Ibn Taymiyya on Causality

Taken from Dr. Tallal Zeni’s book, Ibn Taymiyya On Causality and Reliance on God, pp. 6 -17:

Ibn Taymiyya affirms causality throughout his writings. In the selections of this book, Ibn Taymiyya affirms that all creatures are subject to causality, but that the occasionalists have denied the powers (quwā) and natures (ṭabā’iʿ) of creatures. Ibn Taymiyya points out the many verses of the Qur’ān and ḥadīths of the Prophet Muḥammad which all affirm causality. Of note, Ibn al-Qayyim also affirmed causality and rejected occasionalism in his book Shifā’ al-ʿalīl, and pointed out many evidences from revelation and reason.21

That said, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that one cause alone is not efficient; rather, it requires the existence of a confluence of other causes to assist it to result in an effect. Hence, obstacles must also be absent in order for the effect to occur. Ibn Taymiyya states, “If God does not complete all of the causes and prevent all of the obstacles, the objective will not be attained,” and therefore one cause by itself cannot independently bring about an objective.22 This explains why sometimes an effect will not necessarily follow a cause, i.e. because not all causes are present and not all obstacles are absent. Ibn Taymiyya also affirms that it is “invalid to claim that something created can be a complete and efficient cause necessitating its effect”, and that “The creed of Ahl al-Sunna wa’l-Jamāʿa is that there is no being in existence who can be a completely efficient cause except God (Exalted is He). There is no lord save Him and no deity save Him.”23

Furthermore, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that all causes and obstacles are part of the Divine decree and determination, and all occur according to the will of God Almighty. God is the Causer of causes (Musabbib al-asbāb) Who makes a particular cause effective—everything is dependent upon God for its creation, nature, and power. So nothing occurs in God’s kingdom except that He has willed and allowed it. Thus, if all causes are present and all obstacles are absent, the confluence of causes lead to and result in the effect by God’s will.

Now, Ibn Taymiyya affirms that the Predecessors and Imams upheld causality and wise purposes. Ibn Taymiyya repeats throughout the selection presented in this translation, “Relying solely on causes is a form of polytheism, negating the effectiveness of causes is a deprecation of reason, while rejecting causes altogether represents a denial of the Divine Law.” Therefore, one should not rely solely on causes, but instead should rely on God (Glorious is He) Who created and empowered these entities. At the same time, though, one must carry out those causes and should not deny that the causes, which God has determined, are effective. Ibn Taymiyya states, “Nothing occurs in this world nor the Hereafter except through causes.”24

Ibn Taymiyya also addresses those who deny causes in both what God has created and and what He has commanded. In other words, those who deny causation in the ontologic realm may also deny them in the deontologic realm if they seek to avoid inconsistency. For example, some have denied that supplication is a cause. Ibn Taymiyya rejects that reasoning and upholds the efficacy of supplication in accordance with revelation. He further maintains that those who deny causality are forced to deny wise purposes and reasons. This can be extended further to say that those who deny causality will be forced to vacillate between contradictory and incoherent positions on how to consider God’s actions, how one should act from a religious perspective, and how one should manage one’s affairs and livelihood. This will be considered further below via an example from Ghazālī’s last work, Minhāj al-ʿābidīn. Finally, Ibn Taymiyya alludes elsewhere to the fact that those who deny causality have neglected their sound innate disposition (fiṭra).25

Here we can consider the example of light and photons in order to uphold Ibn Taymiyya’s concept of multiple causes acting in concert (in the absence of barriers) to ultimately lead to an effect. The manner by which a photon interacts with our retina to ultimately lead to our brain sensing light is one of the most unusual examples of causality. A photon of light interacts with an electron within a molecule called retinal (within our retina cells), and this leads to its photoisomerization, which then leads to a cascade of molecular events involving approximately ten other molecules within the retina followed by conduction via the optic nerve to the occipital lobe of the brain—this altogether results in our brain sensing and seeing light. That said, one photon is insufficient; rather, approximately ten photons must interact with the retina in order for our brain to sense and see that there is a flash of light. Thus, although a photon is a cause, there must be other causes assisting it, i.e. other photons, in addition to a number of molecules within the retina, as well as the optic nerve and an intact occipital lobe, to ultimately lead to seeing light. If any one of these steps is absent, i.e. there is an obstacle present, that light will not be sensed.

