Clarifying the Broad Statements of Najdi Scholars

Below is a translation of Ustadh Alaa’ Hasan’s article, Iṭlāqāt Aʾimmat ad-Daʿwah.. Qirāʾah Taʾṣīliyyah.

Introduction:

Sound academic research—particularly in matters of religion and creed—requires the application of precise methodological tools that prevent hasty judgments and protect the researcher from confusing positions with expressions, especially when these are articulated by mujaddid scholars who have had a tangible impact on scholarly and proselytizing circles. Among the most prominent of these methodological tools are understanding absolute and restricted statements, discerning the scholars’ intended meanings and objectives, surveying the totality of their statements, and contextualizing them within their historical and social settings.

In this regard, a pressing need arises to re-examine the texts of the scholars of the Najdī da‘wa through a scholarly lens grounded in comprehensive investigation rather than selective citation, analysis rather than redundancy, and clarification rather than distortion. The significance does not lie in an isolated statement uttered in a context of rebuke, extracted from its setting and then universally applied; rather, the significance lies in understanding the intellectual and scholarly framework from which the statement emerged and in distinguishing between contexts of instruction and those of refutation, and between the aim of foundational exposition and that of disciplinary reprimand.

Among the necessary components of research in this field are the distinction between foundational principles and exceptional cases, the accurate understanding of the scholars’ terminology, and their differentiation between major and minor shirk, as well as between heretical innovations that entail disbelief and those that do not. These matters become clear only to those who gather the relevant texts within their various contexts, reflect upon them as a coherent whole, and do not limit their focus to an isolated fatwá or a selectively quoted phrase.

Another important criterion in understanding the legacy of the scholars of the Najdī da‘wa is the study of the historical reality they lived through and confronted, along with the doctrinal and social corruption they endeavored to reform. Many of their strong-worded statements and strict positions were, in fact, responses to deeply rooted deviations, widespread superstitions, and general ignorance. This necessitated that their discourse take the form of warning and intimidation rather than detailed exposition and careful qualification.

This paper, produced by the Salaf Center for Research and Studies, is an attempt to elucidate the scholarly methodology employed by the scholars of the da‘wa through an analytical presentation of their texts, accompanied by explanations rooted in the contextual and situational demands of those statements—without reliance on external additions or the imposition of meanings they did not intend. This approach is grounded in a foundational research principle: that fairness can only be achieved by collecting all relevant evidence and understanding it within its full historical and scholarly context.

1. Unqualified Declarations of Shirk:

Confusion often arises among those who read the works of the scholars of the da‘wa, especially when they encounter phrases such as: “Whoever worships other than Allah is a mushrik,” or “Whoever seeks help from other than Allah or sacrifices for other than Allah is a mushrik.” These readers may stop at such unqualified statements without understanding the context in which they were made or the objective intended by the scholars. From this, they may formulate an objection suggesting that the scholars of the da‘wa issue rulings of shirk and disbelief indiscriminately, without regard for the precise scholarly distinctions or without offering the necessary detail that would account for the varying circumstances, intentions, and contexts that may surround each instance. There is metaphorical invocation, vocative lamentation, and actions that do not reach the level of major shirk, such as seeking intercession with particular phrasing or requesting supplication.

However, this objection fundamentally stems from neglecting two essential points:

The first is that the statements of the scholars of the da‘wa occur within the context of articulating foundational principles, not in the context of detailing exceptions and the nuanced distinctions associated with each individual case. It is unnecessary to mention exceptions when the objective is to clarify the core principle of an issue.

This point is affirmed with great clarity by Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya—may Allah have mercy on him—who states: “Among the marks of eloquent and sound speech is the use of general and unqualified expressions when the intent to specify and restrict is evident. This is the method employed in the discourse of the Qur’an and Sunnah, in the speech of the scholars, and indeed in all eloquent discourse and the speech of all nations. To mention every condition and restriction in each instance is pedantic, burdensome, contrary to the norms of clear expression, and distracts from the intended purpose.”[1]

This means that eloquence—particularly in contexts of admonition and rebuke—necessitates refraining from excessive elaboration on details, conditions, and restrictions, as such elaboration may weaken the force of the warning and open the door to interpretations that dilute established legal truths. Indeed, this method—unqualified generalization while intending specific qualifications—is the very approach adopted by the Qur’an itself. For example, Allah says: “And whoever does not judge by what Allah has revealed—then they are the disbelievers” [al-Māʾidah: 44], without mentioning that one who refrains from judging by it due to interpretive error (taʾwīl) or coercion is not a disbeliever. This is known from other textual evidences, yet it is omitted here because the context is one of warning and intimidation, not one of detailed instruction.

The second point is that this exposition style—issuing unqualified rulings when addressing foundational principles—is the method historically employed by scholars of the ummah across the centuries. It is a method supported both by linguistic convention and by the higher objectives of the Sharī‘a, particularly in contexts that require deterrence and warning against destructive practices.

Some scholars have clarified that this approach has a well-established foundation in the jurisprudence of fatwá. This was articulated by Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī, who said: “It is permissible for the mufti to intensify the response—even if it does not align precisely with the actual case—so long as it causes no harm. In al-Majmū‘, al-Rawḍa, and its original sources, it is stated: The mufti may deliberately use strong language in his response, employing terms that he interprets in a specific way, as a means of deterrence and warning, where such sternness is needed.”[2]

Al-Nawawī also states, quoting from al-Ṣaymarī: “If the mufti sees that it is in the best interest to issue a fatwá to a layperson using language that carries a stern tone—though its apparent meaning is not intended and he has an interpretive basis for it—then this is permissible, as a form of deterrence…”[3]

Al-Nawawī then cites the report attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās, may Allah be pleased with them both, in which he gave two different answers regarding the repentance of a murderer, based on the condition and intent of the questioner.[4]

Ibn Ḥajar al-Haytamī also highlighted this meaning in his well-known fatwá, in which he was asked about the unqualified statement made by some muftis that whoever uses hashīsha is a disbeliever: should such a generalization be denounced? He responded by saying: “Al-Jalāl al-Suyūṭī was asked about this and replied: Such an unqualified statement should not be condemned, because this kind of language is permissible in the context of rebuke and stern warning—similar to the saying of the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم: ‘Whoever abandons prayer has committed kufr.’ It is to be interpreted as referring to one who deems it lawful or as referring to ingratitude rather than disbelief in creed. When a scholar is asked for a fatwá and responds with such phrasing, he typically intends it with the aforementioned interpretive considerations.”[5]

If this method is endorsed within all four madhhabs and is found in the writings of jurists and scholars of uṣūl, then how can it be objected to when employed by the scholars of the da‘wa—scholars who were confronting a grim reality saturated with overt manifestations of shirk and severe doctrinal deviance? Is it to be deemed blameworthy that they declared shirk to be disbelief without attaching every instance to a list of potential excuses? Such qualifications are not required of a scholar when expounding on foundational legal rulings.

