Addressing Common Misconceptions About the Najdi Da’wah

Below is a translation of Ustadh ‘Alaa Ismail’s article, Da‘wá Ghulūw an-Najdiyyīn wa-Khurūjihim ‘an Sunani al-‘Ulamā’.

Introduction:

There are numerous claims surrounding the Najdi call and many misconceptions about their approach, both from opponents and even from some supporters who have absorbed certain adversarial doubts. Matters were further complicated by the association of many ignorant individuals and extremists with the Najdi call, as they misused some of its statements—often the only ones they knew—leading to unjustified takfir and showing disrespect toward the scholars of the Islamic ummah. Consequently, some have come to believe that these extremists represent the Najdi methodology, leading to the perception that the Najdis have committed grave errors and deviated from the scholars of the ummah in a way that suggests they introduced a new madhab.

The reality, however, is that they did not oppose scholarly principles or methodological foundations, nor did they deviate from the consensus of the Muhammadan ummah. Every statement they made had precedents.

Yes, mistakes are inevitable from them, just as they are from those greater than them. However, we must situate disagreements in their proper context without exaggerating the issues or portraying them as contradictions of the fundamentals of Sharia.

In this paper, we will discuss the claim that the Najdis deviated from the traditions of earlier scholars in matters of takfir. We will examine whether their madhab was built on scientific principles and foundations or not. This will be addressed in eight sections:

Section One: Demonstrating the Rank of Najdi Scholars in Islamic Sciences

First and foremost, it is necessary to understand the rank of Najdi scholars in the field of Islamic sciences, as evaluating their statements depends on knowing the scholarly standing of those who made them. If the individual expressing an opinion is among the well-established scholars, widely recognized for their knowledge, their ijtihad cannot be dismissed, for their views are grounded in legitimate Sharia principles.

Here, it is important to correct a misconception prevalent among the general public and opponents, which asserts that the Najdis had little knowledge of the fundamentals (usul) or branches (furu‘) of Islamic sciences and that they were simplistic individuals who did not acquire knowledge from its proper sources. The truth, however, is entirely the opposite. Najdi scholars are widely acknowledged for their knowledge, jurisprudence, and extensive expertise in Islamic sciences.

1- Ibn Humayd, one of the staunchest opponents of the Najdi movement, says in his biography of the scholar Abdullah Aba Butayn:

“The preeminent jurist of Najd in the 13th century without dispute... [He continues:] He would explain matters with great precision and had an extraordinary ability to recall information. When he discussed an issue, he would say, ‘This is the phrase in al-Muqni‘,’ for example, and then add what al-Munqih said, noting what was added or omitted, and replacing certain terms with others, all with extreme care and deliberation. If he was asked about a straightforward matter that would be obvious even to his least advanced students, he would pause and reflect before answering, to the point that the ignorant might assume he was unfamiliar with the issue. In truth, however, he was fully aware of its sources, who preferred or weakened the opinion, and the supporting evidence. As for his knowledge of the differences among the four imams, as well as others among the early scholars, along with their narrations and opinions within the madhhab, it was astonishing. I do not believe I have seen anyone in this particular area who could rival him—or even come close... [He later concludes:] With his death, a thorough examination of Imam Ahmad’s madhhab was lost. He was a sign of excellence in it and reached its ultimate realization, achieving its highest level of precision and understanding.”[1]

Consider this testimony from one of the adversaries of Wahhabism, who places Aba Butayn in the rank of the muhaqqiqin. The rank of tahqiq is a scholarly level accorded to those whose opinions are relied upon in the madhhab, such as al-Hajjawi, al-Buhuti, and Mar‘i al-Karmi, among others. This means that the scholar Aba Butayn had reached that rank and was the last individual whose opinions could be relied upon in the madhhab. With his death, tahqiq in the madhhab of Ahmad came to an end.

It is worth noting that Ibn Humayd, the author of Al-Suhub al-Wabila, was himself a Hanbali jurist and wrote a hashiya on Sharh Muntaha al-Iradat. Thus, his praise of Aba Butayn’s knowledge cannot be dismissed as mere flattery. Despite his opposition to Wahhabism and Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, he found himself compelled to state the truth that he personally observed and experienced.

Therefore, one must exercise caution and reflection before hastily labeling esteemed scholars—recognized even by their opponents for their scholarly grounding—as ignorant or superficial.

2- Several of the descendants of Sheikh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab studied under the scholars of Al-Azhar University, including Sheikh Abdul Rahman ibn Hasan, the author of Fath al-Majid, his son Abdul Latif, as well as the sons of Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab. There were mutual expressions of praise between them and the scholars of Al-Azhar.

Sheikh Abdul Rahman ibn Hasan, after mentioning a number of his teachers in Najd, said: “As for our teachers from among the scholars of Egypt, among their most distinguished was Sheikh Hasan al-Qawisni. I attended his lectures on Sharh Jam‘ al-Jawami‘ in Usul by Al-Mahalli and Mukhtasar al-Sa‘d in the sciences of Ma‘ani and Bayan. Among them was Ibrahim al-Bajuri, under whom I studied Sharh al-Khulasa by Al-Ashmuni up to the section on addition. I also attended his lectures on Al-Sullam and those of Muhammad al-Damanhuri on metaphors and Al-Kafi in the sciences of prosody (‘arud) and rhyme (qawafi), which he read to us with his commentary at Al-Azhar Mosque—may Allah preserve it with knowledge and faith.”[2]

Sheikh Abdul Rahman ibn Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab even assumed the position of the chair of the Hanbalis at Al-Azhar University. Al-Bitar mentions him in his historical work, saying: “Sheikh Abdul Rahman ibn Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, the renowned Hanbali scholar of Najd, and the distinguished figure whose virtue is well-known... He devoted himself to seeking knowledge, learning, teaching, benefiting, and sharing knowledge until he became the head of the Hanbali quarters at Al-Azhar. He was outwardly characterized by piety, righteousness, asceticism, and worship.”[3]

The distinguished scholar of Al-Azhar, Sheikh Muhammad al-Azizi al-Shafi‘i al-Sufi al-Khalwati, says: “When the honorable Wahhabi dignitaries came to Egypt, among the most eminent and esteemed of them was our dear friend, the virtuous leader, and exemplary scholar, our master Sheikh Abdullah al-Hanbali [referring to Sheikh Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab], and his brother, the virtuous leader and our dear friend, the man of praiseworthy character and exemplary deeds, Sheikh Ibrahim al-Hanbali. Among their distinguished and intelligent figures was Sidi Abdul Rahman ibn Abdul Aziz—may Allah shower him with His vast mercy and grace. Our dear friend Sheikh Abdullah—may Allah have mercy on him—was one of the noble scholars, and he raised his son Sheikh Abdul Rahman al-Hanbali, who was among the most intelligent and virtuous scholars of his time.”[4]

3- One indication of the scholarly grounding of the Najdis is the fact that a number of Ashʿarīs reverted to their position after engaging in discussions with some of their scholars. For instance, al-Tilmisānī[5] returned to the Najdi stance after debating with Aḥmad ibn ʿĪsá al-Najdī (the commentator on al-Nūniyya), and Shaykh Khawqīr al-Makkī, the author of Mukhtaṣar Khawqīr in the Ḥanbalī school, also returned. Khawqīr had previously been a Shāfiʿī and a student of Zaynī Daḥlān, but after debating with Shaykh Aḥmad ibn ʿĪsá, he adopted the Salafī madhab.[6]

The reversion of scholars of such caliber demonstrates that the Najdis possessed a depth of Islamic knowledge and foundational reasoning that enabled them to engage with and persuade leading intellectuals.

The point of the above is to counter the popular misconception that the scholars of Najd were superficial and did not acquire knowledge from its proper sources. Such an assertion is not made by those who have truly understood their status and studied their biographies in the pursuit of knowledge.

Our previous discussion is not so much a defense as it is a description of reality, an attempt to provide a comprehensive picture, to give every individual their due with justice and fairness, and to place everything in its proper context. After this, it remains for the researcher to agree with or differ from them in specific details, which is a separate matter altogether.

Section Two: Declaring Tribes as Apostates or Polytheists

Some individuals argue that Ibn Bishr, Ibn Ghannām, and other Najdi scholars referred to their armies as “the armies of Muslims” and described their campaigns as conquests. They also labeled those they fought against at times as apostates and at other times as polytheists.

This is considered one of the most significant objections raised against the Najdis, often repeated by opponents or even some supporters. However, upon closer examination, such claims do not rest on a sound scholarly investigation.

The Response to This Claim Consists of Several Points:

The First Point: Describing those engaged in warfare with kufr and ridda (apostasy) is neither an unusual nor objectionable designation among scholars of Islamic law and historians. On the contrary, it is a well-established practice among earlier generations, even if it is unfamiliar to some contemporaries.

