Can Salafis and Ash’aris Consider Each Other Ahlus Sunnah?

By “Ahlus Sunnah,” we do not simply mean Sunnis as opposed to Shias,[1] nor are we asking whether one group is considered “closest to Ahlus Sunnah” by the other. The question is not whether one group is willing to label the other as Ahlus Sunnah conditionally if they happen to be the closest to Ahlus Sunnah in a region where their own group is absent. The question does not concern whether one group thinks or hopes that Allah will forgive the other group if they are sincerely mistaken. Nor is it asking whether one group partially considers the other as Ahlus Sunnah, acknowledging them as such in some matters but not in others.

Rather, the question is whether both groups can regard each other’s theological madhabs as unconditionally valid, similar to how jurists in the Shafi’i madhab view the Maliki madhab, for instance.

It has already been demonstrated that the vast majority of theologians in both camps have historically deemed the other as invalid[2] with differences that are not merely peripheral but substantive,[3] particularly on issues that the Salaf themselves considered to be of great importance.[4]

A growing number of Muslims today argue that both theological schools are unconditionally Ahlus Sunnah. In their attempt to argue that the differences between the two camps are either semantic or too minimal, they rely on very weak arguments.

The most common argument suggests that because scholars have differed on these issues, this indicates that the arguments on each side are speculative and, therefore, cannot be considered fundamental aspects of the religion.

However, some scholars have challenged this reasoning by arguing that the definitiveness of evidence is not contingent upon universal recognition. Some would also contend that being backed by definitive evidence is not a prerequisite for a matter to be considered a fundamental aspect of religion.[5]

What is decisive to one person may not be so to another. Various factors influence how people perceive the strength of arguments, such as access to the most compelling and well-presented evidence, comprehension of that evidence, subconscious biases that resist the evidence, intelligence level, and the inability to resolve intellectual doubts about the evidence. Therefore, one’s confidence in the definitiveness and strength of their stance should not necessarily be shaken simply because someone else disagrees.

It is a well-known fact that there are completely misguided and genuinely sincere individuals, even though they believe with certainty that they are on the right path. (e.g., Muslim deviants such as the Khawarij or Twelver Shias, or even sincere non-Muslims who willingly sacrifice their lives for their false beliefs, etc.). Thus, a theologian or jurist who believes that the evidence strongly supports their judgment of something as definitively true is fully entitled to their opinion, provided they have arrived at their conclusion through a legitimate method of ijtihad.

We should also ask ourselves why all those scholars who invalidated each other’s positions never accepted such an argument. Why did they not say to themselves, “My arguments do not convince my opponent; therefore, I should consider my evidence to be speculative”? Are we to assume that all these scholars on both sides were ignorant of this supposedly basic truth, or did they instead recognize it as weak reasoning?

Another argument often encountered is a fallacious appeal to emotion, asserting that one cannot deem the theological school of a particular scholar invalid when that scholar has made significant contributions to Islamic scholarship in other disciplines, such as fiqh, tafsir, hadith, and more. This argument is typically advanced by individuals who are not themselves specialists in aqeedah but are rather known for their expertise and focus on fiqh or the hadith sciences. Students and specialists are often more inclined to fully embrace a broader range of scholars in these disciplines, given the greater tolerance for opposing views in such fields. As a result, some find it difficult to compartmentalize and recognize that the thresholds for tolerance may vary depending on the science or discipline being studied.

More importantly, most scholars in both camps never regarded this as a sound argument. They would have hesitated to consider other prominent scholars as adhering to invalid theological schools if they had.

Another flawed argument is the fallacious appeal to authority, which questions how a theological school comprising the majority of Muslim scholars could possibly be invalid. This argument should also be dismissed.[6] There is no Shar’i or rational basis to assert that one cannot benefit from the unproblematic contributions of scholars while simultaneously recognizing and avoiding the problematic ones.

The Prophet (peace be upon him) said, “Allah may support this religion even with an excessive sinner” (Saheeh Al-Bukhari). If we can accept that Allah can support Islam through an excessive sinner, it should be even more understandable that Allah can also support Islam through pious Muslims who may make serious theological errors. Just as we should not deny the factual reality that the excessive sinner is indeed a sinner, despite Allah using him to do great good for Islam, the same logic applies to those who may fall into theological innovation despite their significant contributions to Islam.

The Prophet’s (peace be upon him) hadith clearly demonstrates the importance of compartmentalizing and distinguishing between these two realities. Just as performing great service to Islam does not change the objective fact that a person might be a major sinner, it also does not change the possibility that the person might be an innovator in theological matters. There is no essential conceptual, logical, or theological difference between these two cases.

