The Problem with Mohammed Hijab’s “Najdi Fork”

Mohammed Hijab recently proposed what he calls the “Najdi Fork.” The argument is straightforward enough: Salafis should admit that if Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab were “teleported” into the twenty-first century, he would make takfir of virtually all contemporary Muslim states. Consequently, Salafis are allegedly left with only two options: either affirm such takfir or repudiate Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab himself.

The problem with this argument is that it rests upon a speculative and highly contestable premise. It assumes that we possess sufficient knowledge to confidently predict how an eighteenth-century scholar would navigate a radically transformed political, military, legal, and social order. We do not.

Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab lived in a world bearing little resemblance to our own. He did not inhabit an international order characterized by sovereign nation-states, constitutions, multinational treaties, international financial institutions, global trade networks, and organizations such as the United Nations. He did not face modern military realities in which attempts at revolutionary change may result not merely in localized conflict, but in devastating civil wars, drone strikes, foreign intervention, economic sanctions, and the destruction of entire societies. Would Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab have regarded these factors as relevant considerations? We simply do not know with absolute certainty.

One could plausibly argue that he might have considered questions of ability (qudrah), incapacity (’ajz), coercive pressures, overwhelming external constraints, and the fear of greater harms. He may have distinguished between a ruler who willingly abandons divine legislation despite possessing the practical ability to govern otherwise, and a ruler operating within a global order that severely constrains what can realistically be implemented without inviting catastrophic consequences.

Likewise, he may have considered the attitudes and preparedness of populations themselves. Modern Muslim societies have been shaped by generations of secular education, nationalist ideologies, and legal systems inherited from colonial administrations or international agreements. Whether Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab would have viewed such conditions as mitigating circumstances is not known with certainty. Whether he would have advocated gradual reform, patient da’wah, political accommodation, migration, or confrontation is equally not known with certainty.

Of course, Hijab may respond that Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab simply would not have cared about such considerations. He may argue that his writings suggest a disposition more akin to contemporary extremist movements that exhibit little concern for consequences, capability, or geopolitical realities. But this response merely exposes the weakness of the fork itself.

For Hijab’s dilemma to succeed, it is not enough to say that Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab might have made takfir of modern Muslim states. Rather, the force of the dilemma depends upon establishing that he would have done so with sufficient certainty to compel contemporary Salafis into choosing between endorsing his presumed judgments or condemning him. That burden has not been met.

Indeed, the difficulty with Hijab’s thought experiment becomes even more apparent when one broadens it beyond Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab. Suppose someone were to ask: If Abu Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him) were transported into the twenty-first century, would he wage war against Muslim citizens who refuse to pay zakah to the government in the same manner that he fought the apostates and zakah-withholders in the aftermath of the Prophet’s death? Would he regard contemporary states as analogous to the nascent polity of Madinah? Would he assess modern military capabilities, international repercussions, and the likelihood of catastrophic civil conflict differently?

Likewise, if one were to transport the great jurists and theologians of the past into our age, we would be hard-pressed to predict with confidence how they would apply their rulings concerning offensive jihad, takfir, treaty obligations, political authority, and public welfare amidst a world characterized by nation-states, global institutions, weapons of unprecedented destructive capacity, and deeply interconnected economies. The principles they espoused may remain the same, but the application of those principles to novel circumstances often depends upon factual judgments, assessments of capability, competing harms and benefits, and considerations that differ substantially from those encountered in their own eras.

This point is particularly significant because many contemporary Salafis themselves invoke concepts such as ability, incapacity, fear of greater harms, and maslahah when discussing modern governance. Whether Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab would have accepted these arguments, rejected them, or reformulated them is precisely the issue under dispute. Yet Hijab’s fork presumes the answer in advance.

The point, therefore, is not to claim that Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, Abu Bakr (may Allah be pleased with him), or any other historical figure, would necessarily have ‘moderated’ their positions. Nor is it to insist that Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab would have excused contemporary Muslim states. Rather, it is to emphasize the limits of our knowledge. We know what these figures said and did within the contexts in which they lived. We do not possess the epistemic access required to confidently declare how they would have adjudicated realities they never encountered.

Hijab’s argument amounts to a speculative counterfactual prediction. Consequently, the so-called “Najdi Fork” fails to function as a genuine dilemma. It asks Salafis to affirm or reject conclusions derived not from the actual statements of Shaykh Muhammad b. Abd al-Wahhab, but from a speculative reconstruction of how he supposedly would have judged realities he never encountered. Such counterfactual exercises may make for provocative rhetoric, but they cannot bear the weight of the conclusions Hijab wishes to draw from them.

Recommended Reading:

Shaykh Muhammad b. Abdul Wahhab Discourse