The scholars of the da‘wa did not intend by such statements to include every individual who engages in supplication to other than Allah, without regard for the specific circumstances or the intentions of the speaker. Rather, they were speaking about the essential reality of the act itself—that it constitutes the directing of an act of pure worship to other than Allah, exalted is He. In the scale of the Sharī‘a, this is shirk in and of itself, regardless of whether someone may have committed it out of ignorance, interpretive error, or mistake. These mitigating factors are examined later under the category of excuse and impediments to takfir, not under the category of ruling on the act itself.

For this reason, the unqualified style employed by the scholars of the da‘wa is, in fact, a deliberate and purposeful approach driven by the demands of clarity and directness—particularly when the goal is to warn against a grave matter that had become widespread and normalized in their time. Such a situation necessitated a firm and unequivocal discourse to awaken the heedless and to close the door to obfuscation.

Here, the wisdom of the scholars of the da‘wa becomes evident in their choice of this mode of expression. They were confronting a reality marked by doctrinal deviations, practical innovations, and widespread entanglement in various forms of shirk. This necessitated a mode of discourse that was clear and unambiguous—one that would restructure concepts in the minds of the common people and firmly impress upon them the seriousness of these acts without opening the door to justifying or trivializing them.

Second: Variation in What Is Meant by Shirk in the Writings of the Scholars of the Da‘wa

It is important to point out that some of the statements made by the scholars of the da‘wa in which they label certain practices as shirk do not necessarily refer to major shirk that expels a person from the fold of Islam. Rather, what is often intended may be minor shirk, or acts that serve as means leading to shirk. This becomes clear upon reviewing their statements within their broader and varied contexts.

For example, practices such as ṭiyarah (superstitious belief in omens) or swearing by other than Allah may be described as shirk, but this does not mean that, according to them, such acts expel a person from the religion. In fact, may Allah have mercy on them; they frequently clarify that these actions fall under the category of minor shirk—unless accompanied by a belief or intention that elevates them to major shirk.

An example of this is what Shaykh ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Āl al-Shaykh said in his refutation of Dāwūd ibn Jirjīs, where he denied that all such acts constitute disbelief. He explicitly stated: “As for his claim, ‘You declare him a disbeliever and consider it disbelief,’ this is a blatant lie and an obvious fabrication. No one among those whom we consider credible has ever stated that it is disbelief that expels one from the religion.”[6]

Likewise, Shaykh Ibn Bāz, may Allah have mercy on him, said: “As for minor shirk, it too includes various forms—for example, swearing by other than Allah, swearing by the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم, by trustworthiness, or by someone’s head, and the like. This is minor shirk…”[7]

Some of the earlier scholars, however, clarified that certain forms of minor shirk may, depending on the state and intention of the speaker, become major shirk. This was affirmed by Ibn al-Qayyim, who categorized swearing by other than Allah and saying, “What Allah wills and you will,” as examples of minor shirk. He stated, “This may become major shirk depending on the state and intention of the one who says it.”[8]

Abū al-Ḥusayn al-ʿImrānī al-Shāfiʿī, may Allah have mercy on him, conveyed this meaning with precise detail, explaining that swearing by other than Allah falls under three categories—one of which constitutes major shirk. That is, if the person swearing intends to venerate the one by whom he swears in the same manner as Allah is venerated, it removes him from Islam.[9]

Third: The Scholars of the Najdī Da‘wa Do Not Deny the Existence of Disagreement in Individual Issues

One common misconception regarding the methodology of the scholars of the da‘wa is the assumption that they did not acknowledge juristic disagreement (ikhtilāf) in issues such as the innovations related to supplication or that they rejected the existence of multiple scholarly views in matters that are subject to ijtihād. In reality, this understanding is inaccurate and contrary to their explicit statements, which demonstrate their awareness of the concept of disagreement and their distinction between matters that fall under innovations and unlawful religious novelties (muhdathāt) and those that fall under legitimate scholarly ijtihād.

An example of this Is what Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb said regarding the issue of tawassul through the righteous:

“We do not denounce the one who does it, and there is no denunciation in issues of ijtihād... or one who intends the grave of Maʿrūf”—meaning al-Karkhī—“or someone else, and supplicates there, but does not supplicate except to Allah, devoting his religion sincerely to Him—how is this comparable to the matter we are discussing?!”[10]

Among the clear examples of their respect for scholarly disagreement is what the scholar ʿAbd al-Laṭīf stated in his refutation of Ibn Jirjīs al-ʿIrāqī:

“Tawassul, in the understanding of the scholars, is not what it is in the understanding of al-ʿIrāqī and his sect from among the grave-worshippers. Among the scholars, tawassul refers to following and emulating [the righteous], and it also refers to asking Allah by the rank of the prophets and the righteous. The dispute is not about any of this. Rather, the dispute concerns taking rivals and deities, making tawassul through supplicating to them, seeking their aid, and circumambulating their graves.”[11]

This passage is of great value. Shaykh ʿAbd al-Laṭīf affirms that tawassul by the rank of the prophets and righteous is a view held by some scholars, and he clearly states that this is not a point of contention with the grave-revering sect. This refutes the common portrayal of the Najdīs as denying the existence of legitimate disagreement.

On the matter of swearing by the Prophet صلى الله عليه وسلم, Shaykh ʿAbd al-Laṭīf says:
“We do not deny that some people held it to be merely disliked (makrūh); the disagreement lies in determining which of the two opinions is correct and which is supported by the Prophetic ḥadīths.”[12]

Accordingly, the accurate depiction of the methodology of the Imams of the Najdī daʿwah is that they clearly distinguish between manifest, agreed-upon matters and those in which disagreement is valid. They do not censure those who differ with them in matters of ijtihād but rather acknowledge the existence of legitimate scholarly disagreement and aim to seek what is closest to the Sunnah.