Various other properties of light will also be mentioned here. Light is timeless—it moves from the sun to the earth in approximately eight minutes from our perspective; however, from the perspective of light itself (and its photons) time has not elapsed. From the photon’s perspective and reference frame that movement is instantaneous. In addition, from the perspective of light, the point of departure is the same as the point of arrival, i.e. from its reference frame has not travelled a distance in space either. Light does not experience space nor time. The frame of reference for light is thus different than our frame of reference.26 Lastly, photons are massless, and they are not matter nor bodies. Yet despite all of that, timeless, massless, and spaceless photons of light paradoxically interact with our retina leading us to sense and see light at a particular time and place!27 God is truly the Best Creator.

Now, Ibn Taymiyya’s rejection of occasionalism28 primarily refutes the Ashʿarīs, although other earlier and some later groups have denied causality as well. For instance, Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbā’ī (d. 303/915), the Muʿtazilī teacher of Abū al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī,29 believed that all events are directly caused by God. Ulrich Rudolph’s investigation of the contribution of other Muʿtazilī predecessors of Ashʿarī concludes that although Ashʿarī’s occasionalism was novel from a systematic perspective, from an historical view “al-Ashʿarī’s achievement is less impressive for what he did was mainly to draw together the conclusion from the ideas of his predecessors”.30 Aladdin Yaqub also rejects the Ashʿarī claim that occasionalism was agreed upon by the early Muslims: “In truth, there is little evidence that the doctrine of occasionalism and its accompanying doctrine of acquisition (kasb) were part of Sunni orthodoxy before Ashʿarism became the dominant theology.”31

Besides Ashʿarī himself, the other leading Ashʿarī scholars who advocated occasionalism include Abū Bakr al-Bāqillānī (d. 402/1013), Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), and Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111). For instance, Ghazālī states in his Seventeenth Discussion in The Incoherence of the Philosophers:

The connection between what is habitually believed to be a cause and what is habitually believed to be an effect is not necessary, according to us… Their connection is due to the prior decree of God, who creates them side by side, not its being necessary in itself, incapable of separation… But the continuous habit of their occurrence repeatedly, one time after another, fixes unshakably in our mind the belief in their occurrence according to past habit.32

It should be noted that Ghazālī’s objective here is, in large part, to reject the philosophers’ doctrines (including their rejection of miracles among others) as well as the Muʿtazilī doctrines (where man creates his acts and God is obligated by necessity to be omnibenevolent among other matters). That said, Michael Marmura has argued that Ghazālī denied both causality and intermediation (except in the case of God utilizing His angels).33

In Incoherence of the Philosophers, Ghazālī denies the effectiveness of fire by stating that it “has no action”34 or “act”; then in Moderation in Belief, he denies that the severing of a head is the cause of death:

It must be said about the one who is killed that he died at his predestined time, for this predestined time is the time at which God (Exalted is He) created his death, whether it was accompanied with the severing of the head, a lunar eclipse, the falling of rain, or not. All of these, for us, are co-occurrents and not causes, but some co-occur repeatedly according to the habitual course of things, and some do not.35

Ibn Taymiyya indirectly addresses Ghazālī’s point here (as well as many others) by saying, “God has determined this individual’s death through that cause—he could not have died otherwise,” and had the cause “been absent, then it would be unknown [to us] what was predestined [yet God would know]… The person’s destiny may be that he would have died and it may have been that he would have remained alive, but it would be incorrect to definitively opine one way or another”.36