The difficulty many people have in applying this principle to theological innovators often stems from emotional attachments and the recurring tendency to be lenient towards others simply because we perceive them as sincere—a leniency that is harder to extend to a known sinner. However, in reality, factual descriptions remain factual descriptions.

Another argument, often directed against Salafis, claims that they cannot deem the Ash’ari school invalid because their isnads pass through Ash’ari scholars. However, this argument has also been addressed and effectively undermined.[7]

Another argument suggests that if these schools do not recognize each other as Ahlus Sunnah, it will harm the unity of the Ummah—a unity that is urgently needed in the face of pressing ideological, political, and sociological threats. However, our classical scholars from both camps were never swayed by such reasoning. They continued to passionately debate these theological issues, even amid the Crusades, the Mongol invasions, and other significant challenges. In fact, they were adept at multitasking: they refuted the disbelievers, waged Jihad, addressed the spiritual needs of the Ummah, and united for the common good,[8] all while vigorously engaging in these in-house theological debates. If they were able to do this, then why can’t we?

Furthermore, who can assert that the disappearance of internal theological debates would necessarily lead to the ‘unification’ of the Ummah? Contentious debates have always existed within the Ummah, whether they pertain to peripheral and substantive issues of fiqh, political disagreements, arguments about personalities, or other matters.[9] The fundamental problem may not lie in the topics being debated but rather in how these debates are conducted.[10] It is, therefore, crucial to educate people on contextualizing the concept of Ahlul Bid’ah, understanding that the connotations associated with this label are not fixed and can vary and change with time.[11] 

I have personally observed many attempts to reconcile the differing views on Allah’s attributes by proposing tafwid (consigning the meaning of Allah’s attributes to Allah) as a middle ground between the Salafi position of affirmation and the Ash’ari practice of ta’weel of the attributes. However, this approach is disingenuous, despite being good-intentioned, because tafwid is an acceptable and viable option within the Ash’ari school but not within the Salafi school. Therefore, it cannot be considered a true “middle” ground.

Some have proposed that both sides refrain from discussing these contentious matters altogether and leave them to the specialists. The Salafi side might be more inclined to adopt this approach, as Imam Ahmad stated that the default rule is silence concerning these topics.[12] However, it would be more challenging for the Ash’ari side to adopt this stance since their prominent scholars believe that the masses must be educated to adopt their beliefs; otherwise, the default would be the adoption of Salafi theology.[13] Moreover, in this age of the internet, it would be nearly impossible to restrain everyone from speaking. It only takes one individual from either side to propagate their beliefs, prompting the other side to respond and “refute those misconceptions.”

The assertion that these topics are no longer important for our times is also greatly misinformed. The subject of Allah’s attributes extends beyond merely debating the meaning of Istiwa’. It encompasses understanding whether certain attributes of Allah are rationally necessary, how attributes such as Mercy, Justice, and Wisdom work in harmony, and what constitutes deficiency for Allah. It also involves discerning what is possible or impossible for Allah.[14]

A thorough knowledge of these aspects aids in refuting various atheistic objections (e.g., having the correct conception of moral ontology would help one address Euthyphro’s dilemma,[15] affirming Allah’s Wisdom correctly would help one debunk the classic problem of evil,[16] etc.), deism (e.g., demonstrating that Allah’s Wisdom entails He acts with wise purposes would greatly help in refuting deism,[17] etc.), and Christian objections (e.g., demonstrating the impossibility of the incarnation and trinity, refuting arguments related to salvation, etc.).

The topic is important and relevant today. The primary issue lies in how many Muslims have underutilized this subject by using it only to attack fellow Muslims rather than also refute disbelievers. Instead of mastering this subject to counter the disbelievers, most Muslims focus on it to argue against other Muslims. This is our essential problem today.

In conclusion, achieving greater unity among Muslims is a cherished goal, but it must never come at the expense of academic integrity. Lowering the temperature of debates and educating Muslims to disagree more diplomatically while encouraging them to prioritize and cooperate in virtuous endeavors is something that everyone, except the most stubborn and sectarian, could reasonably embrace. This is especially true given the numerous scholarly voices and examples from esteemed scholars in both camps to emulate.[18] However, asking both sides to dismiss the overwhelming majority of their theologians, who have deemed these differences substantive, is unreasonable and could further hinder and postpone the enhanced cooperation the Ummah desperately needs.

May Allah strengthen and unite the Ummah so that they can pursue what is best. Ameen.

