Why Was the Excuse of Ignorance Narrowly Applied by the Najdis?

Below is a partial translation of a telegram post written by Ustadh Alaa’ Hasan.

Why did the Najdis restrict the scope of the excuse of ignorance in matters of Tawḥīd while Ibn Taymiyyah granted it?

This is an important question that pertains to the analysis of intellectual schools and juristic sources. Many overlook this because they rely on apparent meanings and neglect deeper analysis.

The answer is that the early Najdis adhered to the Ḥanbalī school (unlike the Salafis today, who follow the approach of weighing opinions). Since the Najdis were traditionally adherents of a particular madhhab, they paid special attention to the books of the four schools of jurisprudence, particularly the chapters on apostasy.

The four schools of jurisprudence generally leaned toward restricting the scope of the excuse of ignorance in matters that entail disbelief. Both al-Qarāfī and al-Haytamī explicitly affirmed this.

You may be surprised to learn that Ibn Taymiyyah—contrary to what is commonly claimed about him—was more expansive in granting the excuse of ignorance than the Ashʿarīs and the scholars of the four madhhabs. In other words, he was more lenient in excusing ignorance than the scholars of his time and those who came after him. In fact, he even criticized them for dividing religion into fundamentals (uṣūl) and subsidiary matters (furūʿ).

However, one might ask: How did the Najdis rely on the books of the madhhabs when the scholars of these schools rarely focused on grave worship and its association with acts of disbelief?

The answer is that this is correct—the scholars of the madhhabs did not give much attention to rulings of disbelief concerning grave worship. However, the Najdis did not take these issues from them; rather, they derived them from Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim, as Ibn Taymiyyah explicitly stated that such matters constitute more manifest forms of disbelief than others. The Najdis then adopted the restriction of the excuse of ignorance from the books of the madhhabs.

For this reason, you will find that the Najdi texts dealing with matters of disbelief, such as Shaykh ʿAbdullāh’s Al-Kalimāt al-Nāfiʿah and Abā Buṭayn’s Takfīr al-Muʿayyan, among others, are filled with citations from the later scholars of the madhhabs.

The key point here is that the Najdis combined two approaches:

1. Ibn Taymiyyah’s position on major shirk.

2. The position of later jurists regarding the restriction of excusing ignorance.

The objection that apparent matters differ based on time and place is generally valid. However, according to the jurists of the madhhabs, it is not an absolute principle. Otherwise, denying a chapter of the Qurʾān, reviling Allah and His Messenger, or prostrating to an idol would not fall under this principle.

Moreover, a group of esteemed scholars upheld the view that ignorance is never a valid excuse, a position documented by Mullā ʿAlī al-Qārī al-Ḥanafī.

In conclusion, a rational person would acknowledge the legitimacy of the Najdis' ijtihād, as it is based on well-founded legal principles. This is why the leaders of Islamic reform movements tolerated their position and did not condemn them for it.

Their ijtihād falls within the realm of right and wrong, not within the doctrine of the Khawārij, as claimed by those who lack scholarly insight.

This issue was thoroughly examined by the distinguished jurist ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Yaḥyā al-Muʿallimī al-Yamānī—may Allah have mercy on him—who affirmed the legitimacy of their ijtihād, despite his own preference for excusing ignorance.

It is a mistake to assume that the early Najdis were ignorant. How could such a claim be made when some of their most prominent scholars spent their lives studying from a young age at Al-Azhar al-Sharīf, where they mastered logic, legal theory, and jurisprudence? Some of them even held leadership positions in the Ḥanbalī school at the Azhar Riwāq, such as ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn ʿAbdullāh. Others, like the esteemed scholar Abā Buṭayn, became the leading authorities of the Ḥanbalī school in Najd. His vast knowledge was attested to by Ibn Ḥumayd al-Makkī, the author of Al-Subḥ al-Wābila, despite his opposition to the Najdi movement.

Ask yourself: How could they have been unaware of something you consider self-evident unless the matter was subject to scholarly debate and inquiry?

For this reason, some contemporary imitators (muqallida) have erred by attributing to them the doctrines of the Khawārij or the Muʿtazilah. This is mistaken for two reasons:

1. The Khawārij declared people disbelievers without a valid basis, whereas the Najdis issued takfīr based on recognized grounds of disbelief.

2. The Najdis did not apply a restrictive approach to excusing ignorance in all matters but only in a specific issue they deemed self-evident—namely, directing acts of worship to other than Allah. However, they granted excuses in most other cases of disbelief, such as misinterpreting divine attributes and political allegiance (muwālāt).

The debate over excusing ignorance in specific acts of disbelief (mukaffirāt) has existed among scholars since earlier times:

• The jurists differed regarding the individual takfīr of the followers of Ibn ʿArabī. Some declared their doctrines heretical, while others extended takfīr to their actual adherents.

• The jurists also disagreed on whether the Mulūk al-Ṭawāʾif (the rulers of the Muslim principalities in al-Andalus) should be excused due to ignorance for their alliance with the Franks. Some excused them, while others did not, and Abū al-Qāsim al-Barzulī recorded this dispute.

• Similarly, the scholars differed regarding the individual takfīr of sorcerers. Some ruled that they should be declared disbelievers outright, while others withheld judgment until the matter was clarified to them.

As for the claim made by some researchers that not excusing ignorance in the case of grave worship necessarily entails the takfīr of all Ṣūfīs, this is incorrect. This is because it is difficult to ascertain the exact practices of Ṣūfīs at gravesites. Not all of them seek aid from other than Allah; rather, some are mere visitors, others seek intercession, and some only seek blessings. Moreover, Allah has not commanded people to scrutinize the personal practices of others, as such an approach falls into unnecessary burden and excessiveness. The fundamental principle is that a Muslim remains upon Islam, and certainty is not removed by doubt.

Therefore, judging the Najdis based on the perceived implications of their statements or the actions of extremists among their ignorant followers is not permissible.

And Allah knows best.

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