Understanding the General Statements of the Salaf and Reconciling Them with Their Practical Applications

Below is a translation of Ustadh Alaa’ Hasan’s article, al-Qawā‘id al-uṣūliyya li-fahm iṭlāqāt al-salaf wa-al-tawfīq baynahā wa-bayna taṭbīqātihim al-‘amaliyya.

Introduction:

Engaging with the righteous Salaf’s statements is among the most significant matters raised in the context of studying Islamic thought—particularly regarding the subjects of takfīr, tabdī‘, and the legal rulings associated with them. This is due to its close connection with passing judgment on individuals and communities as having deviated from the religion, which carries grave consequences on both the individual and collective levels. Muslim scholars—foremost among them the righteous Salaf—approached this matter with extreme caution, relying on clear legal foundations and firmly established scholarly principles to avoid falling into the pitfalls of excess or negligence.

The challenge lies in understanding the statements and positions of the Salaf within their various contexts and in discerning the methodology they employed in formulating rulings. This also entails the crucial task of distinguishing between general expressions and restricted applications.

Due to the extensive debate surrounding these matters, the Salaf Center for Research and Studies has deemed it necessary to produce scholarly work on this topic. It is an obligation to establish a foundational understanding of the Salaf’s general declarations and to ground them in the principles of Islamic legal theory by reconciling their statements with their practical implementations—where a form of contradiction appears to emerge, or, more precisely, a form of apparent contradiction by specification. This must be done through a sound understanding of the Salaf’s discourse in accordance with uṣūlī principles and through a clear grasp of their objectives and the outcomes of their rulings. It also requires harmonizing their general statements with their practical applications across various contexts, considering the accompanying indicators found in the actions of the Salaf themselves.

This discussion will be addressed through two main sections:

First Section: The legal-theoretical principles (qawā‘id uṣūliyya) for understanding the general statements of the Salaf.

Second Section: Examples of the practical applications of the Salaf.

Before delving into the main subject, it is necessary to point out one of the most important characteristics of the discourse of the Salaf: their use of generality, absoluteness, and broad generalizations, even when the intent of specification and restriction is apparent, as well as their avoidance of excessive and contrived detail. This was noted by Ibn Taymiyya, who explained that the Salaf spoke in eloquent Arabic and followed the methodology of the Qur’ān in its use of generality. As for detailed classification, intricate theoretical distinctions, and the codification of such matters, these only emerged after the virtuous generations, to organize the disciplines of knowledge.

Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya states: “Among the most eloquent and excellent forms of speech is the use of general and absolute expressions when the intent of specification and restriction is evident. This is the method employed in the discourse found in the Qur’ān and the Sunnah, as well as in the words of the scholars—in fact, in all eloquent speech and indeed in the speech of all nations. For addressing every issue with all of its conditions and stipulations amounts to pedantry, affectation, a departure from the norms of clear expression, and a distraction from the intended meaning.”[1]

First Section: The Legal-Theoretical Principles for Understanding the General Statements of the Salaf

1. Reconciling their positions within a single domain to understand the nature of generality and restriction:

Reconciling the actions and statements of the Salaf within a single area of jurisprudence is achieved by bringing together the various reports, harmonizing and synthesizing them, and weighing between those that appear contradictory. One must not suffice with a single or even two statements, even if they were uttered by the majority among them. A statement may have been made as a preventive measure relevant to their time, based on the principle of blocking the means (sadd al-dharā’i‘), considerations of public interest (maṣlaḥa), or according to a customary practice they had agreed upon, among other reasons.

Shaykh al-Islām states: “Deriving the legal positions of jurists solely from their general statements—without referring to how they themselves explained their words or what their principles entail—leads to reprehensible conclusions.”[2]

Some extremists have claimed that reconciling general statements with detailed ones applies only to revelation, not to the words of scholars. This claim is problematic. Indeed, if a reconciliation is forced and lacks supporting evidence, it is invalid. However, suppose a scholar has clarified his intent in another context. In that case, it is negligent to attribute a position to him without gathering his statements on the subject as a whole.