1- Ibn Manẓūr states: “It is said of the people of war that they committed kufr, meaning they have rebelled and resisted. Kufr can also refer to kufr ingratitude, which is the opposite of gratitude. Kufr: the denial of a blessing, which opposes gratitude. Allah’s statement: {Indeed, we deny [all of] this} [Qur’an 34:15], means: we are ungrateful.”[7]

Imam al-Shāfiʿī stated: “Ridda refers to turning away from what one previously adhered to, either through disbelief or by withholding what is due. He said: Whoever turns away from something may be described as having irtad from it.”[8]

2- The Najdis’ description of their army as “the army of Muslims” is based on the fact that they were aligned with the Imam. Scholars of Islamic law commonly refer to the Imam’s army as “the army of Muslims” when engaged in combat against the Khawārij or those who refuse to fulfill certain obligations of the Sharīʿa.

Historians have consistently referred to the Imam’s army as “the Muslims,” even when those they were fighting were also Muslims. An example of this can be found in what al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī mentioned: “Those who rebelled against ʿAlī at Nahrawān were four thousand, fully equipped in iron. The Muslims attacked them and killed them, while only nine men from the Muslims were killed.”[9]

Historians of this period also employed such terminology. For example, Tārīkh al-Fākhirī states: “In the year 1176, the Muslims raided al-Aḥsā.”[10] Similarly, Tārīkh Ibn Labūn records: “In the year 1194, the armies of the Muslims marched against the people of al-Zulfi.”[11]

Undoubtedly, the Najdis were influenced by the language of Islamic jurisprudence and historical accounts to the extent that it became customary for them. Even King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, the founder of the third Saudi state—known for his tolerance of others, as attested by his opponents—referred to his army as “the Muslims” during the Battle of al-Sabla. In his letter to the Emir of Kuwait, he wrote: “Thus, the Muslims launched an attack against them on the nineteenth of last month, killed them, and gave them a terrifying lesson.”[12]

It is well-known that the Ikhwān movement, known as Ikhwān Man Aṭāʿ Allāh, were not disbelievers. They were a group known for their rigidity in practicing Islam. Yet, despite this, the Najdis referred to themselves as “the Muslims” when they fought against them.

3- Al-Shawkānī described the wars of Ibn Saʿūd as conquests (futūḥāt), mentioning that the Najdi territories entered into the fold of Islam after having been in a state of jāhiliyya (ignorance). This does not imply that al-Shawkānī was a takfīrī or that he necessarily declared opponents of Wahhabism as disbelievers.

For example, al-Shawkānī praised their campaigns, stating: “Practices of jāhiliyya had dominated those territories, and Islam had become a stranger in those lands. Then, Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd passed away after some of the Najdi territories had embraced the religion, and his son ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz succeeded him. He conquered all the Najdi lands, the regions of al-ʿĀriḍ, al-Aḥsā, and al-Qaṭīf, and extended his conquests to include many areas of the Ḥijāz.”[13]

The Second Point: The tribes declared disbelievers were not labeled so in a general or absolute sense. Rather, this was a case of a general statement (ʿāmm) intended to refer to specific individuals (khāṣṣ). Declaring a village as disbelievers meant referring to the leaders and influential figures (dhawī al-ḥall wal-ʿaqd) among them upon whom the proof had been established. Terms like “polytheists” or “apostates” were used in a general sense (taghlīb), and it was permissible for the ruler to fight such a village while recognizing that among its residents, there might be Muslims.

This was clarified by Shaykhs Ḥasan and ʿAbd Allāh, the sons of Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb—may Allah have mercy on them both—when they said: “It may be ruled that the people of a particular village are disbelievers, and their ruling is that of the disbelievers. However, this does not mean that every individual among them is declared a disbeliever by name, for some among them may be Muslims, excused for not emigrating, or practicing their religion secretly without the knowledge of the Muslims.”[14]

This is legally permissible in Islamic jurisprudence by analogy with the concept of al-ṭāʾifah al-mumtaniʿah (the resisting group). Jurists agree that a group refusing to perform an obligatory act of worship and subsequently confronted by the Imam’s authority can be labeled as murtaddeen. However, they differ on whether this constitutes ridda from Islam itself or simply ridda from accepting the truth.

There is no doubt that the Najdis adopted the view of ridda from Islam because, in their perspective, grave worship constitutes an act of disbelief. This differs from merely refraining from certain obligations of the Sharīʿa.

In any case, both views are valid, and there is no reproach against those who adopt either position. As mentioned earlier, this falls under the category of a general ruling (ʿāmm) intended to apply to specific individuals (khāṣṣ). That is, the ruling of disbelief pertains specifically to the leaders of the village, not to the general populace, as was clarified by the sons of Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in their earlier statement.

Al-Jabarti reported that the Saudi forces did not pursue the defeated in their war with the Ottoman Empire, but rather treated them as rebels. This is explicitly stated by Al-Jabarti in his account of the events surrounding the defeat of the Ottoman armies by the battalions of the Da‘wah.[15]

The third point: the takfir of some tribes by the Najdis was not due to one or two issues alone but was based on the entirety of their conditions and beliefs. Among these tribes were those who denied the resurrection, permitted forbidden acts, and claimed they were not bound by Islamic law, just as Al-Khidr was not bound by the law of Moses. They held beliefs in the extremist leaders of the Sufi pantheists. Furthermore, within each tribe, some individuals claimed knowledge of the unseen, conversed with angels and jinn, and invoked them instead of Allah, such as the two shaykhs: Taj and Shamsan.[16]

This is not an exaggeration by the Wahhabis in describing the general conditions, as some contemporary writers have claimed. Rather, many Ash‘arites shared in describing these conditions, such as Shaykh Al-Sanusi, Al-Bajuri, and Al-Khalili, who stated that many of the Bedouins were apostates due to their false beliefs.[17] Al-Khalili, an Ash‘arite, even went further in his fatwas by declaring the necessity of fighting them and enslaving their women if they persisted in obstinacy. Among his statements concerning the tribes of Al-Sa‘adna, Banu ‘Atiyya, and others from the Arabs of the Levant, Egypt, the Hijaz, and other Bedouin Arabs, he said:

“Whoever deems lawful a ruling whose prohibition and unlawfulness are known in the religion of our Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) is a disbeliever. If they are forbidden and admonished repeatedly, it becomes permissible to kill them, fight them, and seize their wealth. Then, consideration is given to the state of their women: if they are believers forced against their will, bearing no sin, they are to be taught the rulings. However, if not, it becomes permissible to enslave and sell them, as with women from the ranks of those at war. This is their ruling while they remain disbelievers. From this, it is understood that killing them is absolutely permissible under such circumstances, and the one who kills them will be rewarded. The reward for fighting them is akin to the reward for fighting those at war with Islam, provided the intention is sincere, for it is striving in the path of Allah. And Allah knows best.”[18]

The scholar San‘allah Al-Hanafi, who preceded the Wahhabi movement by a century, described the general conditions in the Arabian Peninsula, noting that the people believed in the inherent ability of saints to bring benefit or harm.[19]

Al-Shawkani also mentioned similar observations and stated: “This is among the clearest evidence indicating that their polytheism exceeded that of those who claimed that Allah is one of two or one of three.”[20]

The foregoing serves as historical documentation that refutes accusations of excessive takfir against Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his followers. It is essential to examine the circumstances of that era and study them carefully, with fairness and justice, before hastily passing judgments on the scholars of that time.

Section Three: Citing Verses Revealed About Polytheists and Applying Them to Muslims

One of the surprising claims of the opponents is that the Najdis applied verses revealed about polytheists to individuals from the Muhammadan community. Were it not for the prevalence of this claim and its acceptance by many, we would not have given it any significance, for what is the purpose of the Qur’an if it cannot be used as evidence in matters of dispute?!

This approach is not exclusive to the Wahhabis, as some allege. Rather, it is a practice commonly followed by scholars without objection.

Fakhr al-Din al-Razi, in his commentary on the verse: {They worship besides Allah that which neither harms them nor benefits them, and they say, “These are our intercessors with Allah”} [Yunus: 18], states:

“They fashioned these idols and statues in the images of their prophets and prominent figures, claiming that by engaging in the worship of these figures, those exalted individuals would become their intercessors with Allah. A similar phenomenon is observed in our time, as many people busy themselves with the veneration of the graves of distinguished individuals, believing that by venerating their graves, those individuals will intercede for them with Allah.”[21]

Likewise, Al-Sawi, while interpreting the verse: {Say, O People of the Scripture, come to a word that is equitable between us and you—that we will not worship except Allah and not associate anything with Him and not take one another as lords instead of Allah. But if they turn away, then say, “Bear witness that we are Muslims [submitting to Him]”} [Aal ‘Imran: 64], remarks:

“Although this verse addresses the Jews and Christians, its implications extend to those Muslims who associate partners with Allah, such as the weak in faith who believe that saints inherently have the power to harm or benefit and who permit what Allah has forbidden and forbid what Allah has permitted. Moreover, they introduce major innovations unsupported by divine authority, considering these innovations as pathways to these saints, and falsely claim that such practices lead to salvation even though they contradict the Shari‘ah. They imagine themselves to be on the right path, but indeed, they are the liars.”[22]

Thus, Al-Sawi, an Ash‘arite, applied verses originally revealed concerning disbelievers to groups among the Muslims.