Fourth: Not all grave-related innovations are considered major shirk by the Imams of the daʿwah

This is another area where many have fallen into either excess or negligence. Some have assumed that the Imams of the daʿwah always declare every act connected to grave-related innovations to be major kufr. However, their writings—and those of the verified scholars—clearly indicate a distinction between levels of innovation. What falls under the category of major shirk is only that which entails the direct act of worship being devoted to other than Allah, such as supplication, seeking aid, or asking for spiritual provision (madad). As for other practices, they may be considered prohibited innovations, minor shirk, or means that lead to shirk, but they are not necessarily acts of major disbelief that expel a person from the religion.

Shaykh Ibn Bāz clarified this distinction—may Allah have mercy on him—in numerous instances. He stated in his classification of minor shirk:

“As for minor shirk, it is of various kinds as well, such as swearing by other than Allah, swearing by the Prophet (peace be upon him), by trustworthiness, by someone’s head, and similar expressions. This is minor shirk, based on the statement of the Prophet (peace be upon him): ‘Whoever swears by anything other than Allah has committed shirk.’ Likewise, riyā’ (showing off in worship).”[13]

Here, he clearly distinguishes between major shirk, which is the worship of other than Allah, and minor shirk, which serves as a means leading to it but does not expel a person from the religion. He cites swearing by other than Allah as an example of minor shirk, despite it being a common occurrence among people. This indicates that the ruling of major shirk is not always applied to every error related to tawḥīd.

Shaykh Ibn Bāz also said regarding circumambulating graves: “If one performs ṭawāf seeking closeness thereby to the occupant of the grave, then this is the same as invoking him and seeking his aid—it constitutes major shirk. However, if one performs ṭawāf thinking that circumambulating graves is an act of drawing closer to Allah, just as people circumambulate the Kaʿbah, and he does not intend the deceased, then this is an innovation and one of the prohibited and dangerous means leading to shirk.”[14]

Here, Shaykh Ibn Bāz distinguishes based on the intention of the one seeking closeness: if his aim is to draw near to the deceased, then it is major shirk; but if he aims to draw near to Allah through an unlegislated act—such as performing ṭawāf around graves under the mistaken belief that it is a means of nearness—then this is a forbidden innovation and a means to shirk, though it is not major shirk in and of itself.

Likewise, Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn said regarding seeking blessing (tabarruk) through graves by rubbing against them: “If one believes that it benefits independently of Allah, Mighty, and Majestic, then this is shirk in rubūbiyyah and takes one out of the fold of Islam. But if one believes that it is merely a means and does not benefit independently of Allah, then he is misguided and mistaken, and what he believes falls under minor shirk.”[15]

Here, he offers a detailed clarification concerning belief: if one believes that the grave has independent influence, then this is major shirk; but if one believes that it is merely a means—though such a belief is false—then it constitutes minor shirk. This demonstrates a precise distinction between the degrees of deviation and the fact that rulings are not issued indiscriminately based solely on outward actions. Rather, intention, belief, and objective are taken into account.

In summary, the Imams of the daʿwah and the scholars who follow in their path pay careful attention to precise distinctions in issues of shirk and innovation. They do not issue takfir rulings on all manifestations of such matters. Rather, they assess the matter in light of its potential meanings and the extent to which the clear concept of worship applies to it.

From this, it becomes clear that it is mistaken to assume that every innovation related to graves constitutes major shirk or that everyone who engages in such acts is automatically deemed to have exited the fold of Islam. It is likewise mistaken to accuse the Imams of the daʿwah of rejecting or denying juristic disagreement, for such claims are based either on a selective reading of their texts or preconceived notions lacking scholarly grounding.

Fifth: Justifying rulings by reference to shirk or the means leading to it, according to the Imams of the daʿwah

Justifying rulings by invoking shirk or its avenues is among the issues that some opponents object to with regard to the Imams of the daʿwah, claiming that they diverged from the consensus of the majority of jurists in this matter. They assert that the only precedent for this approach is Ibn Taymiyyah, arguing that jurists—according to their claim—did not describe many shirk-related innovations using the term shirk but instead confined themselves to rulings such as dislike (karāhah) or prohibition (ḥurmah). They view the expressions of the Imams of the daʿwah in this context as excessively harsh, overly inclined to takfir, or as deviating from the methodology of the Muslim jurists—among other frequently repeated objections.

However, this objection is based on a flawed understanding of the methodologies of legal reasoning and derivation (taʾṣīl fiqhī), and its invalidity becomes clear from two angles:

First: Shirk is not to be understood as a separate category parallel to prohibition (taḥrīm); rather, a shirk ruling necessarily entails prohibition, all the more so since both categories of shirk fall under the broader category of what is forbidden. It is a well-established principle among the scholars of legal theory that “a general ruling does not negate the more specific one.” Thus, when a jurist states that a certain act is “prohibited,” this does not necessarily negate its classification as shirk. Rather, the prohibition may stem from the act’s association with meanings of shirk or its being a means that leads to it.

Therefore, shirk serves as a rationale (taʿlīl) for a legal ruling, not as a distinct category of legal judgment in contrast to prohibition, as some lay critics mistakenly assume. When writing in books of jurisprudence, a jurist is typically concerned with outlining the five legal rulings of responsibility (aḥkām taklīfiyyah), not with explaining the underlying rationale for those rulings.

A similar case is what Is said regarding killing; for instance, it Is prohibited, and the reason for its prohibition is that it constitutes “corruption upon the earth.” Thus, the ruling is prohibition, while the reason is corruption. A jurist might mention the rationale of corruption upon the earth to deter people from committing murder, while another jurist may omit this reasoning altogether.

The same applies to matters involving shirk: the jurist often states the legal ruling (ḥukm taklīfī), while Ibn Taymiyyah and Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb were keen to articulate the underlying cause—whether that the act is a means to shirk or that it constitutes shirk in and of itself—in order to deter people from the act and to highlight its danger, especially given the prevalence of such acts in their time.