In this regard, Shaykh al-Islām states: “Among the gravest forms of negligence is to attribute error to a speaker when it is possible to interpret his words correctly and in accordance with the finest patterns of human expression—yet one of two seemingly conflicting passages is dismissed as erroneous without proper justification.”[3]

Ibn al-Wazīr al-Yamānī said: “Likewise, whenever something has been reliably transmitted from a Muslim, and it can bear two meanings—one praiseworthy and one blameworthy—it should be interpreted according to the praiseworthy and commendable meaning.”[4]

Ibn al-Qayyim states: “A single statement may be uttered by two individuals—one intending by it the pure truth, and the other intending the gravest falsehood. What truly matters is the person’s conduct, methodology, what he calls to, and what he defends in argument.”[5]

An example of this is the majority of the Salaf—including Imām Aḥmad and others—prohibiting the use of the phrase that the Qur’ān is muḥdath or ḥādith (created or originated) due to its potential implication of the Kullābī position that the individual instances of divine speech are eternal. Yet, we find al-Bukhārī allowing some flexibility in expressing Allah’s speech in terms of ḥudūth, stating: “And His ḥadath is not like the ḥadath of the created beings.”[6]

By reconciling the statements of the Salaf and considering their other texts affirming Allah’s voluntary actions, we understand that the statements of Imām Aḥmad and others were preemptive in nature or due to the expression’s association with the Mu‘tazilite position.

Whoever understands the issue properly will be able to resolve many of the doubts raised in this field and will not fall into the pitfalls of takfīr or tabdī‘ by rigidly clinging to the statements of the majority of the ḥadīth scholars.

In summary, this is an example of the kind of legal-theoretical and theological reasoning that Shaykh al-Islām applied to the words of the Salaf—reconciling and harmonizing their statements within a single area of discourse rather than becoming fixated on a single phrase without considering its proper qualifications and context.

In contrast, some Islamic sects have taken one part of the Salaf’s discourse while neglecting the other. The Kullābiyya and the Mutakallimun among the Ḥanbalīs clung to the apparent meanings of certain statements of the Salaf, from which they inferred the eternity of the instances of speech while ignoring the words of al-Bukhārī and others. On the other hand, the Ash‘arīs held tightly to al-Bukhārī’s statement that the Qur’ān is temporal (muḥdath), mistakenly assuming that he agreed with them on the createdness of the uttered words of the Qur’ān while disregarding the statements of the rest.

Sound investigation requires understanding all the statements of the Salaf within a single, comprehensive framework.

2. Identifying the Effective Cause (‘illah) and Rationale (manāṭ) Behind a General Statement:

Since, as previously noted, one of the hallmarks of the Salaf’s discourse is their tendency to speak in general terms without specification—following the norms of Arabic usage—it is essential for the researcher to recognize that their speech was often articulated in terms of what was predominant. The Salaf frequently had unstated qualifications that they did not explicitly express, though such restrictions might become evident in particular cases during practical application.

Thus, it is necessary to determine the cause or condition that led a given scholar to issue a general statement rather than accepting the statement in an absolute sense without careful discernment.

Ibn Taymiyya says: “So if you see an imām who has strongly condemned someone for making a certain statement or even declared him a disbeliever for it, this is not to be taken as a general ruling for everyone who utters that statement—unless the condition is fulfilled that warrants such severity or takfīr in that specific instance.”[7]

An example is the general condemnation by the Salaf of tajahhum (Jahmism) upon those who rejected a narration related to the divine attributes—such as the report from Mujāhid regarding Allah seating someone, for instance. This was a description of the condition of the Jahmiyya in their time: rejecting such a narration was a hallmark of Jahmī doctrine. The operative rationale (manāṭ) was the rejection based on a theological principle of negation—an invalid foundational belief. However, suppose someone weakens a report about the attributes based purely on ḥadīth-related grounds. In that case, the cause or rationale intended by the Salaf’s general statement does not apply to him.

Another example of failing to identify the ‘illah correctly is the practice of many extremists who declare anyone who affirms the createdness of the Qur’ān to be a disbeliever (takfīr of the individual) without considering whether the proof has been established. This is because they have not understood the ‘illah behind the Salaf’s takfīr. The real cause was the implications entailed by affirming the createdness of the Qur’ān—namely, denying the attribute of speech for Allah, Exalted is He. The Jahmiyya claimed that the Qur’ān was created because they believed Allah does not speak, and they interpreted Allah’s speech to Mūsā as Allah creating sounds for him to hear. This constitutes a denial of the explicit wording of the Qur’ān.

This view necessitates the belief that some of Allah’s attributes are created, that Allah is incapable of speech, and thus attributes deficiency to Allah, Exalted is He. When the Jahmiyya openly declared that the Qur’ān was created, the Salaf recognized what they intended by this and thus declared them disbelievers.

As for the one who says, “The Qur’ān is created,” but is unaware of these implications, then although he has fallen into a grave innovation, he is not to be deemed a disbeliever until the proof is established against him.