Section Four: The Stance of Najdi Scholars Toward Later Scholars

One of the misconceptions that ought to be corrected in academic circles is the widespread assumption that the scholars of the Najdi Da‘wah declared certain later scholars, such as Al-Subki, Al-Haytami, Al-Qastallani, Zakariya Al-Ansari, Ibn Al-Jazari, and others, to be disbelievers due to their errors. This assumption is held by both opponents and extremist Salafis alike. However, it is a completely mistaken notion with no basis in reality.

The reader may be surprised to learn that the truth is quite the opposite. The Najdi scholars held these figures in high regard, prayed for them, and cited their statements in their writings.

Firstly: Shaykh Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, may Allah have mercy on him, would debate his opponents using the statements of later scholars. He said:

“I told them: I argue with the Hanafi using the words of later Hanafi scholars, and with the Maliki, Shafi‘i, and Hanbali using the words of the later scholars of their respective schools, those upon whom they rely. When they refused this, I presented to them the statements of scholars from every school and cited what they had said after the emergence of the practices involving graves and vows made to them. They diverted this, acknowledged it, but it only increased their aversion.”[23]

Secondly: Shaykh Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab stated:

“We likewise do not declare as disbelievers those whose religiosity is sound, whose piety is evident, whose asceticism and righteousness are well-known, and who have devoted themselves to serving the Ummah by teaching beneficial knowledge and authoring works—even if they erred in this matter or others, such as making istighatha of the Messenger. Examples include Ibn Hajar Al-Haytami. We are aware of his statements in Al-Durr al-Munazzam, and we do not deny his vast knowledge. For this reason, we care for his books, such as Sharh al-Arba‘in and Al-Zawajir, among others, and we rely on his transmissions, as he is among the scholars of the Muslims.”[24]

Al-‘Allamah Aba Butayn stated:

“As for the objection raised by Ibn Jarjis, who said: ‘If the statements of scholars such as Al-Baydawi, Al-Qastallani, and others had any weight with you, we would have mentioned them. However, they are erased by a single phrase: that they are disbelievers.’

Aba Butayn responded:

“As for his false accusation that we declare the scholars of Islam to be disbelievers, he has fabricated a lie against Allah and His Messenger. Allah, the Exalted, says: {Only those who do not believe in Allah’s revelations fabricate falsehood} [Al-Nahl: 105]. We pray for all Muslims generally and for their scholars specifically, saying: {Our Lord, forgive us and our brothers who preceded us in faith, and do not place in our hearts any resentment toward those who have believed. Our Lord, indeed You are Kind and Merciful} [Al-Hashr: 10].

Nevertheless, as they themselves have advised, we affirm that every person’s statement may be accepted or rejected, except that of the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him. The scholars have their errors, and the well-known hadith states: “Beware of the slip of the scholar.” If it becomes clear to us that any of them has erred, we do not follow them in that error, but we pray for them.’”[25]

Thirdly: The Praise for Later Scholars in Najdi Writings

A review of the writings of the Najdi scholars reveals their abundant commendation of later scholars:

1. Shaykh Abdul Rahman ibn Hasan, after quoting Imam Al-Nawawi’s analysis on a certain issue, remarked: “Consider what Al-Nawawi, may Allah have mercy on him, has stated… and suffice it to say, this is an eminent imam.”[26]

2. Shaykh Abdul Rahman would also describe some later scholars as “Shaykhs of Islam,” despite their being Ash‘arites or influenced by Ash‘arite thought.

Examples:

– He said, in the course of his discussion on a doctrinal matter: “Shaykh al-Islam al-Balqini said: I extracted the concealed traces of Muʿtazilite doctrine in al-Kashshaf with the finest scrutiny.”[27] Thus, he referred to al-Balqini as Shaykh al-Islam—reflect on this.

– In his book Al-Iman wal-Radd ʿala Ahl al-Bidaʿ (Faith and Refutation of the Innovators), he mentioned al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar and referred to him as Shaykh al-Islam al-Hafiz. He also mentioned Zakariyya al-Ansari, referring to him as Shaykh al-Islam as well. He said, may Allah have mercy on him: “From Shaykh al-Islam Zakariyya al-Ansari, from al-Hafiz Shaykh al-Islam Ahmad ibn ʿAli ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalani, the author of Fath al-Bari, and most of the transmissions of the works mentioned by our teachers trace back to him.”[28]

3- The writings of the Najdis on the subject of takfir, such as the treatise by Abdullah titled Al-Kalimat al-Nafiʿah ʿan al-Mukaffirat al-Waqiʿah or Al-ʿUdhur bil-Jahl by Shaykh Aba Butayn, among others, relied primarily on the texts of later jurists, such as Ibn Daqiq al-ʿId and Ibn Hajar al-Haytami. They would invoke Allah’s mercy upon them when citing their statements. An example of this is what Shaykh Abdullah bin Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab said: “We begin with their statements regarding major shirk and their pronouncement of takfir on its practitioners when it occurred in their times among some who were affiliated with Islam and the Sunnah, as this is what is most important. Thus, we say: Regarding the statements of the Shafiʿis, Ibn Hajar, may Allah have mercy on him, said in his book Al-Zawajir ʿan Iqtiraf al-Kabaʾir…”[29]

He cited al-Haytami as evidence and invoked mercy upon him, which refutes this widespread misconception about them.

The intended point of the above is that the Najdi scholars—whether one agrees or disagrees with their ijtihad—did not deviate from the methodology of earlier scholars, nor did they dismiss the contributions of later scholars. Rather, they followed the tradition of the scholarly legacy of the Muhammadan ummah.

The actions of the ignorant or certain contemporary students of knowledge who affiliate themselves with the Najdis but have gone to extremes in takfir or have disregarded earlier scholars hold no weight. The fault lies with these ignorant individuals who fail to understand the scholars’ statements in their proper context. A scholar might utter a statement with specific reasoning and conditions, but an ignorant person takes it at face value and applies its implications without adhering to its guidelines.

On this matter, Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah says: “Well-known individuals—meaning scholars—may say things regarding certain issues or evidences that are correct, or that have some semblance of correctness. However, when the ignorant adopt and distort these statements, they become a source of misguidance and among the gravest falsehoods and absurdities.”[30]

He also says: “The ignorant are like flies that land only on wounds and do not settle on healthy spots.”[31]

Section Five: Do the Najdis Consider All Grave-Related Innovations to Be Major Shirk?

One of the widespread popular misconceptions is that the Najdis regard all innovations related to graves as major shirk without distinction and fail to differentiate between the levels of innovation. This assumption is entirely unfounded. In fact, they distinguish between the levels of grave-related innovations: some are classified as major shirk, others as prohibited innovations, and yet others as minor jurisprudential disagreements. In their view, even major shirk has varying levels, and innovations are likewise categorized into different levels. This distinction becomes clear in the following discussion:

1- Seeking Blessings (Tabarruk) and Circumambulating Graves Is Not Major Shirk in Itself:

Shaykh Ibn Baz states: “Circumambulating graves, if done as an act of devotion to the occupant of the grave, is equivalent to invoking and making istighatha from the deceased and constitutes major shirk. However, if one circumambulates the grave believing that doing so is an act of worship drawing one closer to Allah, similar to how people circumambulate the Kaaba, without intending to venerate the deceased, this is an innovation and a prohibited, dangerous means leading to shirk.”[32]

Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymin explains regarding seeking blessings through touching or kissing graves: “If one believes that they benefit independently of Allah, this is shirk in rububiyyah (lordship) and an act that expels one from Islam. However, if one believes that the grave is merely a means and not independently beneficial without Allah, such a belief is misguided and incorrect. What is believed in this case constitutes minor shirk.”[33]

2- The Najdis Do Not Declare as Disbelievers Those Who Seek Intercession through the Righteous or Supplicate to Allah Near Graves:

Shaykh Muhammad bin Abdul Wahhab, may Allah have mercy on him, said:

“The forms of supplication practiced in this era are of various types:

• The first type: Supplicating to Allah alone without associating any partner with Him, which is the message Allah sent His Messenger, peace and blessings be upon him, to convey.