Second: The claim that jurists did not mention shirk as the rationale in these areas is inaccurate. In fact, some jurists explicitly stated shirk as the basis for prohibiting certain actions, including the following examples:

As stated by al-Ḥajjāwī, the Ḥanbalī scholar, in al-Iqnāʿ: “It is prohibited to swear by other than Allah or His attributes, even by the Prophet, because it constitutes shirk in the glorification of Allah. Whoever does so must seek forgiveness and repent, and there is no expiatory penalty for such an oath.”[16]

This statement explicitly affirms that the rationale for the prohibition is that swearing by other than Allah is “shirk in glorification,” which clearly demonstrates that the meaning of shirk is taken into account in the reasoning behind the ruling.

Al-Nawawī said: “It is not permissible for one who slaughters or hunts to say: ‘In the name of Muḥammad,’ nor to say: ‘In the name of Allah and the name of Muḥammad.’ Rather, Allah alone has the right that slaughter be done in His name, oaths be made by Him, and prostration be directed to Him. No created being is to share in this. It is mentioned in al-Wasīṭ that it is not permissible to say: ‘In the name of Allah and Muḥammad, the Messenger of Allah,’ because that constitutes association (tashrīk).”[17]

Al-Nawawī here justified the prohibition by describing it as tashrīk, a term that clearly points to the theological meaning of shirk.

Al-Shirbīnī transmitted from al-Rāfiʿī his statement regarding someone who says: “I slaughter in the name of Allah and Muḥammad”: “A group of jurists from Qazwīn disagreed on this—whether his slaughtered animal is lawful to eat, and whether he falls into disbelief or not. The correct view is what we have clarified. Al-Shāfiʿī explicitly stated that if one were to say, ‘I slaughter for the Prophet ﷺ or as a form of devotion to him,’ then it is not lawful to eat from it. However, if one says, ‘In the name of Allah and Muḥammad is the Messenger of Allah’—with Muḥammad in the nominative case—then it is neither prohibited nor even disliked, as our teacher concluded, due to the absence of any implication of tashrīk. Al-Zarkashī said: This is clear to someone trained in grammar, but not necessarily to others.”[18]

Thus, the rationale that governs the permissibility, prohibition, or even the degree of dislike in such matters is the implication of tashrīk, meaning the presence of shirk-related meaning or its implication in the wording or actions.

From all of the above, it becomes evident that the Imams of the daʿwah did not innovate the classification of certain innovations associated with shirk as being acts of shirk or means leading to it. Rather, they were preceded in this by earlier scholars. However, they gave it greater emphasis due to the urgent need to repudiate such practices in their time, when these actions became widespread, and manifestations of excess regarding graves and seeking blessings from them were common.

Sixth: Specific expressions found in the historical records and wars of the Najdīs

2. The use of the term ridda (apostasy)

One observes in the historical accounts of Ibn Bishr and Ibn Ghannām the use of the term ridda in various contexts, such as their statements: “The people of such-and-such place irtadda,” particularly when referring to the breaking of allegiance or rebellion against the authority of Imām Muḥammad ibn Saʿūd.

It is important to clarify here that this expression does not necessarily imply apostasy in the well-known theological sense—i.e., exiting the fold of Islam. Rather, it may refer to political defection or the breaking of a covenant or oath of allegiance in accordance with established linguistic and sharʿī usages.

Imām al-Shāfiʿī said regarding the term ridda: “Ridda (apostasy) is turning back from what one was upon—either by disbelief or by withholding what is due. And whoever turns away from something, it is permissible to say: ‘He irtadda from it.’”[19]

Al-Khaṭṭābī transmitted that ridda is a linguistic term denoting a return or withdrawal from something, stating: “Ridda is a term in the Arabic language, and whoever turns away from something he was previously engaged in has irtadda from it.”[20]

Similarly, Ibn Manẓūr said: “It is said of the people of war: ‘They have committed kufr,’ meaning they have rebelled and refused to comply. Kufr can refer to ingratitude, and it is the opposite of thankfulness. Kufr is the denial of blessings and is the antonym of gratitude. Allah’s statement: {Indeed, we disbelieve in all of it} [al-Qaṣaṣ: 48] means: we reject and deny it.”[21]

According to these connotations, it becomes clear that the Najdī historians’ use of the term ridda does not necessarily imply doctrinal takfir; rather, it encompasses political, social, and jurisprudential dimensions related to the authority of the legitimate imām and the allegiance of the people of the land to him.

2. Describing the Najdī army as the army of the Muslims:

The Najdī historians described their armies as “the armies of the Muslims,” a designation commonly found in juridical and historical writings to indicate an army that adheres to the obedience of the imām rather than to denote exclusive doctrinal affiliation. Jurists and historians have consistently employed this expression even in instances of internal conflict among Muslims, as in the statement of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī regarding the Battle of al-Nahrawān: “The Muslims attacked them and killed them, and only nine individuals from among the Muslims were killed.”[22]

This expression is repeated in a number of historical accounts, including what is found in Tārīkh al-Fākhirī: “In the year 1176, the Muslims raided al-Aḥsāʾ.”[23] Similarly, in Tārīkh Ibn La‘būn, it is stated: “In the year 1194, the armies of the Muslims marched against the people of al-Zulfi.”[24]

Indeed, even King ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Āl Saʿūd—known for his broad-mindedness and political and religious tolerance—used this expression to describe his army during the Battle of al-Sabla. In his letter to the Emir of Kuwait, he wrote: “Therefore, the Muslims launched an attack against them on the nineteenth of last month…”[25] It is worth noting that the adversaries in this incident were the Ikhwān, who were known for their religious strictness but were not outside the fold of Islam.

3. Describing the wars as Futūḥāt:

The use of the term futūḥ (conquests) to describe certain campaigns of the Najdī daʿwah should not necessarily be understood as implying takfir. For instance, al-Shawkānī—one of the leading scholars of his time and from outside the Najdī milieu—referred to those wars as futūḥāt, saying: “The ways of jāhiliyyah had dominated those lands, and Islam had become a stranger therein… so he conquered all the Najdī territories.”[26]

This does not indicate a takfīrī inclination on his part; rather, it reflects a general juridical description of a reality characterized by ignorance of the sharīʿah and the prevalence of innovations without implying the takfir of the dissenters.