When the student of knowledge distinguishes the ‘illah behind the Salaf’s general declarations, it becomes easier for him to understand the ruling within its proper context and then to comprehend its application across different scenarios—for a ruling is contingent upon its ‘illah, existing when it exists and absent when it does not.

3. Taking into Account the Historical Context and Circumstances in Which a Statement Was Made:

This consideration involves two key aspects that the researcher must be mindful of:

A. Recognizing that a general statement may have been issued for a specific interest (maṣlaḥa), as a means of blocking harmful outcomes (sadd al-dharā’i‘), or due to a particular legal context:

· For example, the intent may have been to deter people from adopting a certain view:

Al-Mu‘allimī al-Yamānī explains the Salaf’s severity toward certain statements by saying: “It may be that the aim was to advise the people so that they would not fall into that matter—since the one who initially made such a statement may have had an excuse, but there was a fear that others would follow him in it without any valid excuse.”[8]

– Or it may have been intended as a means of blocking the path that leads to innovation (sadd al-dharī‘a):

For example, their statement: “Whoever says that the Qur’ān is muḥdath (originated) is a Jahmī,” was said to cut off the root of innovation. Or their statement: “Whoever says, ‘My recitation of the Qur’ān is created,’ is a Jahmī,” since this leads to the claim that the Qur’ān itself is created. The one making such statements sought to eliminate the source of deviation.

Al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Dhahabī said: “Imām Aḥmad, may Allah be pleased with him, did this to cut off the root of innovation. Otherwise, the recited is the speech of Allah, and the act of reciting it is from our own doing.”[9] Further clarification of this will follow in the examples.

B. Recognizing that Ahl al-Sunnah held dominance during the era of the Salaf:

This dominance entailed two important consequences:

1. Their statements were issued when the Sunnah was manifest and clearly established. As a result, the proof was, in most cases, evident to those who opposed it, and thus, rulings were applied based on what was predominant.

2. The one who opposed them did so with full awareness that he was contradicting the consensus of the Muslims. Such a person was regarded as being openly defiant. The condition of someone who deviated while surrounded by scholars such as Mālik, al-Shāfi‘ī, Aḥmad, Sufyān, and others—who were united on the same foundational beliefs—differs entirely from that of someone who lives in an era when innovations have spread and become entrenched among the scholars of the Muslim community.

In conclusion, the true manāṭ behind the Salaf’s general statements concerning takfīr or their severity in denouncing certain views lies in the clarity and manifest nature of the proof for the one who opposes it, along with his awareness that he is going against the consensus of the Muslims. If such clarity and awareness are not present in a particular time or place, then the ‘illah does not apply, and thus the ruling cannot be extended to that context.

Ibn Taymiyya states: “If the Mutakallimun among the Jahmiyya and others say, ‘Whoever opposes that which is known by necessity in the religion is a disbeliever,’ it is said to them: For this reason, the Salaf and the leading imāms were unanimously agreed on the takfīr of the Jahmiyya at a time when their contradiction of the Messenger was widely known and necessarily recognized by the general body of Muslims. But the matter became more complex when knowledge of īmān later diminished, and some aspects became unclear to many who were not heretics.”[10]

Ibn Taymiyya also said: “The ruling upon those in places where the light of prophethood has diminished is not the same as the ruling upon one who, in error, denies what the Prophet brought due to the signs of prophethood being obscure to him—as it would be in those places and times where the signs of prophethood were manifest.”[11]

He also states: “As time passed, what had once been clear became obscure to many people, and what had once been evident became subtle to them. Thus, among the later generations, opposition to the Qur’ān and Sunnah increased in ways that were not found among the Salaf. Yet despite this, they may be mujtahids who are excused—Allah forgives their mistakes and rewards them for their ijtihād. Some of them may attain rewards equivalent to fifty men performing the same deed from earlier times, because the early ones had support in their actions, while these later individuals found no one to assist them.”[12]

Second Section: Examples of the Practical Applications of the Salaf

– Rejecting the Testimony of Ahl al-Ahwā’ (People of Desires) According to Aḥmad: Between Theoretical Affirmation and Practical Application:

‘Abd Allah ibn Aḥmad said: “I heard Muḥammad ibn Yaḥyā ibn Sa‘īd al-Qaṭṭān say: When Mu‘ādh ibn Mu‘ādh was appointed as judge over Baṣra, he refused to accept the testimony of the Qadariyya. Then my father and Khālid ibn al-Ḥārith spoke to him and said: You know the people of this city! So, it seems that he later showed some leniency.”[13]

It is evident that Imām Aḥmad considered the surrounding environment and upbringing when he said, “You know the people of this city,”—meaning that this city (Baṣra) had a distinct context compared to other regions in the Muslim world during their time. Its people were raised on such views, often following trustworthy scholars, and the matter was ambiguous to them.