Hence, in the aforementioned case, the cause leading to the severing of the head is a guillotine or a sword or whatever means that was used. Now, God (Glorious and Exalted is He) does attribute causal power to iron (as well as to other inanimate objects). For instance, the Holy Lord states that in iron there is awesome power as well as [a source of benefits] for humankind.37 Therefore, power is affirmed to iron and it is self-evident that iron is useful in the context of both war and peace. God (Exalted is He) also revealed that He taught David the making of coats of mail for your benefit, to guard you from each other’s violence: will ye then be grateful?38 God (Glorious is He) confirms in the first verse that He sent down iron and in the second that He taught David how to make coats of mail. Yet the Holy Lord then affirms that iron and coats of mail, respectively, are causal. Therefore, even in the matter of war, where God attributed victory and success to Himself alone—Victory cometh only by the help of God39—He advised the believers to empower themselves with whatever they could: Make ready for them all thou canst of (armed) force.40 Thus, it is God Who has created, endowed and empowered these inanimate objects to be causal. The Qur’ān relays that Moses (may God bless him) said, Our Lord is He Who gave unto everything its nature, then guided it aright.41

Moreover, causality can be considered as part of God’s custom, rules and methodology. Recall the verse which states, Thou wilt not find for the law of God aught of power to change.42 This law of God encompasses both ontological and deontological matters. Therefore, should it be said that an effect necessarily occurs if all causes are present and all barriers are absent, then that necessity is only because God has created and empowered the causes, and determined such necessity in accordance with His wisdom and justice.

In addition, there are numerous verses wherein the Holy Lord confirms that some have killed others, such as when He commanded some of the Israelites to kill those who had worshipped the golden calf, or that David killed (qatala) Goliath, or that some of the Israelites killed some of their prophets, among countless other examples. Denying causality contradicts the clear verses of the Qur’ān. Ibn al-Qayyim states that denial of causality may lead some to doubt the religion itself.43

Affirming causes and effects, though, should not be confused with the Qadarī or Muʿtazilī notion that humans create their own acts. God is the Creator of everything including causes and effects, and He (Glory be to Him) has empowered us to be agents capable of causing typical effects. Likewise, the Holy Lord has empowered inanimate objects to cause typical effects.

Let us consider here the verse, And thou (Muḥammad) threwest not when thou didst throw, but God threw.44 This was revealed in reference to the Battle of Badr when the Prophet Muḥammad (may God bless him and grant him peace) grasped a handful of sand and threw it in the direction of the disbelieving Quraysh army. The Prophet Muḥammad’s throw could not have reached the eyes of the disbelievers but God (Glorious and Exalted is He) made particles of sand reach each and every one of the disbelievers’ eyes. Therefore, the Holy Lord here affirms the cause, i.e. the Prophet Muḥammad’s throw, yet the effect was greater than that typically achieved by a humanly throw because it was enhanced, in this case, by God Himself. This verse does not indicate that only God Himself is causal, nor does it support monism (as often alluded to by Ibn ʿArabi); but rather that the cause initiated by the Prophet Muḥammad had a far greater effect than typical because God Himself enhanced it with a miracle. This can be thought of as similar to when the Prophet Moses struck the Sea with his staff and it split apart into two massive mountains of water with dry land in between45 or when he struck the rock with the same staff and twelve springs gushed forth.46 Thus, God has endowed and empowered animate and inanimate entities to be causal, yet in rare instances He creates miracles for the wise purposes which He has determined. It is not necessary, in an effort to affirm miracles, to deny or reject the ability of actors (other than God), whether animate or inanimate, to be causes leading to effects.

Now, Aladdin Yaqub discusses that Ghazālī has three conditions for causal agency: (1) having comprehensive knowledge of all processes leading to the cause itself and all of the consequences or effects of it; 2) possessing a free will; 3) having the power to cause the effect. Inanimate objects are unable to satisfy the first two conditions of complete knowledge and free will, while Ghazālī contends that human beings are unable to satisfy the first.47

It can be said in response to Ghazālī’s first condition for human causal agency that complete knowledge (of all the processes and effects which occur as a result of a cause) is not a necessary condition for one to be causally effective. First, cause and effect is something that one affirms through one’s innate experience of this world. A young child even recognizes that if they perform a particular action A then their action will cause an effect B and their parents will react in C fashion. To deny causality is to deny experience.

Second, in reality, one of the main reasons that occasionalism is proposed by those who do so is due to their incomplete knowledge of all of the causes and barriers to an effect. Had the occasionalists possessed encompassing knowledge they would have affirmed that God has empowered entities to be causal.48 In fact, it is only the incomplete knowledge of why an effect does not occur that leads occasionalists to deny the effectiveness of a cause, in particular, or causality, in general. Complete knowledge affirms causality, but it should not be a condition for efficacy or causality.