4. Their stance on the takfir of tribes:

As for the issue raised concerning the “takfir of tribes,” it is, in most cases, a matter of “a general statement intended for a specific application,” wherein the label is applied to a particular village or group, and what is meant are the leaders and prominent figures upon whom the proof had been established, without this extending to the general population. This was clarified by Shaykhs Ḥasan and ʿAbd Allah, the sons of Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb when they said: “It may be judged that the people of this village are disbelievers… but it is not judged that every individual among them is a disbeliever in particular.”[27]

They based this on the principle of the “withholding faction” (al-ṭāʾifah al-mumtaniʿah), a recognized jurisprudential issue. Scholars have agreed on the legitimacy of fighting those who refuse to uphold certain obligations of Islam, although they differed on whether such refusal constitutes apostasy from Islam—which is the view of the majority—or apostasy from the truth, which is the view of Imām al-Shāfiʿī. Ibn Taymiyyah favored the opinion of the majority.

Accordingly, the matter falls within the scope of legitimate ijtihād in understanding the sharʿī texts, and it does not entail the blanket application of takfir to the general population. Rather, it requires careful distinction and a gradual approach in condemnation and the establishment of proof.

Seventh: Referring the ambiguous to the unambiguous in the words of the Imams of the Daʿwah:

One of the established methodological principles among scholars is that ambiguous statements should be referred back to clear ones, for what truly matters is the meaning clarified by the speaker himself, not what might be inferred from ambiguous expressions that could carry multiple interpretations.

It is, therefore, a clear error for some to cite statements by Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb in which he speaks about the widespread manifestations of shirk within the ummah—as in his statement: “It is not hidden from you how the earth is filled with major shirk, the worship of idols; one goes to the grave of a prophet, and another to the grave of a companion, such as al-Zubayr and Ṭalḥah…”[28]

The Shaykh’s words here do not indicate specification or generalization; rather, he is speaking about the prevalence of the category of shirk, not about the disbelief of the general population.

Similarly, in his statement regarding the people of al-Shām and their veneration of Ibn ʿArabī: “But he came from al-Shām—meaning al-Muways—and they worship Ibn ʿArabī, having placed an idol over his grave which they worship. I do not mean all the people of al-Shām; far be it and never! Rather, a group remains upon the truth, even if they are few and estranged.”[29] This and similar statements have been cited as evidence that the Shaykh declared most of the people of al-Shām to be disbelievers.

To properly understand such statements, one must pay attention to several points:

1. It is a well-known principle that ambiguous statements must be referred back to clear ones. If a scholar makes a statement that is ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations, and then he himself clarifies his intended meaning, it is not permissible for anyone to attribute to him a position he has explicitly rejected. Nor is it permissible to delve into his intentions or search his heart, for Allah has commanded us to judge based on outward expressions.

The Shaykh explicitly denied this claim in his own words: “As for the claim that we make takfir in general terms, this is one of the slanders of the enemies, by which they seek to turn people away from this religion. And we say: Glory be to You, this is a great slander.”[30]

2. Comparing category with category or analogy between similar cases:

It is permissible to liken love, devotion, and intense attachment to something with worship, even if the full conditions of worship are not met in every instance. A scholar may say that certain people “worship” a grave, for example, as a form of rhetorical emphasis (mubālaghah), not a literal assertion.

This is similar to the report from ʿAlī ibn Abī Ṭālib—may Allah be pleased with him—when he passed by a group of people playing chess and said: “What are these idols to which you are so devoted?”[31] He likened the chess pieces to idols, but his intention was not to declare them disbelievers.

Likewise, the Prophet ﷺ said: “Perish the slave of the dīnār, perish the slave of the dirham.”[32] Here, love of wealth is described as a form of servitude, an emphatic expression to illustrate the depth of attachment in the heart, not a declaration of disbelief per se.

This rhetorical style is well known among scholars and is employed for condemnation and rebuke, not to issue a formal sharʿī ruling of takfir upon specific individuals.

Al-Fakhr al-Rāzī, in his commentary on the verse: “And they worship besides Allah that which neither harms them nor benefits them, and they say, ‘These are our intercessors with Allah’” [Yūnus: 18], states: “A parallel to this in our time is the preoccupation of many people with venerating the graves of the great ones, based on the belief that if they venerate their graves, they will become intercessors for them with Allah.”[33]

3. General condemnation differs from specific legal judgment:

General condemnation may involve analogy, hyperbole, or expressions that highlight the gravity of an act. For example, someone who slaughters for other than Allah may be described as worshipping other than Allah, just as one may say, “slave of wealth” or “slave of desire.” Preachers and scholars have long employed such expressions, both past and present.

However, in the context of precise juridical or judicial determination, the rules of takfir are strictly observed: the conditions must be fulfilled, the impediments removed, and the proof established. No one is declared a disbeliever in this context except one who persists after a clear explanation.

4. Distinguishing between absolute Islam and the essence of pure Islam:

When the Shaykh expressed distress over the estrangement of Islam or the spread of shirk, he intended to refer to pure Islam—not Islam in its general or absolute sense.

The Shaykh clarifies this—may Allah have mercy on him—in his letter to ʿAbd Allah ibn Suḥaym, in which he states: “If you come to know that the truth is with me and that the religion of Islam today is among the most estranged of things—by which I mean pure Islam, untainted by shirk and innovations—then as for Islam that stands in opposition to disbelief, there is no doubt that the ummah of Muḥammad ﷺ is the last of nations, and upon it the Hour will be established.”[34]

This statement provides an elegant and decisive clarification, removing all ambiguity. The Shaykh affirms that the ummah remains upon the religion of Islam, even in the presence of shirk, and that what he refers to as “strange” is Islam free from innovations. After such a clear explanation, it is impermissible for anyone to attribute to the Shaykh a position he has explicitly disavowed.