This is supported by what Imām Aḥmad said about Abū Qaṭn ‘Amr ibn al-Haytham al-Baṣrī: “There was nothing wrong with him.” One day, when he narrated from him, a man said, “After returning from you in Baṣra, he began to speak about Qadar and debate over it.” Aḥmad replied: “We narrate from the Qadariyya. If you were to examine the people of Baṣra, you would find that a third of them are Qadariyya.”[14]

This reasoning may be applied analogously to later scholars who fell into the errors of the Ash‘arīs—considering their environment and upbringing and the fact that the proof had not been made manifest to them. In fact, the case is even stronger for the later generations since many of them believed that their view was the very stance of Ahl al-Sunnah.

– Takfīr of the Jahmiyya: Between General Declaration and Practical Application

An example of this is ‘Alī ibn al-Ja‘d, one of the most well-known imāms among the ḥadīth transmitters. He held some views associated with the Jahmiyya and also inclined toward Shī‘ism.

Al-Dhahabī said: “Muḥammad ibn Ḥammād al-Muqri’ said: I asked Yaḥyā ibn Ma‘īn about ‘Alī ibn al-Ja‘d, and he replied: ‘Trustworthy, highly reliable—trustworthy, highly reliable.’ I said: ‘What about what he said [i.e., of deviation]?’ He replied: ‘What was it that he said? He is trustworthy, highly reliable.’ And Muslim said of him: ‘He is trustworthy, but he is a Jahmī.’
I [al-Dhahabī] say: For this reason, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal forbade his sons from hearing ḥadīth from him. Some groups among the ḥadīth scholars were excessively rigid regarding those who had even a minor slip that contradicted the Sunnah. Otherwise, ‘Alī was a great imām, a reliable authority. It is said that he fasted every other day for sixty years. And it is sufficient that Ibn ‘Adī said in his al-Kāmil: ‘I found no objectionable ḥadīths in his narrations when reported by trustworthy transmitters.’”[15]

Some contemporary extremists have argued that his student, ‘Abdūs ibn Muḥammad al-Naysābūrī, denied that ‘Alī ibn al-Ja‘d held Jahmī views. This is a misrepresentation. The point of contention is not whether tajahhum was definitively established in his case or not; rather, the point is that those among the ḥadīth scholars who attributed tajahhum to him still declared him trustworthy and narrated from him. It is well-known in the science of ḥadīth that it is impermissible to narrate from a disbeliever, and it is not allowed to declare a disbeliever reliable (thiqa).

Whether these imāms were correct or mistaken in attributing tajahhum to him is not the crux of the matter. The decisive point is that they did not declare him a disbeliever despite, in their view, his association with Jahmī beliefs—based on their own assessment. This is clear evidence that not everyone who adopts the innovations of the Jahmiyya was necessarily deemed a disbeliever by them.

Al-Dhahabī said: “He was narrated from by al-Bukhārī, Abū Dāwūd, Yaḥyā ibn Ma‘īn, Khalaf ibn Sālim, Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal—though only a little—Aḥmad ibn Ibrāhīm al-Dawrāqī, al-Za‘farānī, Abū Ḥātim, and Abū Zur‘ah,” and he mentioned a group of others.[16]

Even those who refrained from narrating from him, such as Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal, did so because of his innovation—not due to any accusation of disbelief—and there is no statement reported from him declaring ‘Alī ibn al-Ja‘d a disbeliever. On the contrary, the majority narrated from him, as noted previously in the words of al-Dhahabī.

– The Salaf’s Prohibition of Entering into the Debate on Lafẓ: Between Theoretical Affirmation and Practical Application

Al-Ḥāfiẓ al-Dhahabī transmitted the statement of ‘Abd Allah ibn Aḥmad: “My father disliked discussing the matter of lafẓ in any way, or for it to be said: [the Qur’ān is] created or uncreated.” Then al-Dhahabī commented: “Imām Aḥmad, may Allah be pleased with him, did this to block the means to innovation. Otherwise, what is expressed is the speech of Allah, and the act of expressing it is from our own doing.”[17]

He also stated: “There is no doubt that what al-Karābīsī introduced and formulated regarding the issue of utterance—that it is created—is true. However, Imām Aḥmad rejected it so that it would not serve as a pretext for asserting the createdness of the Qur’ān, and so he closed that door. For one cannot separate the act of uttering from the uttered—that is, the speech of Allah—except in the realm of thought.”[18]

In the previous passage, al-Dhahabī clarified that Imām Aḥmad’s strong prohibition against delving into the issue of lafẓ was to block the means—so that it would not lead to affirming the createdness of the uttered words of the Qur’ān.