Third, no one can attain complete knowledge, yet one’s intention, i.e. knowledge of what one intends, determines one’s reward, according to the ḥadīth49 of the Prophet Muḥammad (may God bless him and grant him peace). Therefore, if an act, i.e. cause, results in a bad outcome or effect, yet the individual’s intent was good, the individual will be rewarded. Likewise, if a scholar opines regarding a matter with knowledge in a sincere fashion, yet is incorrect, he is still rewarded despite his incomplete knowledge (or inadequate wisdom) which led him to propose the incorrect viewpoint.

Fourth, if a person perpetrates a major sin which legislates a legal punishment (ḥadd) according to the Divine Law, yet he is unaware of the details of that punishment (but knows it is a major sin), it is still mandatory—according to Ibn Taymiyya, Ibn al-Qayyim and others—to carry out the legal punishment on account of simply performing the major sin. Complete knowledge is therefore not necessary to carry out a legal punishment.

Fifth, if a drunk driver unknowingly kills another, we would not deny in a court of law that he was the cause of the other’s death. In fact, we would apportion greater blame to this drunk driver than to a sober one who took a wrong turn and thus killed another.

The point is that complete knowledge is not a necessary condition for a cause to be effective—nor is it even necessary—and one’s inadequate knowledge does not necessarily determine the reward or punishment (whether in this world or the Hereafter) in all cases. It can also be seen that denial of causality, taken to its logical conclusion, destroys the edifice upon which this world and Hereafter are coherently and rationally established. Human beings are free-willed knowledgeable actors who have power and are causally effective, but they are not the creators of their actions—only God (Glorious is He) can create.

Now, Özgür Koca has described Ghazālī’s novel proposition to uphold Ashʿarī occasionalism on the basis of the idea of preponderance for no reason (tarjīḥ bi-lā murajjiḥ), i.e. that God wills and creates what He does for no reason or purpose. Ghazālī proposed this against the philosophers, so as to explain how the Eternal God could create and will the temporal world without Himself experiencing any change or moving from potentiality to actuality. Ibn Rushd (known in the West as Averroes; d. 595/1198) and later Ibn Taymiyya rejected this notion of preponderance for no reason. Instead, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that God (Glorious is He) has been perpetually creating from pre-eternity in a wise fashion wherein each thing is created at the appropriate time. Ibn Taymiyya also states that Ghazālī’s proposal falls into the hands of those who would claim that a reason no longer need exist to explain the world’s creation, which would lead to denial of God Who created it.50 In addition, this notion of preponderance for no reason ultimately attributes a greater degree of deficiency to God, i.e. arbitrariness— Exalted is God above being arbitrary—even if it was proposed so as to preserve the Divine will and freedom against the philosophers. This will be discussed in further detail in a subsequent section.

Ibn Taymiyya also addresses, within Chapter One of this book, Ghazālī’s suggestion in Minhāj al-ʿābidīn that it is blameworthy for someone who is truly righteous to enter the desert with provision. Note that Ibn Jawzī (d. 597/1201) was more critical of this suggestion of Ghazālī’s when he wrote in his introduction to Minhāj al-qāsidīn:

Know that the book Iḥyā’ contains deficiencies, many of which are only known by the scholars. The least of those are the inclusion of fabricated ḥadīths and traditions attributed to the Prophet when they are instead statements [of the Companions]… It also encourages entry into the desert without provision, amongst many other errors which I have exposed in my book entitled Talbīs Iblīs.51

Obviously, the Qur’ān and Sunna do not encourage the righteous to enter the desert without provision. Certainly, revelation does not include such behavior amongst the characteristics of the righteous, nor does revelation criticize those who take provisions on their journey. Not even the Prophets nor the truly faithful are defined as not taking provisions. Moreover, the righteous and truly faithful are characterized in revelation, in regards to sustenance, by other means, such as being equitable, easy going in buying and selling, not wasteful, and are generous; but nowhere does it say that they do not take provisions with them. The Prophet Muḥammad (may God bless him and grant him peace) and his Companions always prepared for any journey or mission they undertook; but if they ran out of food or drink, the Prophet or his Companions supplicated to God to bless and increase their food and drink. Moses and Joshua, in fact, took with them food, which they were going to eat. Moses asked Joshua, Bring us our breakfast. Verily we have found fatigue in this our journey.52