5. What is reproached in the Shaykh’s statements has parallels in the words of many other scholars:

Among them is what was said by al-Muqbilī al-Kawkabānī—who preceded the Shaykh by a century—quoting some scholars of his time: “The people of al-Ṭāʾif do not know Allah; they have taken Ibn ʿAbbās as a deity besides Allah… There is no remedy for such people except the sword. But those who wield the sword today are the most ignorant of Allah’s creation and the most deluded by such practices—animals of various dispositions, from foxes to beasts of prey, all devoid of prosperity. And Allah is the one whose help is sought.”[35]

Similarly, al-Mawlā al-Dihlawī, the Ḥanafī scholar, said: “Know that shirk has become widespread among the people in this age and has proliferated and that pure tawḥīd has become a stranger. Yet most people do not even know the meaning of shirk, and they claim faith while they are steeped in shirk and stained by it.”[36]

So, what difference is there between the words of Imām al-Dihlawī and those of Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb?

Al-Shawkānī affirms the widespread nature of shirk within the ummah, stating: “Much of what those who hold beliefs about the dead do amounts to shirk—shirk which may be hidden from many among the scholars, not because it is inherently obscure, but because the masses have adopted these practices and they have become so widespread that the young have been raised upon them and the old have grown old with them. You will find none who denounces it; rather, you hear people who encourage and promote it.”[37]

Thus, al-Shawkānī acknowledges that the majority have fallen into this shirk, yet no one claimed that he held the view that the general body of Muslims are disbelievers. This is exactly what Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb affirmed as well.

Eighth: Declaring takfir upon those who do not declare takfir of the polytheists:

This is among the most contentious issues and has caused considerable confusion. The Shaykh—may Allah have mercy on him—did indeed state that whoever does not declare the polytheists to be disbelievers or validates their creed is one of them and that whoever allies with the polytheists is one of them.

This is a sound and well-established principle cited by jurists. However, some have misunderstood this by assuming it necessitates declaring takfir on anyone who refrains from declaring a specific grave-worshipper to be a disbeliever. This understanding is incorrect because the implication of a statement (luzūm al-qawl) is not the same as the statement itself (nafs al-qawl).

To properly understand this issue, one must return to the historical context of the statements made by Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and the scholars of the daʿwah. In the Shaykh’s time, some individuals who were regarded as scholars agreed with him that worshipping Allah alone was preferable. However, they claimed that supplicating to other than Allah and holding beliefs about the righteous were matters of juristic disagreement among the four madhhabs. They cited certain statements of the jurists that permitted tawassul and tashaffuʿ through the Messenger ﷺ, and they assumed this constituted a general license for invoking other than Allah. Consequently, they refrained from declaring the grave-worshippers disbelievers and forbade denouncing them.

However, Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb clarified that tawḥīd is not complete without disavowal of shirk and its people and that the issue of worshipping other than Allah is not a matter of subsidiary jurisprudence (furūʿ fiqhiyyah), but one of the foundational tenets of the religion (uṣūl al-dīn). It is in this light that his well-known statement must be understood: “Whoever does not declare the polytheists to be disbelievers is one of them”—meaning that whoever legitimizes major shirk is himself a disbeliever.

The intent here pertains to the category of belief, not merely a difference over takfir of specific individuals—as some contemporary readers have misunderstood.

Some in modern times have misunderstood such general statements, assuming that the Shaykh declared as disbelievers those who excuse others due to ignorance (al-ʿādhir bil-jahl). This was never his intent. Rather, such expressions are well known among the scholars of the Salaf. For example, Sufyān ibn ʿUyaynah said: “Whoever says the Qur’an is created is a disbeliever, and whoever doubts his disbelief is also a disbeliever”—even though the adherents of that view, such as the Muʿtazilah, were still judged to be Muslims. The point of such statements is to repudiate the core doctrine and not declare takfir on everyone who falls into error due to interpretation or ignorance.

Explicit statements from the Imams of the Daʿwah negating takfir of those who do not declare specific individuals as disbelievers:

4. Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb

The Shaykh said: “If you have understood this, then those ṭāghūts in whom people place their beliefs—from among the people of al-Kharj and others—are well known to both the commoners and the elite for this. They put themselves forward for such status and command the people toward it; all of them are disbelievers, apostates from Islam. And whoever argues on their behalf, or objects to those who declare them disbelievers, or claims that such actions—if false—do not amount to disbelief, then at the very least, such a person is a fāsiq whose writing is not accepted, whose testimony is rejected, and behind whom prayer is not performed.”[38]

This passage clearly demonstrates that the Shaykh did not declare as disbelievers all those who refrained from judging specific individuals as such. His words are directed at those who defended the leading ṭāghūts—figures like Tāj and Shamāsān—who claimed supernatural powers and to speak with angels. So, what then of those lesser than them? And what of the common folk who are ignorant? If the Shaykh had held the view that excusing someone due to ignorance was itself disbelief, he would have explicitly stated it—but he did not.

In addition to this, there are the Shaykh’s own explicit statements in which he denies the accusation that he declared disbelievers those who neither made takfir nor engaged in fighting. The Shaykh said: “As for the lies and slanders, such as their claim that we declare disbelievers those who do not declare others as disbelievers, or those who do not fight—this and much more besides are lies and slanders by which they repel people from the religion of Allah and His Messenger.”[39]

How, then, can anyone attribute to the Shaykh a position he explicitly rejects and denies for himself?

In his letter to Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm, he writes: “As for what you mentioned regarding the issue of takfir, and your request for me to elaborate on the matter—had there been a disagreement between us, I could have either elaborated or refrained. But since we agree on the legal ruling—you do not reject the statements I wrote to you, nor do I reject the expressions you wrote to me—then the disagreement concerns specific individuals.”[40]

In this letter, he clarifies and explains his perspective to one of his opponents who agreed with him on the foundational principles of the daʿwah but disagreed regarding the takfir of certain specific individuals.

Had the Shaykh believed that anyone who refrained from declaring those individuals disbelievers was themselves a disbeliever, he would have clearly declared takfir on his correspondent—Shaykh Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm. Yet he did no such thing. On the contrary, he explicitly states that they agree on the foundational issue and that their disagreement is limited to particular persons—thus affirming that their agreement far outweighs their differences.

2– Shaykh ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Āl al-Shaykh:

Shaykh ʿAbd al-Laṭīf Āl al-Shaykh authored a valuable treatise entitled “Al-Inkār ʿalá Man Kaffara al-Muslimīn Bighayri Mā Ajmaʿa ʿAlayhi al-Fuqahāʾ” (“Refutation of Those Who Declare Muslims Disbelievers Without Scholarly Consensus”), in which he rebukes a group that had emerged, declaring as disbelievers those who did not excommunicate some of the opponents of the daʿwah—such as the followers of Ibn Fayrūz and others.