• The second type: Supplicating to Allah while also calling upon a prophet or a righteous person, saying: ‘I seek their intercession, even though I know that only Allah benefits or harms. However, I am a sinner, and I call upon this righteous person in the hope that they will intercede for me.’ This is what the polytheists did, and the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him, fought against them until they abandoned it and refrained from calling upon anyone alongside Allah—neither for intercession nor for benefit.

· The Third Type: To say: “O Allah, I seek Your favor through Your Prophet, or through the prophets, or through the righteous.” This is not shirk, nor have we prohibited people from doing it on the grounds that it is shirk. However, what has been narrated from Abu Hanifa, Abu Yusuf, and others is that they considered it disliked. But this is not an issue over which we differ with others.”[34]

He also said:

“Their statement regarding seeking rain: ‘There is no harm in seeking intercession through the righteous,’ and Ahmad’s statement that one may seek intercession specifically through the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, while also asserting that it is impermissible to seek help from a created being—this distinction is very clear and is unrelated to our primary discussion. The fact that some scholars permit seeking intercession through the righteous, while others restrict it to the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, and most scholars prohibit and dislike it—this issue belongs to the domain of fiqh. Even if we believe the correct view aligns with the majority opinion that it is disliked, we do not censure those who practice it, as there is no objection in matters of ijtihad…Likewise, if someone visits a known grave—such as that of Al-Karkhi or others—and prays there but calls upon Allah alone, devoting worship sincerely to Him, how is this relevant to what we are discussing?”[35]

In the two preceding texts, the Shaykh considers the issue of tawassul (seeking intercession) to be a matter of jurisprudence. In fact, he leans toward merely deeming it disliked (makruh), rather than prohibited (haram), and does not censure those who practice it or prohibit people from engaging in it.

Yes, the Najdis who follow the Shaykh regard tawassul through the righteous as a prohibited innovation—this is also the opinion of Ibn Taymiyyah—but they do not adopt an overly strict stance on the matter. This is because its evidence was unclear to later generations, and esteemed jurists from the four madhabs supported it.

Shaykh Sulayman bin Abdullah said:

“Know that seeking intercession through the person of a created being or through their status is different from asking or supplicating to them. Seeking intercession through their person or status is to say: ‘O Allah, forgive me, have mercy on me, and admit me to Paradise through Your Prophet Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him,’ or ‘through the status of Your Prophet Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him,’ or similar phrases. This is an innovation but not shirk.”[36]

Among the responses of Imam Muhammad bin Saud, when questioned by the Moroccan judge, who asked: “We have heard that you prohibit visiting the Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, and visiting other deceased individuals, despite such practices being established in the authentic collections that cannot be denied,” he replied:

“God forbid that we deny what has been established in our Shariʿa! Have we prohibited you when we know that you understand the proper manner and etiquette of such visits? Rather, we only prohibit it for the general populace, who commit shirk in ‘Ubudiyyah and Rububiyyah and ask the deceased to fulfill their needs—needs that can only be fulfilled by the Lordship of Allah. The proper purpose of visiting graves is to reflect on the deceased’s state, remember the visitor’s eventual return to the same state, and then pray for the deceased’s forgiveness. One may also use the deceased as a means to supplicate to Allah Almighty, asking Him, the sole giver and withholder, through the status of the deceased—provided the deceased is someone befitting such intercession. This is the position of our Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal; may Allah be pleased with him.

Because the general populace is so far removed from understanding this meaning, we have prohibited it as a preventive measure. So, what opposition is there to this approach?”[37]

3- The Najdis Do Not Declare Prostration or Bowing to Others as Disbelief Unless It Is Intended as Worship:

Shaykh Muhammad ibn Ibrahim said: “Bowing during greetings is prohibited if it is intended as a gesture of salutation. However, if it is intended as an act of worship, then it is kufr.”[38]

Shaykh Abdul Aziz Abdul Latif stated: “It is well known that the prostration of worship, rooted in submission, humility, surrender, and reverence, is exclusively for Allah alone and is part of the tawhid agreed upon by the messages of the Prophets. If such prostration is directed toward others, it constitutes shirk and polytheism. However, if one prostrates to a parent, a scholar, or similar figures to honor and greet them, this is a forbidden act that falls short of shirk. On the other hand, if the intention is submission, closeness, and humility toward them, then this is shirk.”[39]

This aligns with the view of Shaykh al-Islam Ibn Taymiyyah and the Hanbali scholars. Ibn Taymiyyah said:

“Prostration is of two types: prostration of pure worship and prostration of honor. The former is reserved solely for Allah.”[40]

Al-Ruhaybani al-Hanbali stated: “Prostration before rulers or the deceased with the intent of worship is unequivocally disbelief, by consensus among Muslims. However, bowing to a creature as a form of greeting is considered one of the grave major sins.”[41]

In contrast, a group of Shafi’i scholars has held that prostration to anyone other than Allah is outright disbelief, regardless of whether the intent is worship or greeting, and the person’s intention is of no consequence. Their argument is that in this community, prostration has customarily been associated with worship. Among those who adopted this view are Shaykh al-Islam Zakariyya al-Ansari and Ibn Hajar al-Haytami.[42]

Shaykh al-Islam Zakariyya al-Ansari stated in Manhaj al-Tullab in the section on apostasy: “Or throwing a Qur’an into filth, or prostrating to a created being.” Al-‘Allama al-Jamal commented in his marginalia: “That is, even if it were to a prophet, and even if the person denied disrespect or their heart’s intent did not align with their outward action because their apparent state contradicts their claim... However, if there is strong evidence indicating that the act does not signify disrespect—such as the prostration of a prisoner in enemy territory in the presence of a disbeliever out of fear of harm—then it is not disbelief.”[43]

Ibn Hajar al-Haytami stated in Tuhfat al-Muhtaj in the section on apostasy: “Such as throwing the Qur’an [into filth]... or prostrating to an idol, the sun, or any other created being, or performing sorcery involving acts like worshiping a celestial body, for this affirms a partner to Allah, Exalted is He. Al-Juwayni claimed that the act alone does not constitute disbelief, but his son refuted him. However, if there is strong evidence indicating that the act does not signify disrespect—such as throwing [the Qur’an] out of fear of its confiscation by a disbeliever or the prostration of a captive in enemy territory in their presence—then it does not constitute disbelief. Bowing (ruku’) is excluded, as its form is commonly directed toward created beings as a gesture of greeting, unlike prostration. It is evident, however, that the distinction between them applies when no specific intent is declared. If someone intends to glorify a created being by bowing to them in the manner that Allah is glorified, there is no doubt that this constitutes disbelief.”[44]

Al-Haytami distinguishes between prostration and bowing. Bowing is customarily performed as a gesture of greeting and does not, in itself, indicate disbelief. Prostration, however, is not typically performed except as a religious ritual, which is why he regarded it as absolute disbelief, whether the prostrator claimed it was intended as a greeting or an act of worship.

However, the majority of scholars disputed this view, arguing that some of the Sahabah prostrated to the Prophet ﷺ, and he prohibited them without declaring them disbelievers. This undermines the argument that the ruling is based on customary practices in this community. In response, it is noted that the Sahabah did not repeat such actions after being prohibited, and since then, up until the present day, prostration has become exclusively associated with religious rituals. This strengthens the position adopted by al-Haytami.

In any case, the issue remains one of ijtihad, and both opinions agree that prostration to anyone other than Allah constitutes a major sin, regardless of whether it is intended as an act of worship or otherwise.

4. Istighatha: Its forms range from the clear to the ambiguous.

Many people mistakenly believe that the Najdis categorically declare disbelief regarding any act of istighatha from the Prophet. However, the reality is that such acts are not treated uniformly by them. They differentiate between what is clearly apparent and what is ambiguous. The clearly apparent is the direct and explicit invocation of a created being for something that only Allah has the power to grant.

As for seeking du’a or intercession from the occupant of a grave, there are different opinions among scholars. Some view it as an bid‘a, others regard it as major shirk, and some simply report the disagreement without favoring a particular view.

Even those who consider it major shirk do not classify it as something so manifestly clear that the person committing it would be immediately declared a disbeliever, as will be explained later.

Among those who regarded it as merely an innovation are Shaykh al-Sahsanwani, Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen, and others. Among those who reported the differing opinions on the matter are Shaykh Ibn Baz and others.