Of note, Ibn Taymiyya also directly criticised Ghazālī for numerous matters such as adopting Greek logic during most of his life,53 including many fabricated ḥadīths in his writings,54 granting mystical unveiling more than its due in achieving religious knowledge,55 advocating occasionalism, as well as his notion of preponderance for no reason. It should be said that Ibn al-Qayyim never mentions Ghazālī’s name when criticizing those notions, although he does agree with Ibn Taymiyya. Nevertheless, the point of mentioning this is not to criticize Ghazālī, but rather to illustrate that no scholar is perfect in all of his opinions—not even a Reviver (mujaddid) and Shaykh of Islam, such as Ghazālī and Ibn Taymiyya. May God reward them for all that they have done!

Finally, two concepts within Ashʿarī thought, which are related to occasionalism, will now be discussed: first, atomism; and second, the re-creation of the world. These aspects of Ashʿarī thought were also taken up and/or adapted from Muʿtazilī doctrine. Atomism was first proposed by the Muʿtazilī Abu Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (d. 227/841). Ashʿarī atomism proposes that the universe is composed of a finite (albeit massive) number of indivisible particles, i.e. atoms; and each atom is homogeneous and identical to every other atom within it. The Ashʿarī conceptualization of atoms thus differs from the modern definition of an atom, as it is currently understood to be the smallest unit of each chemical element—each element being composed of a varying number of protons, neutrons, and electrons. For instance, a hydrogen atom is composed of one proton and one electron (wherein isotopes have a different number of neutrons), while an oxygen atom has eight protons and electrons. Furthermore, we recognize now that depending on the number of hydrogen and oxygen atoms coming together that the molecule formed is either water or hydrogen peroxide, each having very different properties, natures, and effects than the other. One can extrapolate this to all the other elements of the periodic table and the massive number of molecules that are formed by their reactions.

Moreover, atoms, according to our modern understanding, can be divided beyond just protons etc. For example, protons can be divided to quarks, which are also divisible, and so on. Even if one were to say that the atoms of Ashʿarī doctrine correspond to something smaller than an atom of an element like a quark or superstring, there are many different types of the latter, and there yet remains dark matter and finally anti-matter.

Then the Ashʿarīs claim that since atoms are homogeneous, properties are only granted to them by the Divine will via “accidents”. For instance, according to their understanding, one substance is not differentiated from another due to its atoms (since they are homogeneous) but rather due to the accidents inhering within them. Moreover, the Ashʿarīs claim that these accidents are responsible for color, taste, temperature, etc.

One can now see more easily how occasionalism fits into the view of homogenous atoms, which are not endowed with differing natures. That said, just as Muʿtazilī and Ashʿarī atomism is inconsistent with reality, occasionalism is inconsistent with revelation and experience. Modern-day Ashʿarīs should recognize that their atomism is false. Not only should they abandon atomism, but they should also turn away from any conclusion that resulted from it—one being occasionalism and the other will be discussed in the next paragraph. That said, Ashʿarī atomism is better than the hylomorphism56 and eternal essences of the philosophers.

The next component of Ashʿarī thought that was derived from the Muʿtazilīs was the notion of the re-creation of the world. This began from the idea that accidents cannot last for two consecutive moments; and since substances cannot exist without accidents, God thus constantly re-creates atoms and accidents anew after annihilating them. Hence, according to Ashʿarī doctrine, the world is created, annihilated, and re-created over and over; each occurring in an unnoticeable moment of time.57

To claim that God endlessly annihilates and then re-creates this world is not based on revelation for God never mentions that He does such, nor is it consistent with reason as annihilating and then re-creating over and over again would imply frivolity (ʿabath) on His part—Exalted is God above being frivolous or incoherent! God sustains (yumsik) this world, as He (Glory be to Him) indicated in many verses.58 There is no evidence that God will annihilate this world even on the Day of Resurrection for the Holy Lord states, And they esteem not God as He hath the right to be esteemed, when the whole earth is His Handful on the Day of Resurrection, and the heavens are rolled in His Right Hand.59 In addition, the notion of accidents is not consistent with our modern understanding of matter. Therefore this similarly necessitates that the conclusion derived from it, i.e. that the world must be constantly re-created, is false. Ibn Taymiyya rejected Ashʿarī atomism and re-creation as they are not based on revelation, they contradicted reason, and they were unnecessary.