Shaykh ʿAbd al-Laṭīf, may Allah have mercy on him, addresses them as follows: “In the year sixty-four, I encountered two men from among your type—renegades in al-Aḥsāʾ—who had withdrawn from Friday and congregational prayers, and declared the Muslims of that land to be disbelievers. Their justification resembled yours: they said that the people of al-Aḥsāʾ socialize with Ibn Fayrūz and others like him who did not declare the ṭāghūt to be disbelievers, nor openly pronounced takfir upon his grandfather who rejected Shaykh Muḥammad’s daʿwah, did not accept it, and opposed it. They said: ‘Whoever does not openly declare his disbelief is himself a disbeliever in Allah, having failed to reject the ṭāghūt. Whoever socializes with him is the same as him.’

They built upon these two false and misguided premises, the same rulings that apply to explicit apostasy—even refraining from returning greetings of peace. The matter was brought to me, so I summoned them, threatened them, and spoke to them harshly. At first, they claimed to be upon the creed of Shaykh Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb and that they possessed his letters. I exposed their misconceptions, refuted their misguidance with what I had in the gathering and informed them that the Shaykh was innocent of this belief and ideology. For he did not declare anyone a disbeliever except on the basis of matters agreed upon by the Muslims…As for declaring takfir based on the issues you presume to be grounds for excommunicating Muslims, then this is the methodology of the Khawārij—the renegades.”[41]

Had the Imams of the Da‘wah held that the one who offers excuse (to the Idolater) Is himself a disbeliever, then Shaykh ‘Abd al-Laṭīf would not have denounced those individuals but rather would have affirmed that they were upon the truth. However, he clarified that they were renegades, resembling the Khawārij in declaring others disbelievers without proper criteria.

5. Shaykh Abā Buṭayn, may Allah have mercy on him:

Shaykh ‘Abd Allah Abā Buṭayn was among the prominent scholars of the Da‘wah, and indeed, he was known for his restrictive stance regarding offering excuses in matters of worshipping other than Allah. Despite this, he provided a highly important clarification in this matter.

He was asked, may Allah have mercy on him, about someone who does not know what belief in Allah entails nor understands the meaning of disbelief in the ṭāghūt. This, the questioner said, is the state of the majority of those among us who claim to be Muslim, adhere to the outward practices of the Sharī‘ah, and profess love for the people of truth and affiliate with them in general terms. However, in specific matters, they detest and resent the people of tawḥīd, and they deem them to be in error regarding affairs that go against their own customs and what they are familiar with. They believe anything contrary to what they know to be mistaken—since, in their minds, religion is that which is known and practiced by the people. They are unaware of any evidence to refute this, and they are neither deterred nor do they pay attention because they view religion as being what is outwardly practiced by the majority of the so-called religious.

What is the ruling concerning those of such a description? Among them are many who openly express hatred and enmity toward the people of truth and are eager to expose their faults and seize upon their mistakes. We view such individuals—who exhibit these characteristics, along with a lack of knowledge of the fundamentals of Islam—as disbelievers because, firstly, they have not come to know Islam. Secondly, they have shown enmity toward its adherents and harbored hatred towards them, while considering the religion to be what is practiced by the majority of those who affiliate themselves with it. So, is our judgment concerning them correct or not?

He, may Allah have mercy on him, replied:

“If a man affirms that these polytheistic practices performed at graves and other such places—such as supplicating the dead and the absent, seeking the fulfillment of needs and relief from distress through them, and drawing near to them with vows and sacrifices—are acts of shirk and misguidance and that whoever denounces them is correct, and whoever promotes and calls to them is worse than the doer himself, then such a person is judged to be a Muslim. This constitutes disbelief in the ṭāghūt and in what is worshipped besides Allah.

If he acknowledges that these actions and others like them, which fall under acts of worship, are exclusively the right of Allah Most High and are not permissible for anyone else—not even for a near angel or a sent prophet, let alone for others besides them—then this is the reality of Iman in Allah and disbelief in what is worshipped besides Him. The Prophet said: ‘Whoever says: Lā ilāha illa Allah, and disbelieves in what is worshipped besides Allah, his wealth and blood become inviolable, and his reckoning is with Allah Most High.’ Everyone must know tawḥīd and the pillars of Islam with evidence.

Taqleed (blind following) is not permissible in this regard. However, the layperson who does not know the evidences—if he believes in the oneness of the Lord, Glorified be He, in the Messengership of Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him), in the resurrection after death, in Paradise and Hellfire, and that these polytheistic practices performed at such shrines are falsehood and misguidance—then if he holds to this with firm, unwavering conviction, he is a Muslim, even if he cannot articulate it with proof. For most common Muslims, even if they are taught the evidences, often do not grasp their meaning.

Al-Nawawī mentioned in his commentary on Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, in his discussion on the ḥadīth of Ḍimām ibn Tha‘labah: Abū ‘Amr ibn al-Ṣalāḥ said: ‘In it is proof for what the Imams of the scholars have gone to—that the lay imitators are believers, and that it suffices from them to simply hold to the truth with firm conviction, without doubt, or wavering—contrary to the stance of the Mu‘tazilah who denied this. This is because the Prophet (peace and blessings be upon him) affirmed Ḍimām upon what he relied on in recognizing his prophethood and truthfulness, simply by his report, and did not denounce him for that, nor did he say: You must examine my miracles and deduce them with definitive proofs.’”

As for the one who says that these acts performed at such shrines—such as supplicating to other than Allah, making vows, and offering sacrifices to them—are not prohibited, then the general declaration of disbelief upon this type is unobjectionable; rather, this is undoubtedly disbelief.”[42]

Analysis of the Fatwá of Abā Buṭayn, may Allah have mercy on him:

The question pertained to the ruling on someone who, although he does not affirm what occurs at graves in general, nonetheless—when it comes to specifics—abhors the people of tawḥīd and rejects much of what they uphold simply because it contradicts what he is accustomed to. In fact, he views religion as being with the majority who oppose the people of tawḥīd.