Recommended Reading:

The Inclusion of Asharis within Ahlus Sunnah by Later Hanbalis

Allah's Divine Attributes Discourse

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[1] Ibn Taymiyyah in his Minhajul Sunnah said:

فلفظ أهل السنة يراد به من أثبت خلافة الخلفاء الثلاثة فيدخل في ذلك جميع الطوائف إلا الرافضة وقد يراد به أهل الحديث والسنة المحضة فلا يدخل فيه إلا من يثبت الصفات لله تعالى ويقول إن القرآن غير مخلوق وإن الله يرى في الآخرة ويثبت القدر وغير ذلك من الأصول المعروفة عند أهل الحديث والسنة

“The term "Ahl al-Sunnah" can refer to those who affirm the caliphate of the first three caliphs, which includes all sects except the Rafidah (Shi'a). However, it can also specifically refer to the Ahl al-Hadith and the pure Sunnah, in which case it only includes those who affirm the divine attributes of Allah, believe that the Qur'an is uncreated, that Allah will be seen in the Hereafter, affirm divine decree (qadar), and adhere to other fundamental principles known among the Ahl al-Hadith and the Sunnah.”

In Majmu' al-Fatawa we read:

فجمهور العامة لا تعرف ضد السني إلا الرافضي فإذا قال أحدهم : أنا سني فإنما معناه لست رافضيا

“The majority of common people don't know the contrast of a Sunni, except to be a Raafidi.”

[2] See: The Ash’ari Rejection of the Salafi Theological School

[3] See: Are the Differences Between Ash’aris and Ahl Al-Hadith Semantic and Minor?

[4] This is especially the case when it comes to the methodological role of reason in relation to revelation, the epistemic value of philosophical theology (‘ilm al-Kalam), the concept of Iman, Allah’s Uluww, and correctly understanding the uncreatedness of Allah’s Speech. This is notwithstanding the fact that many Ash’aris are sympathetic to or fall short in condemning (by Salafi standards) practices such as istighatha of the dead and how this has become a matter of Tawheed and Shirk.

[5] See: Sa’d al-Shithri, Al-Usul wal-Furu’: Haqiqatuhuma, al-Farq Baynahuma, wal-Ahkam al-Muta’alliqah Bihima: Dirasah Nazariyyah Tatbiqiyyah, pp. 193-201.

[6] See: Does It Matter If the Majority of Scholars Follow Your Theological School? and Can All These Ash’ari Scholars Be Wrong?

[7] See: Addressing the Argument that Salafis Only Have Ijazahs Through Ash’aris

[8] See: Cooperation with Theological Opponents

[9] One need only glance at the Muslim social media sphere to observe the persistent and regrettable conflicts.

[10] See: How Did Ibn Taymiyyah Ease Hostilities Between the Hanbalis and Asharis?

[11] See: How Do We Understand the Salaf’s Statements Regarding Ahlul Bid’ah?

[12] Uthman al-Darimi, in his response to Al-Marrisi, reports Imam Ahmad as saying:

كُنَّا نَرَى السُّكُوتَ عَنْ هَذَا قَبْلَ أَن يَخُوضَ فِيهِ هَؤُلَاءِ، فَلَمَّا أَظْهَرُوُه لم نَجِدْ بُدًّا مِنْ مُخَالَفَتِهِمْ وَالرَّدِّ عَلَيْهِم

“We previously considered it best to remain silent on this matter before these individuals delved into it. However, once they made it public, we found it necessary to oppose and respond to them.”

[13] See: Is Ash'arism the Theology of the Masses?

[14] For example, see: The Omnipotence Paradox: Can Allah Do the Impossible?

[15] See a practical example here: An Islamic Response to Euthyphro's Dilemma

[16] See a practical example in this lecture: Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya on Divine Wisdom and the Problem of Evil

[17] For a practical example, especially see section 2.1 here: A Critique of Deism

[18] In Fatawaa al-Lajnah al-Daa’ima, vol. 2, pp. 237-238, a question was raised regarding various groups such as the Sufis, Jamaa’at at-Tableegh, Ikhwaan al-Muslimeen, Sunnis, Shias, and others. In response, the scholars provided the following answer:

كل فرقة من هؤلاء وغيرهم فيها خطأ وصواب، فعليك بالتعاون معها فيما عندها من الصواب، واجتناب ما وقعت فيه من أخطاء، مع التناصح والتعاون على البر والتقوى

“Each group among these and others contains both errors and truths. You should collaborate with them in what they have of truth and avoid the mistakes they have fallen into while engaging in mutual advice and cooperation in righteousness and piety.”

This committee's members were Abdullah ibn Qu’ood, Abdullah ibn Ghudyaan, and Abdul Razzaaq Al-'Affifi. Abdul Azeez ibn Baaz is the chairman.