Nonetheless, whilst Ashʿarīs propose a theory of occasionalism, i.e. that God Himself is the only cause, many of them then proceed to say that God has not settled above His Throne nor does He move, because that would attribute direction to Him and entail change—this doctrine of theirs will be discussed in detail later. For now, they deny that the Causer of causes (Musabbib al-asbāb) can Himself move, although it is He alone Who causes human beings to move. Indeed, the Ashʿārī doctrine of occasionalism is inconsistent with their approach to the Divine Attributes.

Finally, if one holds that the Holy Lord is the only causer, then all events occurring in this world are attributed to Him, but this would then include all evil acts as well—God is Exalted above any evil! Even if the Ashʿarī doctrine uses the term “acquisition” (kasb) to avoid that attribution, this term must denote some degree of causal efficacy, otherwise it is meaningless, and evil inevitably becomes attributed to God (Glorious is He) in cases where humans perpetrate evil.60 And if humans are causally efficacious, whether partly, contingently or fully, occasionalism, by definition, is rejected. Indeed, in reality, God is the Creator of everything, both good and evil, but evil acts are not attributable to Him (Glorious and Exalted is He).61 Thus, the existence of evil, if one wishes to avoid attributing evil to the Holy Lord, results in another means by which to reject occasionalism.

Footnotes:

21 See Tallal M. Zeni (tr.), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawiyya on Divine Wisdom and the Problem of Evil (Cambridge: Islamic Texts Society, 2017), pp. 39-42 and 72-93.

22 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmuʿ al-fatāwā, vol. I, p. 137.

23 Ibn Taymiyya, Bayān talbīs al-Jahmiyya fī ta’sīs bidaʿihim al-kalāmiyya (Riyadh: Mujammaʿ al-Malik Fahd li-Ṭabāʿat al-Muṣḥaf al-Sharīf, 2010), vol. V, p. 250.

24 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā (Medina: Mujammaʿ al-Malik Fahd li-Ṭibāʿat al-Muṣḥaf al-Sharīf, 1995), vol. VIII, p. 70.

25 See Ibn Taymiyya, al-Jawāb al-ṣaḥīḥ li-man badda dīn al-Masīḥ, eds. ʿAlī b. Ḥasan b. Nāṣir, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Ibrāhīm al-ʿAskar and Ḥamdān b. Muḥammad al-Ḥamdān (Riyadh: Dār al-ʿĀṣima, 1999), vol. VI, pp. 396-397. I would like to thank Nazir Khan for this reference and for discussing this section on causality.  

26 This is included within Einstein’s theory of special relativity.

27 For another brief discussion on light see Tallal M. Zeni, Revival of Piety Through an Islamic Theodicy (Seattle: Kindle Direct Publishing, 2020), pp. 36-40 and 290-291.

28 Occasionalism is the belief that God has created cause and effect and attaches them together through constant conjunction according to habit or custom (ʿāda)—the causes, whether human or inanimate, are not connected nor do they result in the effect. At best, the doctrine of occasionalism holds that the cause can possibly lead to the effect.

29 Abū al-Ḥasan ʿAlī b. Ismāʿīl b. Abū Bishr Isḥāq al-Ashʿarī (d. 324/936) was born in Basra, as a descendent of the Companion Abū Mūsā al-Ashʿarī. He remained a Muʿtazilī until forty years of age when it was said he disavowed their doctrine after debating Jubbā’ī. See Zeni (tr.), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya on Divine Wisdom and the Problem of Evil, p. 95. Ashʿarī’s works include Maqālāt al-Islamiyyīn wa ikhtilāf al-muṣallīn, Kitāb al-Lumaʿ fī’l-radd ʿalā ahl al-ziyagh wa’l-bidʿa and Ibāna ʿan uṣūl al-diyāna. Of note, Ibn Taymiyya commended Ashʿarī often and stated that his theology was closer to that of Imam Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal than some Ḥanbalīs. See Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā, vol. III, p. 228, for instance.