Thus came this weighty response from Shaykh Abā Buṭayn, may Allah have mercy on him, clarifying that the key criterion is his belief that what occurs at graves is falsehood and misguidance. If he rejects what the grave worshippers do in general terms—without necessarily understanding the details—then this general rejection is accepted from him, and he is considered a Muslim on that basis. This is because not all people grasp the evidences.

Moreover, the words of Shaykh Abā Buṭayn here imply that if a person holds that these actions generally belong to the prohibited category—without delving into specifics—then that suffices for establishing the man’s Islam. This is since not everyone is capable of comprehending evidentiary proofs.

Conclusion:

Following this exposition and clarification, it becomes evident that approaching the general statements of the Imams of the Najdī daʿwah must not occur in isolation from the foundational principles of academic inquiry nor apart from the tools of sound legal and methodological understanding. Many of the areas of confusion encountered by extremists or detractors have, in fact, arisen due to a failure to distinguish between contexts, a practice of selectively quoting statements, or applying them to inappropriate situations without regard to their context or the intent of their author.

We have demonstrated throughout this paper that, despite the widespread notion of the Najdī Imams’ harsh expressions in response to manifestations of shirk and innovations, they were, in truth, careful to distinguish between the varying levels of actions, considerate of the circumstances of those addressed, and perceptive of the fine differences between major and minor shirk, and between apparent and ambiguous disbelief. Furthermore, they did not neglect the areas of legitimate scholarly disagreement in matters of secondary rulings (furūʿ), nor did they expel from the fold of Islam those whose errors did not meet the standard established by definitive evidence.

One key insight this research highlighted is that their strong-worded declarations emerged within a turbulent historical and societal context dominated by pagan practices and theological deviations. This often necessitated strong speech and stern rebukes of the masses to safeguard the core of the religion and the features of tawḥīd. This is a position supported by numerous scholars throughout the ages when addressing situations requiring reprimand and deterrence.

Methodological fairness demands that every statement be judged in light of its context, purpose, and the overall corpus of its author’s positions—not through haste or subjective inclinations. Accordingly, the call for a balanced and enlightened understanding of the legacy of the Imams of the Najdī daʿwah does not mean excusing their mistakes but rather calls for an academic and fair reading that does not stop at the surface of the text but penetrates to the depth of its meaning and context.

May Allah send His prayers and peace upon our Prophet Muhammad and upon his family and companions.

Recommended Reading:

Shaykh Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab Discourse

---

[1] Tanbīh al-Rajul al-ʿĀqil (1/349).

[2] Al-Iʿlām bi-Qawāṭiʿ al-Islām (p. 98).

[3] Al-Majmūʿ (1/50).

[4] Ibid. (1/50).

[5] Al-Fatāwá al-Fiqhiyya al-Kubrá (4/332).

[6] Tuḥfat al-Ṭālib wal-Jalīs (p. 145).

[7] Majmūʿ Fatāwá wa-Maqālāt al-Shaykh Ibn Bāz (28/369).

[8] Madārij al-Sālikīn (1/530).

[9] Al-Bayān fī Madhhab al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī (10/493–494).

[10] Muʾallafāt al-Shaykh – al-Qism al-Thālith: al-Fatāwá (pp. 59–60).

[11] Minhāj al-taʾsīs wal-taqdīs (p. 306).

[12] Ibid. (p. 302).

[13] Majmūʿ fatāwá wa-Maqālāt al-Shaykh Ibn Bāz (28/369).

[14] Fatāwá Nūr ʿalá al-Darb (1/258).

[15] Majmūʿ Fatāwá wa-Rasāʾil Ibn ʿUthaymīn (2/231).

[16] Al-Iqnāʿ (4/333).

[17] Rawḍat al-Ṭālibīn (2/475).

[18] Mughnī al-Muḥtāj (4/273).

[19] Al-Umm (9/206).

[20] Maʿālim al-Sunan (2/6).

[21] Lisān al-ʿArab (5/144).

[22] Tārīkh Baghdād (1/536).

[23] Tārīkh al-Fākhirī (p. 139).

[24] Tārīkh Ibn La‘būn (p. 191).

[25] Al-Ikhwān al-Saʿūdiyyūn fī ʿAqdayn (9/204).

[26] Al-Badr al-Ṭāliʿ (1/182).

[27] Al-Durar al-Saniyya fī al-Ajwibah al-Najdiyya (10/145).

[28] Al-Rasāʾil al-Shakhṣiyyá – Ḍimn Majmūʿ Muʾallafāt al-Shaykh (6/125).

[29] Al-Rasāʾil al-Shakhṣiyyá – Ḍimn Majmūʿ Muʾallafāt al-Shaykh (6/137).

[30] Majmūʿ Muʾallafāt al-Shaykh (5/60).

[31] Reported by Ibn Abī Shaybah (26158), al-Khallāl in Al-Amr bil-Maʿrūf wal-Nahy ʿan al-Munkar (153), al-Ājurrī in Taḥrīm al-Nard (107), and al-Ḍiyāʾ in Al-Mukhtārah (2/361/744). Authenticated by Ibn Ḥazm in Al-Muḥallá (9/63).

[32] Reported by al-Bukhārī (2887).

[33] Mafātīḥ al-Ghayb (16/58).

[34] Al-Rasāʾil al-Shakhṣiyya (p. 66).

[35] Al-Abḥāth al-Musaddadah fī Funūn Mutaʿaddidah (p. 158).

[36] Risālat al-Tawḥīd (pp. 17–18).

[37] Al-Badr al-ṭāliʿ (1/169).

[38] Tārīkh Najd (p. 310).

[39] Fatāwá wa-Masāʾil – Ḍimn Majmūʿ Muʾallafāt Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (4/11).

[40] Al-Rasāʾil al-shakhṣiyyá – ḍimn majmūʿ muʾallafāt Muḥammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhāb (6/204).

[41] Al-Inkār ʿalá man Kaffara al-Muslimīn Bighayr mā Ajmaʿa ʿalayhi al-Fuqahāʾ – ḌImn Majmūʿat al-Rasāʾil wal-Masāʾil al-Najdiyya (3/4).

[42] Al-Durar al-Saniyyah (10/406–408).