Al-Sahsanwani, when discussing the issue of seeking supplication, stated: “If the one being invoked is deceased and is called upon at their grave, this is not shirk but an innovation. In any case, it is incumbent upon a believer to avoid invoking anyone other than Allah, as this is the position that avoids both excessiveness and negligence.”[45]

Shaykh Ibn ‘Uthaymeen said: “Asking the deceased to ask Allah or asking them to fulfill a need involves a distinction. If one asks the deceased to fulfill a need, this is major shirk. However, if one asks the deceased to ask Allah, this is a bid‘a and misguidance because once a person dies, their deeds come to an end, and supplication is one of their deeds. So how can you ask them for what is impossible? This includes saying, ‘O Messenger of Allah, intercede for me.’ This is forbidden and a reprehensible innovation. But if you were to say, ‘O Messenger of Allah, save me from the Fire,’ this would be major shirk.”[46]

Shaykh ‘Abdul Aziz ibn Baz referenced the differing opinions regarding the statement attributed to Malik al-Dar: “O Messenger of Allah, ask for rain for your nation, for they are perishing.” The Shaykh, may Allah have mercy on him, said: “What this man did is objectionable and a means leading to shirk. In fact, some scholars have classified it as a type of shirk.”[47]

As for those who consider seeking supplication from the deceased as major shirk, this includes many of the scholars of Najd, as is evident in the words of Al-‘Allama ‘Abdullah in his letter to the people of Mecca.

This view, however, was not exclusive to the Najdi scholars; it was also upheld by scholars from other schools, such as Mawlana Ismail al-Dehlawi, a Hanafi scholar, in his treatise Taqwiyat al-Iman, where he definitively classified it as shirk.

Mawlana al-Dehlawi stated: “It is evident from this that those who seek help and think that they have not committed shirk because they did not request the fulfillment of needs but merely supplications are mistaken. Even if they have not committed shirk by requesting the fulfillment of needs, they have committed shirk through their act of invocation, for they assume that the deceased can hear their call from afar as they would from nearby.”[48]

However, this remains one of the ambiguous matters for them, and its practitioner is not immediately declared a disbeliever. Instead, continuous clarification and explanation are required. Shaykh ‘Abdullah ibn Jibreen stated: “Because of the barrier of misinterpretation, scholars did not declare disbelief upon some of those who engage in excessive veneration of the deceased and ask them for intercession with Allah, the Exalted.”[49] He then referenced the words of ‘Abdullah, the son of Shaykh Muhammad, in his treatise Mubahatha ma‘a Ahl Makka, where he classified later scholars as being among those who err due to misinterpretation.[50]

In summary: The Najdis clearly differentiate between the various levels of grave-related innovations; not all of them are considered disbelief, as some might assume. The actions of ignorant individuals associated with them, or even those of certain students of knowledge who have misrepresented the call, hold no weight. What matters is the statements of the scholars as reflected in their works.

Thus, their restriction of the scope for excuses applies specifically to matters that are extremely clear and evident, such as invoking other than Allah for things that only Allah can grant. As described by al-Sahsanwani, this category necessitates the belief in the saints’ ability to influence events, thereby attributing some of the divine attributes to created beings. In other words, they declare disbelief in cases where the matter is unambiguous and leaves no room for doubt.

The discussion then remains: Is invoking saints for matters that only Allah can fulfill among the clear and manifest issues, or is it not? And can ignorance serve as an excuse in such cases?

If the focus of the discussion is confined to this issue, it becomes manageable—in sha’ Allah. Even if Ibn Taymiyyah’s opinion on excusing ignorance differs from theirs, this does not diminish their standing nor harm the scholarly discourse. This is because the issue of declaring a specific individual a disbeliever when they commit an act of disbelief is one of the permissible areas of disagreement, as explicitly mentioned by Mulla Ali al-Qari al-Hanafi and others, whose words will be cited later.

Section Six: Is the Position of Not Excusing Ignorance in Clear Matters Exclusive to the Najdis?

The foundational principle is that clear issues (al-masa’il al-zahira)—those known to be part of the religion by necessity (ma‘lum min al-din bil-darura)—are not excused by ignorance. This is not a view held exclusively by the Najdis; rather, it is a position shared by many Muslim jurists, with some even citing it as a consensus.

Al-Qadi ‘Iyad stated: “No one is excused for disbelief due to ignorance or by claiming a slip of the tongue.”[51] His statement pertains to clear matters.

Similarly, it is mentioned in al-Durr al-Mukhtar, a foundational text of the Hanafi school:

“Whoever utters a word of disbelief, even if they do not hold it in their heart or are unaware that it constitutes disbelief, but uttered it willingly, has committed disbelief according to the majority of scholars, and they are not excused by ignorance.”[52]

Mulla Ali al-Qari, a prominent Hanafi scholar, elaborates: “If someone utters a word of disbelief without realizing it is disbelief, Fatwas of Qadi Khan mentions a disagreement without favoring either view, as it states: ‘Some say they are not deemed a disbeliever because they are excused by ignorance, while others say they are deemed a disbeliever and are not excused by ignorance.’ I say: The more apparent view is the first (excusing ignorance), except in cases pertaining to what is known to be part of the religion by necessity, for in such cases, they are deemed a disbeliever and are not excused by ignorance.”[53]

Al-Suyuti stated: “Anyone who is ignorant of the prohibition of something commonly known among the majority of people is not excused by claiming ignorance unless they are a new convert to Islam or someone who grew up in a remote area where such matters are not known—such as the prohibitions of adultery, murder, alcohol consumption, speaking during prayer, or eating during fasting.”[54]

What may surprise the reader is that Ibn Hajar al-Haytami also does not excuse ignorance in acts that entail disbelief. He does not consider the heart’s intent or circumstantial evidence, limiting excuses to those in remote areas or new to Islam—exactly like the Najdis.

Ibn Hajar al-Haytami said: “The basis for ruling on disbelief is the outward actions, with no consideration given to intentions or purposes, nor to circumstantial evidence. Yes, a person who claims ignorance is excused—if they are to be excused—only when they are new to Islam or distant from scholars.”[55]

Reflect on the parenthetical phrase, “if they are to be excused,” as it suggests a degree of skepticism, even towards those new to Islam. Had such a statement been made by one of the Najdis, it would have drawn widespread criticism and uproar.

But perhaps someone might say: Ibn Hajar al-Haytami permits seeking intercession from the Messenger and does not consider it disbelief, so how can he be cited as evidence?

The response to this is twofold:

First: There is no issue with this. Scholars may differ on individual issues while agreeing on the broader foundational principles of Islamic jurisprudence.

The second point: Seeking the intercession of the Prophet, according to Al-Haytami, is not considered supplication, nor is it a type of request that only Allah is capable of fulfilling. Rather, it is a form of seeking intercession and mediation through the Prophet, which he refers to as istighatha in a technical sense. This usage is not exclusive to Al-Haytami, as many later scholars use the term istighatha to describe tawassul (seeking closeness to Allah through intermediaries).

Al-Alusi explicitly stated this, saying: “As for his [i.e., Al-Nabhani’s] statement that Al-Subki, Al-Qastallani, Al-Samhudi, and Ibn Hajar in Al-Jawhar Al-Munazzam said that seeking the intercession of him [the Prophet] or others is equivalent to tawassul to Allah Almighty... it is said: The issue of making istighatha from him or his status is not the point of contention. The scholars mean asking Allah through the status of His servant and Messenger, not asking the Messenger himself.”[56]

Shaykh Abdul Latif Al Al-Sheikh also says: “Some use the term to refer to asking Allah and supplicating to Him through the status of His Prophet, the right of His righteous servant, or His righteous servants in general. This is the predominant understanding in the usage of later scholars such as Al-Subki, Al-Qastallani, and Ibn Hajar [i.e., Al-Haytami].”[57]

As for direct and explicit supplication, according to Ibn Hajar Al-Haytami, it constitutes major disbelief (kufr akbar) that takes one out of the fold of Islam. Al-Haytami conveyed the statement of Ibn Muflih—approving of it—regarding the disbelief of those who adopt intermediaries, calling upon them and relying on them.[58]

According to Al-Haytami’s principles, ignorance is not considered an excuse in this matter, nor are intention and purpose taken into account, as previously mentioned. His position aligns with that of the Najdi scholars in matters of takfir, though he is even stricter in some issues, such as the matter of prostration. The Najdi scholars distinguish between prostration as an act of worship and prostration as a greeting, following most scholars. However, Al-Haytami and a group of Shafiʿi scholars hold that anyone who prostrates to other than Allah is an outright disbeliever, as has been previously clarified.

Whoever assumes that the position of declaring as disbelievers those who invoke other than Allah—or at least considering the apparent implication of such statements as disbelief—is exclusive to Ibn Taymiyyah and the Wahhabis is unaware of the teachings of Islam. This type of invocation has been unanimously considered disbelief by Muslim scholars. Anyone who attributes to Taqi al-Din al-Subki or the Ash’aris the view that they permit this type of invocation is mistaken in their attribution.