30 Ulrich Rudolph, “Occasionalism”, in Sabine Schmidtke (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 352-355. These Muʿtazilī predecessors included Abū Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf, Ṣāliḥ b. Abī Ṣāliḥ, Aḥmad b. ʿAlī al-Shaṭawī, and Abū al-Qāsim al-Kaʿbī al-Balkhī.

31 See Aladdin M. Yaqub (tr.), Al-Ghazālī’s Moderation in Belief: al-Iqtiṣād fi al-iʿtiqād (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), pp. 90-91.

32 See Michael E. Marmura (tr.), Incoherence of the Philosophers (Provo: Brigham Young University Press, 1997), pp. 166-170.

33 See Michael E. Marmura, “Ghazālī’s Second Causal Theory in the 17th Discussion of his Tahafut”, in Parviz Morewedge (ed.), Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism (New York: Caravan Books, 1981), pp. 85-112. See also Özgür Koca, Islam, Causality, and Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), p. 62.  

34 Marmura (tr.), Incoherence of the Philosophers, p. 167.

35 Yaqub (tr.), Al-Ghazālī’s Moderation in Belief, p. 220. Also see Yaqub’s discussion in ibid., pp. 285-286, whereby he maintains that those who downplay Ghazālī’s strict occasionalism neglect passages such as this. In addition, see Aladdin M. Yaqub, “Al-Ghazālī’s View on Causality”, in Nazif Muhtaroglu (ed.), Occasionalism Revisited: New Essays from the Islamic and Western Philosophical Traditions (Abu Dhabi: Kalam Research & Media, 2017), pp. 25-27.

36 Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā, vol. VIII, p. 531.

37 Q.LVII.25 (Muḥammad Asad translation).

38 Q.XXI.80 (Yusuf Ali translation). God (Glorious is He) Himself attributes the guarding (tuḥṣinakum) to the coats of mail—He did not say uḥṣinakum or nuḥṣinakum. It is understood that these coats of mail only guard the wearer and are effective by His just will and empowerment.

39 Q.VIII.10.

40 Q.VIII.60.

41 Q.XX.50.

42 See Q.XXXIII.62 and Q.XLVIII.23. See also Q.XVII.77 and Q.XXXV.43.

43 Ibn al-Qayyim states, “If those who have weak intellects hear that the fire does not burn, water does not drown, bread does not satisfy, the sword does not cut, and that they are not effective or causative, but rather it is only the Creator who chooses and wills the occurrence of each of these effects each time, then they may have doubts [about the religion itself].” Zeni (tr.), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya on Divine Wisdom and the Problem of Evil, p. 41.

44 Q.VIII.17.

45 See Q.XXVI.63.

46 See Q.II.60.

47 See Yaqub, “Al-Ghazālī’s View on Causality”, pp. 36-37.  

48 Of note, Ibn Taymiyya affirms throughout his writings miracles (muʿjizāt) for the prophets and (karāmāt) for the saints. He also affirms that God (Glorious is He) may create through unusual means like when He created Adam without parents, created Eve from Adam’s rib, created Jesus from Mary, but that in most instances He creates in the usual manner, i.e. an infant from the father’s sperm and mother’s egg.

49 See Bukhārī 1; Muslim 1907/4927; Tirmidhī 1647; Abū Dāwūd 2201; Ibn Māja 4227; Nasā’ī 75; Aḥmad 168.

50 See Ibn Taymiyya, Majmūʿ al-fatāwā, vol. VIII, pp. 133-137, for example.

51 Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. al-Jawzī, Minhāj al-qaṣidīn wa mufīd al-ṣādiqīn, ed. Kāmil Muḥammad al-Kharrāṭ (Damascus: Dār al-Tawfīq, 2010), pp. 6-7. See also Jamāl al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. al-Jawzī, Talbīs Iblīs (Beirut: Dār al-Fikr, 2001), pp. 265-269. Ibn al-Jawzī’s dismay with some elements of Ghazālī’s Iḥyā’ ʿulūm al-dīn led him to abridge it into Minhāj al-qāṣidīn, which was further summarized by Ibn Qudāma al-Maqdisī into Mukhtaṣar Minhāj al-qāṣidīn.