Al-Dhahabī’s approach was based on applying the principles of reconciliation (jam‘) and preference (tarjīḥ), harmonizing the various positions and practices of Aḥmad and the Salaf—such as al-Bukhārī—in a single domain. There are indeed statements from Aḥmad that justify and support this kind of reconciliation.

Ibrāhīm ibn Isḥāq al-Ḥarbī said: “I was sitting with Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal when a man came to him and said, ‘O Abū ‘Abd Allah, there are people among us who say that their utterances of the Qur’ān are created.’ Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal replied: ‘The servant turns to Allah with the Qur’ān in five ways, all of which are uncreated: memorization in the heart, recitation with the tongue, hearing with the ears, seeing with the eyes, and writing with the hand. The heart is created, but what is memorized is uncreated. The recitation is created, but what is recited is uncreated. The vision is created, but what is seen is uncreated.’”[19]

This detailed clarification from Imām Aḥmad explains the general and interest-based (maṣlaḥī) phrases he had previously used—particularly during the emergence of the lafẓiyya controversy.

– Takfīr of a Doctrine: Between Theoretical Affirmation and Practical Application

Qiwām al-Sunnah al-Aṣbahānī said:

“The senior scholars of Ahl al-Ḥadīth made general declarations of takfīr against the Qadariyya and declared as disbelievers those who said that the Qur’ān is created. Yet a group of scholars have said: We may make such statements about something as a form of representation, but we do not judge the reality of the matter as such when it comes to detailed examination.”[20]

In this passage, al-Aṣbahānī clarifies that the Salaf’s declarations of takfīr were sometimes conditional or restricted. This is what Ibn Taymiyya described as the distinction between general (iṭlāq) and specific (ta‘yin) takfīr—since generality is a hallmark of the Salaf’s speech, as previously explained. In contrast, specification involves exceptions made for particular cases.

Al-Aṣbahānī explains this more clearly, saying:

“The one who interprets erroneously (al-muʾawwilu idhā akhṭaʾa) and is among those firmly committed to the bond of faith is to have his interpretation examined. If his interpretation is based on something that leads to opposition to any part of the Book of Allah, or a Sunnah that is definitive and leaves no room for excuse, or a consensus, then he is deemed a disbeliever and is not excused. This is because the doubt he relies upon is weak and insufficient to provide an excuse—since anything that is supported by one of these foundational sources is marked by utmost clarity and manifest evidence.

Therefore, when a person who holds such a view is not hindered in accessing the truth, and the point of proof is not obscure to him, he is not excused for failing to follow the truth. Instead, his opposition is deemed obstinacy and persistence in falsehood.

However, suppose someone deliberately opposes a foundational principle but is ignorant and did not intend it out of defiance. In that case, he is not deemed a disbeliever—because he neither intended to choose disbelief nor was content with it. He exerted his effort, but nothing else occurred to him. And Allah, Exalted is He, has informed us that He does not hold anyone accountable except after clarification, nor does He punish except after warning, as He said: {And Allah would not let a people go astray after He has guided them until He makes clear to them what they should avoid} [al-Tawbah: 115].”[21]

This is supported by the statement of Ibn Abī ‘Āṣim:

“The Qur’ān is the speech of Allah, Blessed and Exalted, He spoke it, and it is not created. Whoever says it is created—after the proof has been established against him—is a disbeliever in Allah the Almighty. But whoever says it before the proof has been established against him, then there is nothing upon him.”[22]

It is well known that Ibn Abī ‘Āṣim was one of the leading imāms of the Salaf and a contemporary of al-Bukhārī and others.

All of the preceding aligns with the affirmations of Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya, who emphasized the distinction between the disbelief of a statement (kufr al-maqāla) and the disbelief of the one who says it (kufr al-qāʾil). Indeed, specific conditions must be fulfilled and impediments must be absent before issuing a ruling upon an individual—while maintaining certainty about the innovated or even heretical nature of the statement itself.