Abu Zurʿa al-ʿIraqi al-Ashʿari, a student of Al-Subki, when asked about seeking intercession through saints, said: “As for the statement of the one seeking intercession: ‘I ask you to grant me such-and-such,’ it is a reprehensible matter. Requests are to be made to Allah Almighty alone, while intercession is through righteous deeds or through their doers, whether they are alive or dead.”[59]

Al-Hafiz Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqalani, commenting on the grave of Lady Nafisa, said: “Some scholars reported that the Egyptians used to call supplication near her grave ‘the tried-and-true remedy.’ Some of the common folk, or rather most of them, went to extremes in this, to the extent that some of them fell into disbelief without realizing it. Allah is the one whose help is sought.”[60]

Shaykh ʿAbd Allah al-Ghumari, the Sufi Ashʿari scholar, said: “A practice has become widespread among many people in their invocations and visits to saints. They have expanded this practice in an unsanctioned manner and crossed the bounds of what is permissible, uttering reprehensible phrases such as, ‘O master, heal me,’ or ‘For the sake of the Prophet, I implore you,’ and other similar expressions whose apparent meaning implies disbelief.”[61]

Shaykh Ahmad al-Ghumari, the Shaykh of the Sufis, says: “We see them swearing oaths by them and speaking about them in a manner that outwardly appears to be explicit disbelief. Rather, it is disbelief in reality without any doubt or hesitation... Many ignorant commoners in Morocco utter statements that are explicit disbelief concerning our master ʿAbd al-Qadir al-Jilani, whose shrine is in Baghdad. Likewise, we see some of them doing the same with those they believe in among the living, prostrating to them, kissing the ground before them while prostrating, placing their hands behind their backs as a sign of surrender, extreme supplication, and reliance. In this state, they ask them for healing, wealth, offspring, and similar things that should only be requested from Allah, the Exalted... He mentioned other matters and then said: This is disbelief.”[62]

Section Seven: Can Invoking Other than Allah Be Classified Among the Clear issues (al-masa’il al-zahira)?

The answer: Invoking other than Allah can indeed be classified among the clear issues for three reasons:

1. Invocation is a Manifestation of Worship: Invocation is one of the forms of worship, and directing worship to anyone other than Allah constitutes disbelief by consensus.

2. The Implication of Belief in the Intercessor’s Power: Invocation of a saint or other entity implies a belief in their intrinsic ability to influence outcomes. The person invoking would not make such appeals unless they believed in the intercessor’s power; otherwise, such supplication and submission would be futile. Al-Sahsanwani has pointed to this matter.[63]

3. Attributing Divine Qualities to a Creature: Invoking other than Allah for matters that only Allah can accomplish entails ascribing terms and attributes to a creation that should be reserved exclusively for the Creator. This demonstrates a profound disregard for the status of Allah, the Almighty, and is a cause for disbelief, according to the jurists, as will be elaborated upon.

Al-Qadi ʿIyad states: “Whoever addresses a creature with words that are only befitting for the Creator, without intending disbelief or disrespect, nor deliberately inclining toward heresy, but repeats such statements and becomes known for them, this indicates his frivolity regarding his religion, his disrespect for the sanctity of his Lord, and his ignorance of His immense majesty and grandeur. This is disbelief without doubt.”[64]

Al-Qadi ʿIyad refers here to those who address a creature—whether living or deceased—with words exclusive to Allah’s rights. For example, addressing a king with expressions such as, “O Possessor of Favor and Blessings, O Possessor of Majesty and Honor.” How much worse is it when someone says: “Guide me among those whom You have guided, bless me in what You have given,” or “Heal me, grant me well-being, or send down rain,” and other requests that should only be directed to Allah?

This reasoning refutes the claim of some contemporaries that disbelief requires affirming lordship or independence. Another basis for declaring such acts as disbelief is their inherent disrespect for the sanctity of Allah by attributing words to a creature that are exclusive to Allah, as Qadi ʿIyad, may Allah have mercy on him, explained.

Abu al-Fath al-Shahrastani states: “Whoever raises their need to one who is not qualified to fulfill needs has committed complete shirk.”[65]

Al-Hafidh Ibn ʿAbd al-Hadi said: “If someone comes to the bier of a deceased person, calling upon them instead of Allah and doing istighatha of them, this is shirk prohibited by the consensus of Muslims.”[66]

Abu al-Maʿali al-Juwayni said: “The foundational scholars agree that whoever utters a statement of apostasy and claims they concealed an alternative intention has disbelieved both outwardly and inwardly.”[67]

This statement by al-Juwayni invalidates the claim made by some later figures that calling upon other than Allah does not constitute disbelief if the person claims they intended intercession. No one of sound intellect should give such reasoning credence. For example, if someone says, “O Badawi, heal me, grant me well-being, and provide for me,” and then claims that their intention was intercession or asking Badawi to pray for them, they have made their reasoning laughable. If such interpretations were permitted, all human speech could be explained away, and the essence of the Sharia would devolve into sophistry.

Someone may indeed be excused due to ignorance until they are taught—excusing ignorance is a valid opinion. However, the claim that the speech itself does not constitute disbelief is highly problematic.

The claim made by some contemporary Ashʿarites that disbelief pertains only to beliefs and not to the actions of individuals is a false and novel statement. None of the scholars of Islam, whether Ashʿarite or otherwise, have ever made such a claim. Jurists explicitly state that disbelief pertains to beliefs, actions, and speech.

Al-Dumyati, the Ashʿarite, said: “The summary regarding the types of apostasy is that they are confined to three categories: beliefs, actions, and speech. Each of these categories branches into numerous subdivisions.”[68]

Al-Kashmiri, the Hanafi Maturidi scholar, said: “They agreed on certain actions being disbelief, even though it is possible for such actions not to negate belief in the heart, as they are acts of the limbs and not of the heart. Examples include jokingly uttering words of disbelief without believing them, prostrating to an idol, killing a prophet, and showing contempt for him, the Qur’an, or the Kaʿbah. They disagreed over the reasoning behind considering such acts as disbelief, although they agreed to declare them acts of disbelief.”[69]

Consider Al-Kashmiri’s statement: “...not necessarily renouncing belief, such as prostrating to an idol.” This is explicit in affirming that the cause of disbelief lies solely in the action itself, not in the belief in rububiyyah in other than Allah.

By analogy based on principles of Islamic jurisprudence, what is said regarding prostration applies equally to supplication, as there is no distinction between them. Supplicating to an idol is akin to prostrating to it, with no difference whatsoever.

Even those who favored the Murji’ah position and asserted that faith is merely assent (taṣdīq) did not condition actions outwardly resembling acts of worship on the presence of belief. This is for two reasons:

1. The context and indications of the action itself point to the state of the heart.

2. The action constitutes one of the rites exclusive to Allah. Thus, whoever performs it mocks the station of their Lord and denies His Prophet—even if such denial is not accompanied by explicit belief.

In this regard, Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, may Allah have mercy on him, states: “If it is said: Prostration before an idol is disbelief, and it is merely an action that does not fall under these categories, then is it a separate principle? We respond: No, for the disbelief lies in his belief in venerating the idol, which constitutes a rejection of the Messenger of Allah, peace and blessings be upon him and the Qur’an. However, his belief can sometimes be known explicitly through his speech, sometimes through gestures if he is mute, and sometimes through an action that definitively indicates it, such as prostration.”[70]

Al-Ghazālī noted the disbelief of such an individual from a perspective other than the belief in rububiyyah, namely, the rejection of the Messenger of Allah (peace and blessings be upon him). Even if the person does not believe in the rububiyyah or worship of others, their disbelief arises from another angle: denial of the Prophet. This is an important insight from al-Ghazālī, may Allah have mercy on him. Additionally, it aligns with the reasoning of Al-Qāḍī ʿIyāḍ, who emphasized mockery of Allah’s station as a basis for disbelief.

This is why Al-Kashmīrī stated, “They differed regarding the basis of disbelief, though they agreed on its occurrence.”[71]

This is an issue that some later scholars overlooked when they posited that belief in independence from Allah was a prerequisite for the ruling of disbelief. This is an error, as disbelief has multiple grounds, not merely one. Whoever supplicates to other than Allah has attributed to a created being words that are befitting only of Allah. This constitutes mockery of the Lord’s station, thereby resolving the misconception held by some contemporaries.

Al-Fakhr al-Rāzī transmitted a consensus that worship does not require the belief in divinity or efficacy; it is sufficient for a person to perform an act that constitutes a manifestation of worship or a sacred ritual.

He states: “Know that it is impossible for a rational person to say to Moses, ‘Make for us a god as they have gods, a creator, and a sustainer,’ because what can result from Moses’ creation or fashioning cannot be a creator or sustainer. Whoever doubts this lacks rational completeness. It is more plausible that they asked Moses, peace be upon him, to designate idols and statues for them so that they could draw closer to Allah through worship. This is the very statement that Allah, Exalted be He, attributed to the idol worshippers when He said: {We worship them only so they may bring us nearer to Allah} [al-Zumar: 3].

