʾwīl), and there is no report of the early generations engaging in such reinterpretation.”

Thus, their understanding is that Allah’s intended meaning in these words corresponds to the meanings known to the Arabs in their language. Each expression is understood in accordance with what suits the one being described. So, terms like istiwāʾ (rising), fawq (above), and nuzūl (descent) are to be understood according to their customary meanings in Arabic. For example, if one says, “Zayd is above the bed,” the intended meaning is that he is settled upon it, firmly situated, elevated. Now, since we know that Zayd is a corporeal entity and the bed likewise, we recognize that Zayd’s being above the bed entails contact and spatial localization.

But as for the Lord ﷻ, His essence is beyond human comprehension. How then can we say that His being above the Throne entails contact or spatial confinement? That is the nature of the positioning of physical bodies. As for One who is not a body, we cannot declare that His being above entails such and such until we know His essence—and His essence is unknowable. Therefore, we affirm for Him a true and real istiwāʾ above the Throne, because He affirmed it for Himself in His Book and upon the tongue of His Messenger ﷺ.”

[16] I already explained the difference between the two in my article, The Hanbali School's Aqeedah on Allah's Attributes.

[17] Al-‘Ayyashi said:

ولقد أطلعني بعض أصحابنا بالقاهرة على رسالة للشيخ ابن تيمية وهي معتمدة عند الحنابلة، فطالعتها كلها،

One of our companions in Cairo showed me a treatise by Shaykh Ibn Taymiyya, which is regarded as authoritative among the Ḥanbalīs. I read through the entire work.

[18] Particularly the Hamawiyyah, al-Tadmuriyyah, and Sharh Hadeeth al-Nuzul.

[19] This should come as no surprise, given that Ibn Qutlubgha al-Hanafi (d. 879 A.H.) states in vol. 1, p. 86 of his commentary on a theological work of Ibn al-Humam called al-Musayara, that the Hanbalis themselves confess that Ibn Taymiyyah is the most knowledgeable of them:

وإنما سقت كلام هذا الرجل الاعتراف أهل مذهبه أنه أعلمهم