Ibn Taymiyya said:

“We affirm the general statements found in the texts of divine promise and threat, and in declarations of takfīr and tafsīq, but we do not judge a specific individual to fall under those general statements until the necessary conditions are met and no valid impediment remains.”[23]

He recounts his own experience during his ordeal, saying:

“I used to explain to them that what was transmitted to them from the Salaf and the imāms—regarding the general takfīr of those who say such and such—is indeed correct. However, it is necessary to distinguish between general declarations and individual application.”[24]

He also states:

“So if you see an imām who has spoken harshly about someone’s statement or declared him a disbeliever for it, this should not be understood as a universal judgment upon everyone who utters that statement—except if the condition is fulfilled that justifies such severity and takfīr in that specific case.”[25]

Within this framework, the general declarations of the imāms concerning heretical doctrines and their proponents are to be understood as clarifications and warnings—not as necessary rulings upon every individual who falls into such views.

– The Salaf’s Condemnation of Rational Argumentation: Between Theoretical Affirmation and Practical Application

Imām Aḥmad said: “We used to command silence, but when we were called to a matter, we had no choice but to respond and to clarify it in a way that refutes what they claimed.” He then supported this by citing the verse: {And argue with them in a way that is best} [al-Naḥl: 125].[26]

The ḥanbalī jurist and uṣūlī scholar Ibn Mufliḥ said:

“The correct view in the madhhab is that the science of kalām is legislated and commanded. It is permissible to engage in debate and argument with the people of innovation and write books to refute them. This was the view of the leading verifiers, such as al-Qāḍī [Abū Ya‘lā] and al-Tamīmī among a group of verifying scholars. They supported this position—not even needing an explicit statement attributed to anyone—by citing the statement of Imām Aḥmad, as narrated by al-Marwudhī: ‘If one busies himself with fasting and prayer and withdraws, remaining silent about the people of innovation, then that fasting and prayer are for his own benefit. But if he speaks, then that is for his benefit and the benefit of others—thus, speaking is better.’

Imām Aḥmad—may Allah have mercy on him and be pleased with him—authored a book in refutation of the heretics and Qadariyya regarding the ambiguous verses of the Qur’ān and other issues. In it, he argued using rational evidences. This book was transmitted by his son ‘Abd Allah and mentioned by al-Khallāl in his work.

What the earlier scholars relied upon from Aḥmad’s statements [against kalām] is abrogated. Aḥmad said in the narration of Ḥanbal: ‘We used to command silence, but when we were called to a matter, we had no choice but to respond and to clarify it in a way that refutes what they claimed.’”[27]

In the previous passage, Ibn Mufliḥ interprets Imām Aḥmad’s prohibition of engaging in kalām-based disputation as abrogated—which is one of the recognized methods of reconciliation (jamʿ) when apparent contradictions arise, as previously discussed.

Ibn Mufliḥ’s interpretation is based on two key points:

1. The presence of a contradiction between Aḥmad’s earlier statements forbidding engagement in kalām and his later authorship of the Refutation of the Jahmiyya, a treatise filled with rational arguments. This necessitates a reconciliation between the two positions.

2. A clear and explicit statement from Imām Aḥmad himself declares that he was compelled to engage in such discourse due to the emergence of tribulation—thus justifying his shift in approach.

Ibn Ḥamdān, Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya, and Imām al-Buhūtī did not view the matter as one of abrogation (naskh). Rather, they held that reconciliation (jamʿ) between the two positions is possible. They interpreted the prohibition as referring specifically to the kalām of Mutakallimun—discourse built on corrupt rational foundations—not to rational argumentation that is sound and supported by the Qur’ān and Sunnah.

Al-Buhūtī said:

“Ibn Ḥamdān said: The blameworthy ‘ilm al-kalām is the discussion of the fundamentals of religion (uṣūl al-dīn) using pure reason or reasoning that contradicts the clear, authentic transmitted texts. But if one discusses it using only textual evidence or both textual and rational proofs that agree with one another, then this is the true uṣūl al-dīn and the methodology of Ahl al-Sunnah. This is the meaning of the words of Shaykh Taqī al-Dīn [Ibn Taymiyya]…

I [al-Buhūtī] say: The words of Ibn Ḥamdān function as a reconciliation between the two positions, and reconciliation is preferable to abrogation. The narration from al-Marudhī further supports this view.”[28]

– The Salaf’s Practice of Boycotting Innovators: Between Theoretical Affirmation and Practical Application

Shaykh al-Albānī, may Allah have mercy on him, said regarding the boycotting of innovators:

“What I see—Allah knows best—is that the statements of the Salaf were made in a Salafī environment, meaning an atmosphere filled with piety, faith, and correct adherence to the Prophet ﷺ and the Companions. It is exactly like a Muslim boycotting another Muslim as a means of discipline and education—this is a well-known Sunnah. But in my opinion—and I’ve been asked this many times, I say: Our time is unsuitable for boycotting. Therefore, our time is unsuitable for boycotting innovators because that would mean you have to live on the top of a mountain! To isolate yourself from people and cut yourself off from them!