If this is understood, one might ask: Why is such a statement considered disbelief? We say that all the prophets, peace be upon them, unanimously agreed that worshipping other than Allah is disbelief, whether it is done with the belief that the object of worship is the deity of the world, or with the belief that its worship brings one closer to Allah. This is because worship entails ultimate veneration, and ultimate veneration is only appropriate for the One from whom ultimate benefaction and honor emanate.”[72]

It is noteworthy that al-Rāzī does not consider belief in divinity or rububiyyah a prerequisite for the concept of worship, unlike the claims of grave worshippers, who assert that this is the basis of worship. Instead, worship, according to al-Rāzī, is identified through actions and words that are permissible only for Allah. Thus, he said: “Because worship entails ultimate veneration, and ultimate veneration is only appropriate for the One from whom ultimate benefaction and honor emanate.”

In summary, directing acts of worship to anyone other than Allah constitutes disbelief. The Najdi scholars were preceded in their restriction of excuses concerning apparent acts of disbelief.

Indeed, we may agree or disagree on whether invoking others besides Allah falls within the realm of apparent matters or not. Apparent matters are relative and differ based on time and place. However, despite this relativity, they remain matters of subjective reasoning and conjecture. It is not permissible to impose the perspective of those who consider such acts hidden and then accuse those who view them as apparent of being Kharijites or of possessing flaws in their creed.

Among those reported to have denied excuses based on ignorance in the case of major shirk are Ibn ʿAqīl, Ibn al-Qayyim, and al-Shawkānī, among others.

Abū al-Wafāʾ Ibn ʿAqīl states: “When the obligations of the Sharīʿah became burdensome for the ignorant and the common folk, they deviated from the statutes of the religion to practices they devised for themselves.” He continues: “In my view, they are disbelievers due to these practices, such as venerating graves and honoring them in ways prohibited by the Sharīʿah, including lighting fires at them, kissing them, anointing them with fragrances, addressing the deceased with requests, writing notes to them with appeals like, ‘O my master, grant me such-and-such,’ taking soil for blessings, anointing the graves with perfumes, undertaking journeys to them, and tying scraps of cloth to trees, emulating those who worshipped al-Lāt and al-ʿUzzā.”[73]

Ibn al-Qayyim says: “Section: One who worships anyone other than Allah—be it a messenger, a prophet, a jinn, a shaykh, or anyone else—is a disbeliever. This can occur even among some ignorant individuals who affiliate themselves with Islam, as seen in certain practices by those devoted to shaykhs, such as Shaykh Ahmad al-Rifāʿī, Shaykh Yūnus, Shaykh ʿAdī, and others. They excessively revere these figures with remembrance and love, to the exclusion of Allah, and are devoted to their graves, kissing and prostrating to them, seeking their aid, and requesting forgiveness and the fulfillment of needs from them. This is the very essence of idol worship.”[74]

Al-Shawkānī, when responding to a question about whether the ignorant—specifically regarding grave worship—can be excused on the basis that action is contingent on knowledge and thus obligation as well, stated: “One who falls into shirk out of ignorance is not excused, because the proof has been established against all creation with the advent of Muhammad, peace and blessings be upon him. Whoever remains ignorant has only himself to blame due to his neglect of the Qur’an and Sunnah.”[75]

The most balanced view on the issue of excusing ignorance is that of Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn, who said it is among the fiqh-related matters of ijtihad.[76] It is important to note that what is considered clear or obscure is often relative, varying from person to person, place to place, and time to time.

The earlier transmission of disagreement on this matter from the words of Mullā ʿAlī al-Qārī al-Ḥanafī, may Allah have mercy on him, has been mentioned.[77]

Section Eight: Does the Position of Non-Excusal Necessitate Declaring Sufis or the Majority of People as Disbelievers?

The answer is that this does not necessarily follow, and the clarification comes from two perspectives:

The first perspective: Shaykh ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Muʿallimī al-Yamānī, despite being among those who hold the view of excusing ignorance, responded to those accusing the Wahhābīs of takfīr due to this issue. He stated:

“It is unbefitting for a fair-minded person to blame those who declare disbelievers the ones who call upon, seek aid from, or hold beliefs about others in the manner described. This remains true even if their view implies declaring the majority of the ummah as disbelievers. Likewise, no Muslim would dare criticize Imām Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal for his view that whoever abandons even one of the obligatory prayers has apostatized, even if they affirm its obligation. This is despite the implication that, according to his position, most of the ummah would be considered apostates.

For indeed, in nearly every city inhabited by Muslims, the number of those who abandon prayer exceeds those who perform it. And if one were to consider those who pray, one would find that many of them do not perform their prayers correctly despite being able to learn. Consequently, they are not excused and thus fall into the category of abandoners, as supported by the Prophet’s (peace and blessings be upon him) statement to the man who prayed improperly: ‘Pray again, for you have not prayed.’”[78]

The second perspective: The issue is more theoretical than practical, as it is difficult to comprehensively monitor people’s actions and conditions. This difficulty arises due to the varying levels of acts associated with shirk.

Some acts are definitively classified as shirk, such as directly supplicating for matters that only Allah can accomplish. Others are not definitively considered shirk and are subject to debate, such as requesting dua from the deceased. Some practices are considered innovations and means leading to shirk, such as seeking blessings from graves or circumambulating them without the intention of worship. Furthermore, some acts are not shirk at all, such as intercession through righteous individuals, visiting graves, and similar practices permitted by the majority of scholars from the four schools of thought, including some Hanbalīs and Ahlul ḥadīth scholars.

With this understanding, it becomes evident that it is challenging to track every individual associated with Ṣūfism and observe their behaviors at shrines. Some may seek intercession, others may circumambulate graves, some may visit graves, and others may do none of these but go for prayer and dhikr only, among other possibilities.

Allah Almighty has not tasked Muslims with monitoring the conditions or actions of others, as this falls under excessive scrutiny and unwarranted burden, both of which are prohibited. Moreover, the default assumption about a Muslims is that they adhere to Islam, while disbelief is considered an exceptional state. Certainty is not to be removed based on mere doubt or speculation.

In light of the above: the obligation of takfir does not necessarily apply to the Najdī scholars, as their writings are filled with disclaimers against declaring the Muslim community as disbelievers.

The point here is that the matter is more theoretical than practical. Islamic law does not require surveillance of people’s actions, and as long as the disagreement remains confined to scholars and not to the ignorant or extremists, it is closer to being a theoretical and academic debate.

As for those who truly deserve to be declared disbelievers, they are to be deemed so without issue, and there should be no hesitation in declaring the disbelief of someone who meets the criteria. This tendency, found among some opponents of the call (to tawhid), to shy away from takfīr is an extreme Murji’ite tendency, unknown to the jurists of Islam. Jurists have historically declared disbelief for statements much lesser in severity than invoking others besides Allah. For instance, some have ruled that a person who tells a non-Muslim wishing to convert, “Wait until you purify yourself,” has apostatized. How, then, about someone who invokes others besides Allah and attributes to them words that are appropriate only for Him?

The jurists declared disbelief in certain seemingly minor statements and did not excuse ignorance regarding them. Imam al-Qarāfī al-Mālikī mentioned many such examples in al-Furūq. After citing some supplications deemed as disbelief, he stated:

“It is incumbent upon the supplicant to avoid such invocations and their likes with extreme caution, due to what they lead to: incurring the wrath of the Just Judge, eternal dwelling in the Hellfire, the nullification of deeds, the dissolution of marriages, and the violation of lives and property. All of this corruption results from a single invocation of such nature. Returning to Islam and removing most of these corruptions can only occur through renewing one’s Islam and proclaiming the two testimonies of faith. Should a person die in this state, their fate will be as we have described.

We ask Allah Almighty for protection from that which leads to His punishment. The root cause of all corruption in both this world and the Hereafter is ignorance; thus, strive to remove it from yourself as much as possible. Likewise, the foundation of all goodness in this world and the Hereafter is knowledge; therefore, exert every effort to acquire it to the best of your ability. And Allah Almighty is the One who aids in all goodness.”[79]

Many jurists have explicitly stated that phrases of disbelief often occur on the tongues of the general public, which can lead them out of Islam, as noted by al-Haytami and al-Dimyati.[80] Moreover, some scholars, such as al-Sanusi, al-Bayjuri, and al-Khalili, went to even greater lengths, explicitly declaring that many among the Bedouins were apostates due to their false beliefs, as was previously detailed at the beginning of this study.

If this is the position of many Ash‘arite scholars—none of whom were accused of wrongful takfir, even though some of the acts they deemed as acts of disbelief may not be entirely agreed upon—what then prevents, legally or rationally, the declaration of disbelief for someone who invokes others besides Allah and attributes to a created being words that are permissible only for the Creator?!