52 Q.XVIII.62.

53 See Wael Hallaq, Ibn Taymiyya Against the Greek Logicians (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 111–112.

54 Ibn Taymiyya, Dar’ taʿāruḍ al-ʿaql wa’l-naql, ed. Muḥammad Rashād Sālim, (Riyadh: Jāmiʿat al-Imām Muḥammad b. Saʿūd al-Islāmiyya, 1991), vol. VII, p. 149.

55 Ibid., vol. III, p. 80–82. Of note, Ghazālī states, “The way of moderation… [is only found by] those granted success [from God], those who perceive things with illumination [from God] rather than only by transmitted reports. Then, when the mysteries of things as they truly are, are unveiled to them, they go back to the traditions and narrations, and affirm what accords with what they have witnessed with the light of certitude, and figuratively interpret what does not accord with it. As for the one who takes the cognition of these things from transmitted reports alone, he will not be able to secure a firm foothold in them or find a solid position.” See Khalid Williams (tr.), The Principles of the Creed: Book 2 of The Revival of the Religious Sciences (Louisville: Fons Vitae, 2016), p. 55.  

56 For Rāzī’s discussion of hylomorphism, see Eşraf Altaş, “Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Epistle on al-Hayūlā wa al-Ṣūrah: A Study and Editio Princeps”, in Nazariyat Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences 1/1 (November 2014), pp. 61-108 (in particular, pp. 72-85). For Rāzī’s vacillation between accepting Ashʿarī atomism then rejecting it, suspending judgment on it and finally accepting it once again, see Eşraf Altaş, “An Analysis and Editio Princeps of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Risālah: Al-Jawhar al-Fard”, in Nazariyat Journal for the History of Islamic Philosophy and Sciences 2/3 (November 2015), pp. 77-178 (in particular, pp. 100-101).

57 Of note, Ibn ʿArabī also held that God re-creates the world at each moment in time. Ibn ʿArabī (following the philosophers) also differentiated between essence and existence. For instance, the philosophers Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd claimed that the essences are uncaused and are in accordance with what they deserve, but are not determined by God (Glorious is He). Similarly, Ibn ʿArabī claims that the essences are uncaused and pre-existing within the Divine knowledge, and thereafter He bestows upon them existence (whereby “the knowledge follows the known” or the “known precedes the knowledge”). Ibn ʿArabī only adopts the term “secondary causality” for semantic reasons, i.e. to affirm the proper courtesy with God. Otherwise, this world, as Ibn ʿArabī claims, is a mirror for the Divine Names and their manifestation, and contingent entities therefore only participate in the Divine Names. Koca states accordingly, “It can thus be argued that essences are coeternal with the divine Self as [uncaused] objects of the divine knowledge.” See Koca, Islam, Causality, and Freedom, pp. 55-58, 95-98, and 116-134, whereby the quote is on p. 57. Ibn Taymiyya, as expected, rejects Ibn ʿArabī’s notion of eternal essences as well as his monism. See, for instance, Alexander D. Knysh, Ibn ʿArabi in the Later Islamic Tradition: The Making of a Polemical Image in Medieval Islam (New York: SUNY Press, 1998), pp. 100-108.

58 See Q.XXXV.41; Q.XXII.65; and Q.XVI.79.

59 Q.XXXIX.67.

60 Of note, the Ashʿarī Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī eventually abandoned the kasb theory of acquisition, and “endorsed unequivocally” compulsion or fatalism (jabr). See Anjum, Politics, Law, and Community in Islamic Thought, p. 193. Ibn al-Qayyim was very critical of Rāzī for that—see Zeni (tr.), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya on Divine Wisdom and the Problem of Evil, pp. 34-35.

61 See Zeni (tr.), Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya on Divine Wisdom and the Problem of Evil, pp. 19-24, 186, 201, and 205.