When you boycott people for their sins or innovations, it does not produce the effect that was once expected at the time when those early scholars made such statements and urged people to avoid the people of innovation.”[29]

From the preceding passage, it becomes clear that Shaykh al-Albānī employed two key principles:

1. Understanding the historical context and reality in which the Salaf’s statements were made, recognizing that Ahl al-Sunnah held dominance during their time, and that innovators were a small minority within the Ummah.

2. The jurisprudence of objectives and consequences (fiqh al-maqāṣid wa al-ma'ālāt), by understanding that the primary purpose of boycotting was disciplinary—serving as a deterrent to urge a return to the truth. If this rationale no longer applies in a time when innovators dominate, then the statements of the Salaf should not be applied rigidly to such a context.

Supporting Shaykh al-Albānī’s view is the fact that Imām Aḥmad himself considered the maṣlaḥa shar‘iyya (legally recognized interest) in his dealings with the people of Khurāsān, permitting them to show outward friendliness to the Jahmiyya, as they were not strong enough to stand against them.

It is reported in Masāʾil al-Imām Aḥmad wa-Isḥāq that Isḥāq al-Kawsaj asked Imām Aḥmad, may Allah have mercy on him, saying:

“What do you say about the one who says: ‘The Qur’ān is created’?”
He replied: “Attach to him every affliction.”
I said: “Is he to be called a disbeliever?”
He replied: “Yes, by Allah—every evil and every calamity is with them.”
I asked: “Should enmity be shown toward them, or may one be courteous with them?”
He said: “The people of Khurāsān are not strong enough to stand against them—so it is as if courtesies are permitted.”[30]

Shaykh al-Islām Ibn Taymiyya said:

“It is reported in the Masāʾil of Isḥāq ibn Manṣūr—and al-Khallāl mentioned it in Kitāb al-Sunnah under the chapter on avoiding those who say the Qur’ān is created—that Isḥāq said to Abū ‘Abd Allah [Aḥmad ibn Ḥanbal]: ‘What about the one who says the Qur’ān is created?’ He replied: ‘Attach to him every affliction.’ I said: ‘Should enmity be shown to them, or should one be courteous with them?’ He said: ‘The people of Khurāsān are not strong enough to stand against them.’

This response—together with his statement on the Qadariyya: ‘If we were to abandon narrating from the Qadariyya, we would have to abandon narrating from most of the people of Baṣra’—and with what he practiced during the miḥna (inquisition), of repelling harm with what is best and addressing them with proofs—explains what is found in his words and actions regarding boycotting them, and forbidding sitting or speaking with them. He sometimes boycotted prominent individuals and ordered them to be boycotted for a particular type of tajahhum (leaning toward Jahmism).

Indeed, hijra (boycotting) is a form of ta‘zīr (disciplinary punishment), and punishment itself is a kind of hijra, which consists of abandoning sinful acts. The Prophet ﷺ said: ‘The muhājir is the one who abandons sins,’ and he said: ‘Whoever abandons what Allah has prohibited.’ This is the hijra of piety.

As for the hijra of discipline and jihad, it includes the case of the three who stayed behind [from Tabūk], and the Prophet ﷺ ordered the Muslims to boycott them until they were forgiven.”[31]

Ibn Taymiyya also said:

“This form of boycotting (hajr) differs depending on the strength or weakness of those doing the boycotting and their numbers—whether they are few or many. The objective behind it is to deter and discipline the one being boycotted and to cause the general public to turn away from adopting his condition.

If the benefit in doing so outweighs the harm—such that the boycott leads to a weakening and concealment of the evil—then it is prescribed. But if neither the one being boycotted nor others are deterred by it, and instead, the evil increases and the one doing the boycotting is weak so that the harm outweighs the benefit, then boycotting is not legislated. In such cases, winning hearts over (ta’līf) may be more beneficial than boycotting.

And for some people, boycotting is more beneficial than winning them over. For this reason, the Prophet ﷺ used to win over some people and boycott others. The three who were left behind [from Tabūk] were better than many whose hearts were being won over because the latter were leaders obeyed by their tribes, and the religious interest lay in winning them over. But the three were believers, and believers besides them were many—so in boycotting them there was honor for the religion and purification for their sins.