Conclusion:

An impartial observer, free from bias and partisanship, cannot but acknowledge that the Najdis did not deviate from the methods of earlier jurists. Rather, they followed in their footsteps, honoring the scholars of this Muhammadan nation from the four schools of jurisprudence. Furthermore, they did not declare others disbelievers unjustly. Whether one agrees or disagrees with them on certain issues, the disagreement remains within the acceptable scholarly framework.

No consideration should be given to the ignorant, extremist groups, or students of knowledge who associate themselves with the Najdis yet misunderstand their statements or fail to adhere to their guidelines. The true measure lies in the statements of the scholars as reflected in their authentic writings.

And with that, may Allah’s blessings and peace be upon our Prophet Muhammad, his family, and his companions.

Recommended Reading:

Shaykh Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab Discourse

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[1] Al-Saḥb al-Wābila ʿalá Ḍarāʾiḥ al-Ḥanābila (2/531, 533).

[2] From the book Al-Īmān wal-Radd ʿalá Ahl al-Bidaʿ (p. 53), published as part of Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil wal-Masāʾil al-Najdiyya, and also cited in ʿUlamāʾ Najd wa-Ghayruhum.

[3] Ḥilyat al-Bashar fī Tārīkh al-Qarn al-Thālith ʿAshar (1/839).

[4] Kitāb al-Ijāza al-ʿIlmiyya fī Najd: Qirāʾa Istiqrāʾiyya (2/518–521). See also a manuscript of the Ijāza in the handwriting of the granting scholar preserved in Leiden Library under no. 2496.

[5] Refer to ʿUlamāʾ Najd Khilāl Thamāniyat Qurūn (1/438).

[6] Mashāhīr ʿUlamāʾ Najd wa-Ghayruhum by al-Bassām (1/302).

[7] Lisān al-ʿArab (5/144).

[8] Kitāb al-Umm (9/206).

[9] Tārīkh Baghdād (1/536).

[10] Tārīkh al-Fākhirī (p. 139).

[11] Tārīkh Ibn Laʿbūn (p. 191).

[12] Al-Ikhwān al-Suʿūdiyyūn fī ʿAqdayn (9/204).

[13] Al-Badr al-Ṭāliʿ (1/182).

[14] Al-Durar al-Saniyya fī al-Ajwiba al-Najdiyya (10/145).

[15] Tārīkh al-Jabartī (3/337).

[16] Tārīkh Ibn Ghannām (1/8, 217, 225); see also Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb’s letter to ʿAbd Allāh ibn Saḥīm in Tārīkh Ibn Ghannām (1/210, 333).

[17] See: Sharḥ ʿAqīdat Ahl al-Tawḥīd al-Kubrā (p. 37) and Ḥāshiyat al-Bayjūrī ʿalá Jawharat al-Tawḥīd (p. 78).

[18] al-Khalīlī (2/282).

[19] Sayf Allāh ʿalá Man Kadhaba ʿalá Awliyāʾ Allāh (p. 27).

[20] Nayl al-Awṭār (4/95).

[21] Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb (16/58).

[22] Ḥāshiyat al-Ṣāwī ʿalá al-Jalālayn (1/150).

[23] Al-Rasāʾil al-Shakhṣiyya (p. 38).

[24] Al-Durar al-Saniyya fī al-Ajwiba al-Najdiyya (1/222).

[25] Al-Durar al-Saniyya (12/177).

[26] Al-Durar al-Saniyya (8/270).

[27] Al-Durar al-Saniyya (11/172).

[28] Kitāb al-Īmān wal-Radd ʿalá Ahl al-Bidaʿ, published within Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil wal-Masāʾil al-Najdiyya (p. 21).

[29] Al-Kalimāt al-Nāfiʿa ʿan al-Mukaffirāt al-Wāqiʿa (p. 9).

[30] Naqḍ al-Manṭiq (p. 120).

[31] Minhāj al-Sunna al-Nabawiyya (6/150).

[32] Fatāwá Nūr ʿalá al-Darb (1/258).

[33] Majmūʿ Fatāwá wa-Rasāʾil Ibn ʿUthaymīn (2/231).

[34] Al-Durar al-Saniyya (2/43).

[35] Muʾallafāt al-Shaykh – third section, Fatāwá (pp. 59, 60, 68, 69).

[36] Al-Durar al-Saniyya (2/165–166).

[37] Al-Jaysh al-ʿArmaram al-Khamāsī by Akansūs (1/291–292) and Al-Iʿlām bi-Man Ḥalla Marrākush wa-Ighmāt min al-Aʿlām by ʿAbbās al-Samlālī (6/171).

[38] Fatāwá wa-Rasāʾil al-Shaykh Muḥammad ibn Ibrāhīm Āl al-Shaykh (1/109).

[39] Nawāqiḍ al-Īmān al-Qawliyya wal-ʿAmaliyya (p. 278).

[40] Majmūʿ al-Fatāwá (4/361).

[41] Maṭālib Ulī al-Nuhá (6/278).

[42] Their argument is that prostration as a gesture of honor was known only among previous nations, so anyone who performs it in this nation has enacted a manifestation of worship.

[43] Ḥāshiyat al-Jamal ʿalá Sharḥ al-Manhaj (7/571).

[44] Tuḥfat al-Muḥtāj fī Sharḥ al-Minhāj (9/90).

[45] Ṣiyānat al-Insān (p. 238).

[46] Al-Taʿlīq ʿalá Iqtiḍāʾ al-Ṣirāṭ al-Mustaqīm no. 1359.

[47] Shaykh Ibn Bāz’s commentary on Fatḥ al-Bārī (2/575). See also: Sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī by al-Rājḥī (2/708).

[48] Risālat Taqwiyat al-Īmān (p. 35).

[49] Tashīl al-ʿAqīda al-Islāmiyya (p. 243).

[50] Al-Durar al-Saniyya fī al-Ajwiba al-Najdiyya (1/222).

[51] Kitāb al-Shifāʾ (2/231).

[52] Majmaʿ al-Anhur (1/696).

[53] Sharḥ al-Fiqh al-Akbar (pp. 244–245).

[54] Al-Ashbāh wal-Naẓāʾir (p. 200).

[55] Al-Iʿlām bi-Qawāṭiʿ al-Islām (1/185).

[56] Ghāyat al-Amānī fī al-Radd ʿalá al-Nabhānī (p. 281).

[57] Minhāj al-Taʾsīs (p. 267).

[58] Al-Iʿlām bi-Qawāṭiʿ al-Islām (p. 213).

[59] Fatāwá al-Faqīh Walī al-Dīn Abū Zurʿa al-ʿIrāqī (pp. 166–168).

[60] See: Al-Jawāhir wal-Durar by al-Sakhāwī (p. 944).

[61] Al-Radd al-Muḥkam al-Matīn, cited by Dr. Fārūq Ḥammāda in his book Al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Nāqid ʿAbd Allāh al-Ghumārī (p. 95).

[62] Iḥyāʾ al-Maqbūr (p. 19).

[63] Ṣiyānat al-Insān min Waswasat al-Shaykh Daḥlān (p. 213).

[64] Al-Shifāʾ (2/1065).

[65] Al-Milal wal-Niḥal (2/94).

[66] Al-Ṣārim al-Munkī fī al-Radd ʿalá al-Subkī (1/325).

[67] Refer to: Nihāyat al-Muḥtāj (7/414).

[68] Iʿānāt al-Ṭālibīn fī Ḥall Alfāẓ Fatḥ al-Muʿīn (4/149).

[69] Iʾkfār al-Mulḥidīn fī Ḍarūriyyāt al-Dīn (p. 68).

[70] Al-Iqtiṣād fī al-Iʿtiqād (p. 160).

[71] Iʾkfār al-Mulḥidīn fī Ḍarūriyyāt al-Dīn by al-Kashmīrī (p. 68).

[72] Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb (14/232).

[73] Refer to: Talbīs Iblīs (p. 448).

[74] From Al-Kabāʾir by Ibn al-Qayyim—lost, but quoted in Al-ʿAqd al-Thamīn by al-Suwaydī (p. 125).

[75] Al-Fatḥ al-Rabbānī min Fatāwá al-Imām al-Shawkānī (1/145).

[76] Majmūʿ Fatāwá al-Shaykh al-ʿUthaymīn (2/answer to question 224).

[77] Sharḥ al-Fiqh al-Akbar (pp. 244–245).

[78] Taḥqīq al-Kalām fī al-Masāʾil al-Thalāth – part of Āthār al-Muʿallimī al-Yamānī (4/448).

[79] Al-Furūq (4/265) – ʿĀlam al-Kutub.

[80] Refer to: Iʿānāt al-Ṭālibīn (4/149).