This is just like how the prescribed approach with enemies may vary: sometimes it is to fight them, sometimes to make a truce, and sometimes to take jizya from them—all of it depending on circumstances and the benefits involved.”[32]

Shaykh Ibn ʿUthaymīn, may Allah have mercy on him, said:

“The correct opinion is that hajr (boycotting) is neither obligatory, recommended, nor even permissible—except when a clear benefit is achieved. If there is a benefit, then we boycott; otherwise, we do not. This is because hajr is either a form of treatment (dawāʾ) or a form of disciplinary punishment (taʿzīr). If it is due to an ongoing sin, then it is a remedy; if it is due to a sin that has passed and ended, then it is disciplinary.

It is, therefore, impermissible to boycott one’s believing brother unless the sin reaches the level of disbelief. The evidence for this is the many general texts indicating the rights of a Muslim upon his fellow Muslim. A believer does not exit the fold of īmān merely due to sin or disobedience, according to Ahl al-Sunnah wa al-Jamāʿah.

For this reason, the basic ruling is the prohibition of boycotting believers, even if they commit sins or do so openly—because they are believers. The Prophet ﷺ said: ‘The right of a Muslim upon a Muslim are six.’ Among them: ‘If you meet him, greet him with salām.’ He said: ‘The right of the Muslim,’ and did not say: ‘The right of the believer,’ because Islām is broader than īmān.

However, if there is a benefit in boycotting, then it may be either recommended or obligatory—depending on the nature of the benefit and the gravity of the sin.”[33]

Conclusion:

It becomes clear that the methodology of the Salaf in dealing with matters of creed—particularly in the issue of takfīr—is grounded in a deep understanding of the Arabic language and the foundational principles of religion. The righteous Salaf were exceptionally cautious in not rushing to issue rulings without verifying that the necessary conditions were met and the valid impediments removed.

Our examination of their conduct and views shows how they combined firm adherence to sound creed with flexibility in application when dealing with individuals and communities. This affirms the importance of following their balanced methodology—one that unites the textual sources with their proper contextual understanding. Such an approach strengthens correct comprehension and safeguards against misinterpretation and the improper application of legal rulings.

Recommended Reading:

How Do We Understand the Salaf’s Statements Regarding Ahlul Bid’ah?

Would the Salaf Have Made Takfeer of Ash’aris?

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[1] Tanbīh al-rajul al-‘āqil (1/349).

[2] al-Ṣārim al-maslūl ‘alá shātim al-rasūl (p. 201).

[3] Majmū‘ al-fatāwá (31/114).

[4] al-‘Awāṣim wal-qawāṣim (5/13).

[5] Madārij al-Sālikīn (3/409).

[6] See: Fatḥ al-bārī sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī (13/505).

[7] Majmū‘ al-fatāwá (6/61).

[8] al-Tankīl limā fī Ta’nīb al-Kawtharī min al-abāṭīl (1/55).

[9] al-‘Ulū lil-‘Aliyy al-Ghaffār (p. 193).

[10] Bayān talbīs al-jahmiyya (2/74).

[11] Bughyat al-murtād – al-Sab‘īniyya (p. 311).

[12] Majmū‘ al-fatāwá (13/64).

[13] al-‘Ilal wa-ma‘rifat al-rijāl (2/360).

[14] See: Tārīkh Baghdād (12/200).

[15] Siyar a‘lām al-nubalāʾ (10/460).

[16] Siyar a‘lām al-nubalāʾ (12/80).

[17] al-‘Ulū lil-‘Aliyy al-Ghaffār (p. 193).

[18] Siyar a‘lām al-nubalāʾ (12/80).

[19] Risāla fī anna al-Qur’ān ghayr makhlūq (p. 31).

[20] al-Ḥujja fī bayān al-maḥajja (2/552).

[21] al-Ḥujja fī bayān al-maḥajja (2/552).

[22] al-Sunna (p. 263).

[23] Majmū‘ al-fatāwá (28/501).

[24] Majmū‘ al-fatāwá (3/231).

[25] Majmū‘ al-fatāwá (6/61).

[26] See: Naqḍ al-Dārmī ‘alá al-Marīsī (1/538); al-Sunna by al-Khallāl (5/134).

[27] al-Ādāb al-shar‘iyya (1/206–207).

[28] Kashshāf al-qinā‘ (7/8).

[29] Silsilat al-hudá wal-nūr, tape no. 666.

[30] Masā’il al-Imām Aḥmad wa-Isḥāq (2/565).

[31] Majmū‘ al-fatāwá (28/210).

[32] Majmū‘ al-fatāwá (28/206).

[33] al-Sharḥ al-mumti‘ (12/324).